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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the key (institutional, regulatory, external and specific) 
determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria. The study adopted a mix of the 
following qualitative research methods: in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, 
direct observations and case studies, to conduct a survey of corporate governance 
specialists in Nigeria, with sufficient capacity mix and diverse disciplinary and functional 
backgrounds. The study provides in-depth discussions with regards to the definitive 
motive of corporate governance and further demonstrates that developing countries face 
peculiar corporate governance challenges. The author shows how this peculiarity is 
contingent on certain national and firm-specific institutional environments. Furthermore, 
whilst there have been recent advocacy at implementing good corporate governance in 
Nigeria, as a means to re-shape the perceived negative institutional configurations, the 
author presents a case of institutional maintenance, where changes at the industry level 
are unable to change the self-reinforcing institutional landscape. As a result, whilst 
encouraging a deeper and less normative discourse, the author exposes possible 
challenges in transferring and enacting uniform corporate governance practices across 
different institutional contexts.  
 
Upon this institutionalist background, the thesis further looks exhaustively into the 
subject of corporate governance regulation in Nigeria (including the role of government), 
and shows that countries will have to position their regulatory systems to tackle the 
particular challenges they face. Furthermore, given that the African business 
infrastructure cannot be separated from past and present external influences, the author 
provides a cross-examination of the impact and influences of external governance 
mechanisms and forces on Nigeria. Discussions here have specific relevance for the 
literature on corporate governance in the USA, the UK, Japan, China and India. Also, the 
author examines the impact of the varying dimensions of global (as posed, but Anglo-
Saxon in principle and character) institutional initiatives, with regards to cross national 
corporate governance monitoring and development, on Nigeria. Lastly, guided by the 
ultimate need to promote good corporate governance in developing countries, the author 
identifies nine specific drivers of good corporate governance in developing countries, 
whilst taking into account the afore-mentioned determinants. It is anticipated that this 
thesis augments the budding literature on corporate governance in developing countries, 
with secondary contributions to the broad literature on comparative corporate governance 
studies and comparative institutionalism, and presenting implications, not only to the 
academy but, to the business sector and the polity of developing market economies. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND FOCUS: WHY A NIGERIAN CASE 
STUDY? 
Current global economic crisis has reiterated the importance of good corporate 
governance to the world economy and humanity as a whole. Indeed, the central role of 
the modern corporation in any nation’s economy is an indication that good corporate 
governance is imperative to the economic wellbeing of both developed and developing 
countries. However, the corporate governance literature is yet to reflect this considerably. 
Despite budding evidence of prospects for a very promising future, a quick literature 
search on corporate governance in sub Saharan Africa would reveal a huge comparative 
lacuna, which has made scholarly knowledge of the subject in such developing countries 
feeble. Thus, with deep insights from a multi-theoretical and practical scrutiny of the 
subject in one of Africa’s most important financial markets - Nigeria, it is anticipated that 
this thesis augments the literature on developing countries whilst drawing out significant 
implications for comparative corporate governance studies.  
 
What are the key determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria? In an attempt 
to answer this question, the author specifically explores the institutional, regulatory, 
external and specific determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria. Given that 
weak governance in both private and public sectors has contributed immensely to the 
endemic corruption, poor state of economic development and poverty in the African 
continent, the cavernous lacuna of literature on corporate governance in developing 
countries calls for increased attention. Indeed while corporate governance discussions 
may be said to have attained some degree of “maturity” in developed nations, the subject 
is still at its infancy in the developing world, even though good corporate governance is 
clearly imperative to the survival and global competitiveness of African corporations in 
today’s ever challenging business climate.  
 
So, why Nigeria? What is particularly important about this country and why is it a good 
laboratory for this doctoral research on the determinants of good corporate governance, 
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particularly in sub Saharan Africa? The notable cavity of literature on corporate 
governance in Africa, no doubt, provides an opportunity for profound and novel works.  
With this in mind, Nigeria presents a good case study for empirical investigations. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the author’s motivation to augment the budding literature 
on corporate governance in sub Saharan Africa, the choice of Nigeria is not arbitrary. On 
one hand, recent and current developments in the country have added an energetic 
momentum to the burgeoning corporate governance debate (Wallace 1987; Yahaya 1998; 
Okike 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007; Oyejide and Soyibo 2001; Yakasai 2001; Ahunwan 2002; 
Nmehielle and Nwauche 2004; Sanda, Mikailu and Garba 2005; Bolodeoku, 2006, 2008; 
Ajogwu 2007; Adegbite and Nakajima 2009; Adegbite, Amao and Amaeshi 2009). These 
include the 2003 Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria; the 2006 mandatory Code of 
Corporate Governance for Nigerian Banks post consolidation; the 2007 Code of Conduct 
for Shareholder Associations in Nigeria; and notable/high profile corporate governance 
scandals. Indeed widespread corrupt corporate behaviour as exemplified by ongoing 
corporate disasters as well as near-disasters particularly in the country’s financial sector, 
has brought to the fore the imperativeness of effective governance and accountability in 
modern day Nigerian corporations. Notably these have brought corporate governance 
discussions to the pinnacle of academic, practice and policy debates in Nigeria. As a 
result, while South Africa may be the leading contributor (Vaughn and Ryan 2006), 
corporate governance developments in Nigeria are becoming increasingly notable in the 
African corporate governance literature.   
 
More importantly, with regards to the research questions of this study (as discussed later 
in this Chapter), the embryonic institutionalised corporate governance system in Nigeria 
presents a rich platform from which to examine the institutional, regulatory, external and 
specific parameters which shape the evolution, construction, expectation and expression 
of corporate governance, particularly in developing countries. Nigeria’s institutional 
arrangements particularly provide a profound basis to investigate the barriers to effective 
corporate governance and accountability in developing Africa. Nigeria further presents a 
good case study, not only because it is at the fore-front of rigorous corporate governance 
research in the African continent, but largely because of her economic and political 
13 
 
powers in Africa. Particularly, one would expect many poorer African countries to 
continue to look up to the rather less popularly acclaimed “giant of Africa”. 
 
Consequently, while the focus is on Nigeria, discussions have significant theoretical 
implications and contributions with regards to both Anglo-Saxon1 and comparative 
corporate governance research.  This thesis encourages a deeper discourse of the subject, 
challenging established Anglo-Saxon theoretical postulates with regards to their 
applicability in developing countries. It particularly points out some translational 
challenges, and suggests more caution, in the diffusion of corporate governance practices 
across different institutional environments.  In this regard, it identifies the limitations of 
the agency theory in solely (and sufficiently) explaining the corporate governance 
dimension in developing sub-Saharan Africa. Particularly, this thesis brings insights from 
a case of a developing country to highlight the benefits of the theoretical bedrock of this 
thesis – institutional theory – in complementing the principal/agent model of the agency 
theory in cross national corporate governance research. It further creates an 
understanding of the institutional embeddedness of corporate governance and explores 
the self-reinforcing powers of institutions as vibrant shaping factors for national systems 
of corporate governance. It is anticipated that this thesis makes contributions to the field 
of international corporate governance research, particularly as it further draws on 
comparative cross-examinations of the corporate governance systems of developing, 
transitional and developed economies. There is also a secondary contribution to the broad 
literature on comparative institutionalism and comparative management, respectively. 
 
1.1 RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
To begin with, there is no doubt that the corporate governance literature originated and 
remains dominated by Anglo-Shareholder theoretical constructions and assumptions 
which were founded on the premise that there must be a mechanism in place to minimise 
agency conflicts and costs, and to align the interests of firms’ managers with their 
owners. Traditionally this has been seen as crucial to reducing managerial self-serving 
tendencies, which can arise in a situation where a firm’s ownership is separated from its 
                                                   
1 The term Anglo-Saxon is used throughout this thesis to broadly represent the UK and the US  
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control - a common feature of the modern corporation. However, the financial 
economics’ favoured spectacles of the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 
and Jensen 1983) do not take into account the institutional effects on corporate 
governance. This thesis analyses the relevance of key institutions in a corporate 
governance system, in the context of developing countries, and in particular, Nigeria. It 
specifically investigates the extent to which Nigeria’s major institutional underpinnings, 
at the firm, industry and country levels, complement good corporate governance.  
 
Furthermore, what happens when important institutional environments are 
uncomplimentary with good corporate governance but rather incubates and promotes bad 
corporate behaviour, making corporate law enforcement and self-regulatory initiatives 
remain in idealism? Also, what stimulates good corporate governance when relevant 
market pressures such as shareholder activism, market for corporate mergers and 
takeovers, and pressures from institutional investors are either absent, non-vibrant or 
corrupt? Furthermore, in a situation where there are limited market incentives to 
encourage compliance with self-regulatory initiatives, will significant governmental 
involvement drive the promotion of good governance principles and practices in Nigerian 
corporations? It is worth noting that in line with the desperation of the Federal 
Government of Africa’s most populous country to attract foreign direct investments 
(FDI) through good corporate governance, the state has been recently prominent in the 
affairs of corporations. What, therefore, is (and should be) the role of the state in 
corporate governance? This research further explores and scrutinises the role of the 
Nigerian government in corporate governance. It analyses how the Nigerian government 
should go about achieving responsible behaviours in corporations without having them 
laden with undue regulations. Here, the author does not only probe deeply into a 
relatively less researched field, but scrutinises the role of the Nigerian government by 
examining the effectiveness of its regulatory policies in ensuring a good and competitive 
corporate governance system, even as the country faces a global competition for 
investments. This scrutiny of corporate governance regulation expressly examines the 
philosophy, structure, machinery and conduct of corporate governance regulation in 
Nigeria, including the statutory and self-regulatory mechanisms in place to guide 
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corporate conduct and instil good behaviour. The author further develops a wider 
perspective of the regulatory framework of corporate governance by offering comparative 
analyses which draw on insights from the corporate governance regulatory structures and 
practices of various other countries. A case study of corporate governance regulation in 
the Nigerian banking industry, which is the country’s most regulated sector, is also 
incorporated. This facilitates a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Nigerian corporate governance regime. 
 
At this point, it is important to note that in the development of corporate governance 
structures, practices and regulatory initiatives especially in developing countries, there 
have been a lot of inputs and borrowed principles from other jurisdictions. In many cases 
these inputs and principles have engulfed indigenous practices and ideologies about the 
meaning and function of the corporate character. As a result, a study of corporate 
governance in developing countries would be significantly incomplete and defective 
without a thorough investigation and subsequent account of past and current external 
influences and interferences.  In this thesis, the author further analyses the influences of 
external governance systems on Nigeria. The author specifically examines the influence 
of the Shareholder and Stakeholder models on the ideology, construction, structures and 
practices of corporate governance in Nigeria. To what extent can a “global template” for 
good corporate governance be achieved? To what extent is there evidence of Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance imposition on developing countries? 
 
This theoretically well-grounded and comprehensive scrutiny of the institutional, 
regulatory and external determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria facilitates 
our understanding of the evolution and present state of the subject in the country. It 
further identifies the peculiar challenges inherent in corporate Africa, the applicability of 
widely-accepted theories, and the danger of “taken for granted assumptions”. Upon these 
considerations, the author is subsequently able to highlight the specific determinants of 
good corporate governance at the firm level. This thesis assumes readers’ superficial 
knowledge of corporate governance in developing countries particularly Nigeria. The 
author therefore presents a comprehensive survey which further constitutes a useful 
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outlook towards understanding corporate governance in other developing countries. 
Following this overview, the rest of the introduction proceeds with a background to the 
study and concise introductions to the key research themes explored. The research 
agenda, objectives and questions are also discussed. This chapter ends with an overall 
structure of this thesis. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO STUDY  
The last two decades have marked an exponential and extensive growth in corporate 
governance research.  While the USA and the UK can be referred to as countries where 
the subject has been well established and very popular, increasing interest in the subject 
is evident across other countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. The dynamism and 
importance of the subject have attracted discussants ranging from academics across 
various disciplines, practitioners, policy makers to the entire public. However recent 
happenings in the corporate world have also contributed to the rapid development of the 
subject. In recent times, most academic literature, media reports and other stakeholders’ 
summits on corporate governance have begun by citing the collapse of once seventh 
largest company in America. The Enron scandal has acted as an energetic catalyst to the 
recent scrutiny of corporate governance due to the enormity of its impact. The scandals at 
Parmalat, Adelphia, Conrad Black and WorldCom have also added momentum to the 
debate at different times. More importantly, they have enriched discussions on the 
subject, especially in the area of regulation, and as a result, raising serious concerns for 
policy makers.  
 
The Enron scandal and other recent corporate misdeeds and questionable business 
practices have undermined investors’ confidence in the capital markets; notable business 
leaders, high-ranking senior managers and high profile auditing firms have been labelled 
thieves, some jailed and these have impacted on the public’s faith in corporations. No 
doubt, stakeholders have demanded that business practices be ameliorated. These 
developments have resulted in significant investments in corporate governance guidelines 
and rules such as Sarbanes Oxley in the USA and revisions to the UK Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance. However, current global economic crisis fuelled by substantial 
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irresponsible and risky behaviour by corporate managers and directors does little to 
suggest that the massive investments in corporate governance reforms and regulation 
have yielded much good. 
 
Nigeria has had her share of corporate scandals; Cadbury Nigeria accounting scandal of 
2007; the Halliburton scandal of 2008; and the Siemens bribery scandal of 2009; are 
recent examples. However, whilst the aforementioned 2003 Code of Corporate 
Governance and subsequent codes represent major developments in the country’s 
corporate governance regulatory infrastructure, these developments have been unable to 
prevent these scandals. Notably also, the recent resuscitation of the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange and the subsequent escalation in the volume of daily trading activities have 
further brought to the fore the need to ensure that mechanisms are in place to ensure 
honesty and transparency in the custody of investors’ wealth. There has also been a 
renewed governmental desire to attract more domestic and foreign investments in order to 
strengthen the country’s economy.   Thus major governmental policies and initiatives 
have since developed to promote transparency in corporate financial disclosure, 
encourage board’s accountability and independence, and check managerial and board 
corruption.  
 
In strengthening corporate governance and promoting good behaviour in the Nigerian 
private sector, discussions will have to reflect a broader horizon of institutional effects 
which enables us to understand the rationale and underlying machinery upon which 
business conduct and governance structures and practices are developed, nurtured and 
sustained. Consequently, a subsequent and detailed scrutiny of the regulatory 
infrastructure and the external determinants shaping the Nigerian corporate governance 
landscape creates a strategic position from which the specific drivers of good corporate 
governance can be identified. Before the introduction of these key themes, it is essential 
to briefly address some of the concerns which relate to the general relevance of corporate 
governance research and discourse. For example, do we really have to bother about 
corporate governance? 
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1.3 DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTER?  
“The proper governance of companies will become as crucial to the world economy as 
the proper governing of countries”  
 
   James Wolfensohn, Former President of the World Bank, (CACG 1999).   
 
It was earlier mentioned that the subject of corporate governance has benefited from an 
enormous scholarly attention in recent times. However what is deeply lacking in the 
literature is a definitive motive behind these discussions. Why is corporate governance 
important? The author calls for a multi-theoretical and multi-disciplinary scrutiny of the 
corporate governance motive and agenda. This is vital to the survival and 
continued/future relevance of the already vast literature. It is worth noting that scholars 
have studied corporate governance less as a planned, systematic inquiry, but more as a 
response to observed problems in corporations which has resulted in the subject evolving 
as an aggregate of disparate studies without collective coherence (Murphy and Topyan 
2005). Furthermore, whilst the recent scandals have enabled the rapid development of the 
subject, they could also account for some of the unresolved/never-to-be resolved 
conceptual disparities associated with it. Four decades ago, it would have been unlikely 
to anticipate that the subject would come to occupy such dominance on scholarly minds, 
notwithstanding its multi-disciplinary allure. However, in preparing for a stimulating and 
new knowledge-creating environment for future research, scholarly repository may 
benefit from unifications in reasoning, and lessening of disciplinary conflicts. 
 
But why should we strive to achieve these? Is Adam Smith’s invisible hand not 
applicable to the conduct of corporate players, who should create public good by acting 
dependently and independently in the pursuit of personal benefits? Does the operation of 
today’s market forces fail to instil good governance in corporations? Why do we bother 
about corporate governance? Does corporate governance matter at all? There are limited 
evidence in the literature to suggest that scholars have exhaustively attempted to address 
these questions, rather the literature keeps maturing on a platform filled with silent 
doubts. Notably, however, scholars as well as other non-academic discussants 
overwhelmingly assume that the motive and relevance of the corporate governance 
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subject are apparent. The normative undertone which trails this assumption centres on the 
belief that corporate governance is crucial to shareholders’ protection (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997; Chi and Scott Lee 2010), wealth creation (Healey 2003; Gill, Vijay and Jha 
2009), firm performance (O’Sullivan 2003; Sueyoshi, Goto and Omi 2010) corporate 
accountability (Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram and Walsh 2000) and/or wider stakeholder 
interests (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Solomon 2004). However, to what extent are we 
convinced by available empirical and conceptual evidence? Are these interests actually 
being protected by corporate governance?  
  
1.4 WHAT THEN IS GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? 
The lack of clarity of the goals and concerns of corporate governance does not only cast 
doubts on the relevance of the subject but has also distorted scholarly interpretation and 
approach to the term “good corporate governance”. While corporate governance has no 
doubt benefited from considerable attention from the numerous stakeholders of today’s 
corporations, startlingly however, there remains no universally accepted definition 
despite numerous academic discourses on the subject. Indeed, while there are notable and 
exhaustive definitions in the literature, it is important to note at this juncture that it is 
unlikely for any one definition to fully describe the complex relationships within the 
realm of corporate governance, and to achieve universal acceptance.   
 
However, definitions of corporate governance have traditionally differed theoretically 
along two major standpoints. The Anglo-Saxon economics and finance literature put 
shareholder primacy at the core of corporate governance and strive to ensure that there 
are mechanisms in place to align the interests of firms’ managers with their shareholders 
so as to reduce managers’ self-serving behavioural tendencies. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the traditional German and Japanese stakeholder models take a broader look at 
the firm and consider the legitimate interests of other firms’ stakeholders with a view to 
providing a long-term sustainable value for all stakeholders. Certainly understanding the 
philosophy and rudiments of good corporate governance would therefore require a less 
normative approach to the subject but one with clearer perspectives. This is essentially 
what this thesis offers, particularly as the discussions in Chapter 2 will indicate.  
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1.5 THE RELEVANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN CORPORATE  
      GOVERNANCE RESEARCH  
From the preceding discussions, one can deduce that it has become generally accepted 
that corporate governance discussions originated from the agency problem (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976), created by the separation of a firm’s ownership from its control. Indeed, 
the study of corporate governance has traditionally been within the framework of agency 
theory, with the “corporation” viewed as a nexus of contracts between principals 
(shareholders) and agents (managers), where mechanisms must be in place to align the 
interests of both parties (Aguilera and Jackson 2003). Corporate governance thus 
becomes the ways through which shareholders can assure themselves of getting maximal 
returns on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Whilst there have been recent 
efforts towards the embeddedness framing of governance and opportunism in order to 
ensure a cross-nationally accommodating theory of agency (Lubatkin et al. 2005, 2007), 
conventional agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976) does not 
accommodate the institutional effects on corporate governance. 
 
Institutions matter in corporate governance. Aguilera and Jackson (2003) noted that 
agency problems can be dealt with in different ways, for example, through dispersed 
ownership, markets for corporate control and contractual incentives in the UK and US, 
and through fewer market-oriented approaches to disclosure, weaker managerial 
incentives, and greater supply of debt in continental Europe and Japan. They therefore 
argue that the agency theory is unable to fully account for cross-country differences 
because it does not take into account the influence of institutions on corporate 
governance. Certainly comparative corporate governance scholars would agree that the 
diversity of national corporate governance ideologies, systems and practices is such that 
one might begin to wonder if we are still discussing the same subject. This diversity has 
been obscured by the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon’s corporate governance dogmas and 
theories in the literature. Worse still, a considerable amount of comparative national 
corporate governance studies have only been descriptive, failing to convincingly provide 
explanations for the differences across countries. This is because certain institutional 
configurations have not been fully accounted for.  
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Institutional theory focuses on the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure, 
considering the processes by which structures (schemas, rules, norms, and routines) 
become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour (Scott 2004). The 
behaviour of firms as well as the structure and responsibilities of stakeholders are deeply 
entrenched in the social values they uphold and their cultural, social, political, legal and 
economic environments. It is thus important that corporate governance discussions reflect 
a broader perspective of institutional domains (Aoki 2001). However while there is a 
growing knowledge that institutions shape corporate governance, much of the discussions 
in this area have been based on comparative evidence from studies of the UK and the US 
on one hand, and China and Japan as well as transitional economies such as Russia, on 
the other. From the lens of institutional theory, this argument is strengthened by 
examining the relevance of institutional theory in shaping the governance ideology, 
structure and practices of corporate Nigeria, thus contributing to the literature by 
providing important insights based on evidence from a developing country. 
 
Similar to the corporate governance literature, contemporary institutional theory has 
indeed attracted a wide range of scholars across the social sciences, thus providing 
opportunities for exchange and cross-fertilisation of ideas, which have facilitated the use 
of the theory to deeply examine business systems ranging from micro interpersonal 
interactions to macro global frameworks (Scott 2004). Recognizing the institutional 
effects on corporate governance will therefore enable us to understand why certain 
governance mechanisms are more effective in some jurisdictions while they do not 
appear to work in others, and why certain governance challenges are characteristic of 
some environments.  
 
In making generalisations about corporate governance systems around the world, scholars 
need to be cautious, as certain traditional and institutional mechanisms have already 
created firm bedrocks of informal/self regulation which makes subsequent regulatory 
initiatives effective in certain market economies such as the UK, while these structures 
are either not present or are just emerging in most developing economies (Nakajima 
1999). Therefore, in conceptualizing the dynamics of business relationships and corporate 
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governance, especially in developing economies, it is important to understand and 
account for certain firm-level and country-level institutional effects which constitute 
vibrant forces which shape the behaviour of managers and board directors, the level of 
investors’ participation, the role of the state, as well as the degree of effectiveness of 
regulatory initiatives.  In this thesis, the author accounts for certain national and firm-
specific institutional effects in the case of Nigeria and investigate the extent to which they 
are complimentary with good corporate governance principles and practices. 
Furthermore, whilst there have been recent advocacy at implementing good corporate 
governance in Nigeria as a means to re-shape the negative institutional configurations, 
the author investigates the extent of deinstitutionalisation and institutional change. As a 
result, the author explores a possible case of institutional maintenance, where regulatory 
reforms at the industry level are unable to change the self-reinforcing institutional 
landscape. Upon this institutionalist background, the other three key themes of this 
research are explored. 
 
1.6 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION AND THE ROLE OF  
      GOVERNMENT  
Current global economic crisis has led to calls for increased regulation as an alternative to 
the “over-liberated” freedom of modern capitalism. Indeed many economists see 
regulation solely as a response to market failure (Ogus 1994). Most times, regulations are 
in place to prevent perceived/detected wrongdoings from reoccurring. Regulations can 
thus be described as sustained and focused controls exercised by a public or overseeing 
agency over activities that are valued by a particular community (Selznick 1985). 
Regulation can either be voluntary by virtue of association with a non-legally binding 
institution or a governmental order having the force of law. In both cases, the aim is to 
govern behaviour. Notably, until the 1970s, when commentators began to criticise the 
traditional “command and control” form of regulation as being over-intrusive, regulators 
were seen as experts who controlled private sector behaviour with the interest of the 
public at heart (Baldwin 2000). By the 1990s, less-restrictive forms of regulation that 
encouraged self-regulatory practices began to gain preference. In all, it must be noted that 
firms can be seen as profit-seekers that would comply with regulations only if the legal 
23 
 
penalties for non-compliance exceeds the costs of compliance, or when there are 
substantial incentives to comply (Corneliussen 2004).  
 
Indeed, corporate governance is not normally seen as a “regulated” activity (Dewing and 
Russell 2004), at least in terms of strictness and enforcement. Given that corporations are 
private institutions, should they be burdened with regulation in the first place?  As a 
result, self-regulation has been traditionally prominent in the operation of securities 
markets (Coglianese, Thomas, Elizabeth, and Michael 2004). Self-regulation is a 
voluntary mechanism.  It can be described as any regulatory regime which has been 
developed, funded and exclusively enforced by industry (Maaseen 2003). Corporate self-
regulatory bodies have thus played a traditional role in monitoring both corporate 
behaviour and the conduct of professionals (such as accountants, auditors, lawyers 
amongst others) involved in corporate matters. Are the self-regulatory mechanisms in 
place in Nigeria efficient?  Will government’s intervention in corporate governance mean 
the failure of self-regulatory institutions?  What is the role of government in corporate 
governance? 
 
In the wake of the Enron scandal, doubts (both globally and locally) have been cast on 
the efficiency of self-regulatory institutions to curb corporate malpractices and safeguard 
against the loss of investors’ money. Although corporate governance reforms are not 
new, there have been so many reforms, around the world, within the last six years that 
have sought to address several issues on different aspects of the subject. While the 
governments of most countries have not been totally passive with regards to these 
developments, most of the reforms, until very recently after the Enron case, have been 
championed by self regulatory organisations and stock exchange authorities.  
Indeed regulating corporate governance is thorny. Globalisation is on the increase; 
protected markets are being opened up and one can argue that the stock market remains 
the most efficient means to provide funds for businesses in many countries. These 
developments require proper monitoring with adequate control measures in place to 
ensure corporate integrity, which continues to be questioned by scandals. Many states 
have now developed their own corporate governance guidance, and for many others they 
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must comply with major codes of conduct in order to do business. However, discussants 
in favour of regulation have reckoned that the status quo is no longer acceptable and that 
it will take more than just corporate leadership to restore public confidence in the capital 
markets and ensure their vitality2; they have called for government’s action in the form of 
reformed regulatory systems, improved auditing, and enhanced law enforcement 
(Coglianese et al. 2004).  
 
Part of the premise of this thesis is the recognition that the role of government is very 
important as well as highly delicate. Indeed, the Nigerian corporate governance 
regulatory framework is faced by numerous challenges. These challenges have their roots 
in corruption coupled with the poor state of development in the country. In Nigeria, as in 
many other developing countries, firms have somewhat conventionally been less 
encouraged to adopt good corporate governance principles, thus leaving investors 
(particularly minority shareholders) without adequate protection. The 2004 World Bank’s 
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) in the Nigerian accounting 
and auditing practice revealed enormous institutional weaknesses in regulation, 
compliance, and enforcement. But why are the regulatory institutions weak? Widespread 
corruption following several political turbulences coupled with massive institutional 
shortcomings. Indeed the situation in Nigeria may not be not a matter of “lack of laws”, 
but that of the institutional capacity to ensure enforcement. Thus there is a clear need to 
assess the effectiveness of government’s policies in ensuring that there exists a robust, yet 
flexible and competitive regulatory mechanism to promote good corporate conduct.  
 
Thus, it is worth reinstating that the federal government of Nigeria has been recently 
prominent in the governance of corporations in order to enhance the country’s 
competitiveness for investments and avoid the reoccurrence of the aforementioned 
Cadbury, Unilever and related scandals.  However this study explores ways in which 
public policy responses can be strategically formulated to ensure corporate vitality and 
prevent market failures. This is because an over- proactive/radical governmental policy 
                                                   
2 Corporate vitality relates to the overall well-being of corporations. It encompasses their long-term 
financial profitability and growth. 
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approach simply as an overreaction to corporate scandals could seriously limit the 
flexibility and competitiveness of corporations. Therefore, to what extent is the Nigerian 
government’s regulatory response well measured to avoid excessive regulatory burden. 
Also, is there a need for the government to balance pressures from foreign investors to 
adopt “global standards” and the desire to attract those investments with the need to 
foster indigenous competitiveness? As the following section discusses, the author 
(specifically in Chapter 7) looks into the extent to which advocates of global standards 
are pushing the standards in their own countries covertly through the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD). 
 
1.7 THE EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF GOOD CORPORATE  
      GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA  
Considering the thesis’s overall aim of identifying the key parameters of good corporate 
governance in Nigeria, it is important to examine some influences from external 
corporate governance systems. Indeed there is limited evidence in the literature of 
comprehensive studies which specifically examine the influence of a country’s corporate 
governance system on that of another although comparative studies are common. This 
thesis further provides an extensive review of the impact and influences of external 
governance systems on Nigeria. It reviews the influences of the Anglo-Saxon 
(Shareholder) and Japanese or Continental European (Stakeholder) corporate governance 
models on the ideology, structure and practices of corporate governance in Nigeria. It 
considers the influences of these two dominant governance models through case studies 
of the UK, Japan, China and India given their specific relevancies and connections with 
Nigeria. Let us start with the UK influence. Nigeria, as a former British colony, has 
inherited the British corporate governance system. The UK has traditionally influenced 
the development of corporate governance structures and practices in Nigeria, as in the 
case of her other former colonies. Furthermore, to what extent does the UK, posited as a 
globally recognised voice in corporate governance innovations, assert any present 
authority and influence on Nigeria?  
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In particular, it is important to note that the London Stock Exchange (LSE) houses about 
24 percent of foreign-owned firms and plays host to many of the world’s cross-border 
securities trades and management (Clark 2002). Furthermore, Aguilera (2005) argue that 
the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and the accountancy profession have always 
been pace-setters in corporate governance innovations. She also noted that the UK 
operates under a common law system with strong protection for minority shareholders. 
These two factors further allow corporate governance within the UK, and essentially 
within the LSE, to have a great influence on the rest of the industrialised world (Aguilera 
2005). Given that less industrialised nations themselves particularly some African 
countries such as Nigeria were former British colonies where the foundations of their 
company law and regulation lie, the study examines the degree to which the influence of 
the UK corporate governance system extends beyond the industrialised world. Viewing 
the UK as a global corporate governance innovator, any UK regulation, code of conduct 
and/or listing standard could become a “model of best practice” particularly for the 
countries of origin of the companies listed on the LSE (Aguilera 2005). Furthermore as 
Nigerian banks have begun what appears would be a strong presence on the LSE in few 
years to come3, it has become important to account for the UK’s influence on the system 
of corporate governance in Nigeria. To what extent will the UK’s comply or explain 
principle work in Nigeria? To what extent are corporate governance structures and 
practices being mimicked? 
 
On the other hand, the dominant ideology of the Nigerian people and the country’s 
cultural settings appears to be tilted towards the stakeholder model of corporate 
governance. Indeed, whilst the conceptual configuration of corporate governance and 
accountability in Nigeria has been influenced by several other theories associated with 
the subject, a strong cultural notion in the country - that corporations should be 
accountable to the wider society - finds an expression in the stakeholder hypothesis (see 
also Yakasai 2001).4 The author thus considers the influence of the stakeholder model on 
                                                   
3 Guarantee Trust Bank, Nigeria Plc and Diamond Bank, Nigeria Plc, both Nigerian banks, have recently 
become listed on the LSE. GT Bank issued global depositary receipts (GDR) while Diamond Bank was 
listed on the Professional Securities Market (PSM) 
4 These discussions are developed further in Chapters 4 and 7. 
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Nigeria using Japan, China and India as reference points. It must be noted that these 
countries have recently focussed on investing aggressively in Nigeria, especially in the 
country’s oil sector (Bala 2003; Hanson 2008; Ajayi 2009). Thus, to what extent will this 
amount to the pushing of their own governance standards in other to secure their 
investments and cater for their oil dependent economic future? The prospects of these are 
investigated in this thesis. Indeed to what extent can these traditionally/predominantly 
stakeholder countries promote good corporate governance in Nigeria? To what degree are 
the corporate governance practices in these countries worthy of emulation? If there are 
influences of the stakeholder and shareholder approaches to corporate governance in 
Nigeria, to what extent does the country constitute a fertile ground for a hybrid corporate 
governance system to emerge? Indeed, to what extent can a truly hybrid corporate 
governance system develop amidst strong regulatory advocacy for the “preferred” 
shareholder model? 
 
Indeed, the debate on the convergence or divergence of national systems of corporate 
governance has stemmed from research on comparative corporate governance. But are we 
talking of convergence or conforming to the Anglo-Saxon model? This question further 
brings critical questions to mind. For example, why should any country adopt 
international best practises?  What impact does the push for global standards have on 
Nigeria? What are the projected and actual roles of the OECD, IMF and World Bank in 
promoting good corporate governance? To what degree can governance mechanisms be 
exported? To what extent are the external influences on corporate governance in Nigeria 
culminating to promote better corporate behaviour? How effective are local institutional 
initiatives in ensuring good corporate governance? To what extent are external influences 
and local initiatives conflicting in terms of corporate governance development and 
monitoring in sub Saharan Africa? What are the specific Nigerian institutionalised 
limitations to the adoption of “globally recognised principles of corporate governance”? 
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1.8 WHAT DRIVES GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE FIRM 
       LEVEL?  
Since the aim of this thesis is to explore, understand and identify the determinants of 
good corporate governance in Nigeria, the study further examined the specific drivers of 
good corporate governance at the firm level. This provides a rich and internal/firm level 
perspective to complement the discussions on the climate of corporate governance in the 
country. On the basis of the institutional, regulatory and external determinants, this thesis 
further generates a rich and practical discourse on how to specifically improve corporate 
governance practices in developing countries. Here, attempts were made to add practical 
perspectives to facilitate an encompassing discourse on the determinants of good 
corporate governance in Nigeria. 
 
1.9 RESEARCH STATEMENT  
By harnessing the above described research themes which this research has explored, the 
thesis seeks to make precise theoretical contributions just as it significantly augments the 
literature on corporate governance in sub-Saharan Africa, which suffers from dearth. It 
must be reinstated that whilst there are increasing interests in the corporate governance 
subject across the globe, corporate governance discussions in Africa can still be 
comparatively referred to as “premature” with the possible exception of South Africa. In 
Nigeria, while there have been notable previous  and ongoing works (Wallace 1987, 
1989; Yahaya 1998; Okike 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007; Yakasai 2001; Ahunwan 2002; 
Ajogwu 2007; Amao and Amaeshi 2008; Adegbite, Amaeshi and Amao 2009; Adegbite 
and Nakajima 2009), this thesis is an up-to-date and in-depth analysis of corporate 
governance and accountability in Nigeria. This thesis further contributes to scholarly 
knowledge with regards to the corporate governance phenomenon in developing 
countries.  
 
With regards to precise theoretical contributions, it must be noted that whilst the agency 
theory will remain the starting point for corporate governance discussions, this thesis 
identifies the need to complement it with an institutionalist perspective, in order to 
provide an encompassing understanding of the corporate governance dimension in 
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Nigeria.  It specifically forges a fundamental examination of the evolution and complex 
configurations of corporate governance in developing market economies, from the 
spectacles of institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987; Scott 2004). 
Here, institutional theory serves as a complimentary theory and not a replacement for the 
agency theory. In particular, the notion of “institutions” in this thesis depicts certain 
underlying national conditions, such as the political, economic, legal and social 
environments as well as firm/industry values, culture, ethics and history. The thesis 
examines the roles of these institutions in shaping corporate governance in Nigeria. Thus 
this thesis brings further insights from a developing country perspective, to augment the 
evolving institutional theory of corporate governance (Aoki 2000 and 2001; Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; Jackson 2005; Lubatkin, Lane, Collin and Very 2007; Adegbite and 
Nakajima 2009). This further creates an avenue to enrich discussions from a multi-
theoretical perspective. Particularly, complementary with the need to promote effective 
corporate governance and accountability in Nigeria, is the need to progress such 
discussions in ways which reflect their broader horizon of institutional, regulatory and 
external under-tones. These would enable the understanding of the rationale and 
underlying machinery upon which the structures and practices of corporate governance 
are developed, nurtured and sustained. As a result, whilst the thesis primarily contributes 
empirically to the literature on corporate governance in Africa, it furthers an 
understanding of the institutional embeddedness of corporate governance in different 
institutional contexts – another stride towards an institutionalised theorising of corporate 
governance in varieties of capitalism. 
 
1.10 RESEARCH KEY OBJECTIVES  
Having introduced the major themes explored in this research and their empirical and 
theoretical implications, the author proceeds to highlight the work-template upon which 
this research was carried out. This includes the research aim and objectives, as well as the 
research questions and their relevance. The author has earlier stated the benefits of a 
Nigerian case in exploring the key research themes. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), 
however, argue that the challenge of justifying inductive case research depends on the 
nature of research questions. In the author’s attempt to make the afore-mentioned 
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theoretical and practical contributions to corporate governance research, the author 
follows their advice, by framing the research questions within the context of 
institutionalism in ways which facilitate inductive theory building through a mix of 
qualitative data.  As a result, questions are framed in ways which increases the prospects 
of enriching findings and subsequent robust analysis, in ways which altogether culminate 
to identifying the key determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria. The 
foregoing has prompted the author to hook the research mainly on the question: what are 
the key determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria? Nigeria presents a good 
empirical site upon which the following interrelated sub-research questions are explored 
for this doctoral study: 
 
(1) Which firm and national level institutional environments matter most in 
corporate governance, especially in developing countries? To what extent are 
these institutional environments complementary with good corporate 
governance?   
(2) Why do corporate governance systems remain largely unchanged despite 
regulatory reforms? What is the role of government in corporate governance? 
(3) What effects do external corporate governance systems have on Nigeria? To 
what extent is there an imposition of “good” corporate governance on developing 
countries? 
(4) On the basis of the institutional, regulatory and external determinants, in what 
ways can good corporate governance be promoted, particularly at the firm level 
in Nigeria?  
 
By answering these, this thesis further provides insights concurrently to the following 
intertwined sub-questions: 
 
 To what extent will certain firm and national level institutional environments 
continue to matter in corporate governance? To what extent will they loose their 
influential powers over time due to globalisation and global competition for 
investments?  
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 To what extent can (should) corporate governance be regulated? To what extent is 
government capable of regulating corporate governance efficiently considering 
the underlying legal systems? How has government’s intervention in corporate 
governance evolved over time? What are the aims of government in corporate 
governance? To what extent are these aims being achieved? 
 To what extent can corporate governance mechanisms be exported? What can 
Nigeria learn from the corporate governance regulatory frameworks of other 
countries? To what extent are developing countries tilted towards the Anglo-
Saxon/Shareholder model orientation or the Stakeholder model? What are the 
implications of the imposition of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance principles 
on developing countries? 
 
1.11 STRUCTURE OF THESIS  
The rest of this thesis is organised into eight more chapters as summarised below.  
 
In Chapter 2, the author provides a theoretical discussion of corporate governance. In the 
chapter, a comprehensive and well-grounded review of relevant literature is undertaken to 
analyse the conceptual and contextual meanings of the term “good corporate 
governance”. The rationale behind the evolution of modern corporate governance 
discussions, as well as the subject of the firm in the context of corporate governance, and 
the corporate governance convergence debate are examined. The author further analyses 
their overall implications for the corporate governance subject. Thereafter, the author sets 
the perspective of this thesis with respect to related literature, examining the gaps in 
literature, which further gives sufficient rationale with regards to the derivation of the 
afore-mentioned research questions. Chapter 2 provides the background to examine our 
Nigerian case and gives illumination to applicable research methodology.  
 
The literature review further acts as a methodological instrument which serves as a 
background for the mix-method qualitative research approach adopted for this study, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, the research method; research strategy and data 
collection; research instruments; data saturation; data analysis; and related issues are 
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discussed. The findings of this research are thereafter presented, making use of extracts 
from the survey (typed in italics and single spaced) from the raw data, in a way which 
facilitated useful deductions, and ensured a clearer link between existing literature, the 
research findings and analysis, in an attempt to make scholarly, practice and policy 
contributions.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the state of corporate governance in Nigeria, as a background to 
subsequently present the specific findings of this research. This exposition examines the 
disparity in orientation with regards to the theoretical construction of the subject in 
Nigeria. It therefore takes into account relevant historical underpinnings including the 
traditional ownership structure of Nigerian corporations. Specific corporate governance 
issues in Nigeria are also discussed. These include the particular expressions of the 
agency relationship and conflict; the workings of the market as a form of corporate 
control; stakeholder activism; and other issues relating to corporate social responsibility 
and ethical business conduct.  
 
Following on, Chapter 5 examines corporate governance in Nigeria in the context of 
institutional theory. It analyses how institutions have shaped/are shaping the state of 
corporate governance in Nigeria, thus providing a basis to understand the rationale 
behind the preceding discussions in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 further highlights the need to 
complement the agency theory with an account of the institutional determinants of 
corporate governance, especially when attempting to conceptualise the corporate 
governance dimension in developing economies. It specifically discusses the national and 
firm/industry specific institutional determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria. 
Discussions here aim to extend the literature on the institutional effects on corporate 
governance with evidence from a developing country.  
 
Bearing in mind the limited complimentarity of the Nigerian institutional setting with 
good corporate governance, Chapter 6 analyses the corporate governance regulatory 
framework in Nigeria, essentially with regards to the mechanisms in place to promote 
good governance. It discusses the internal and external disciplinary mechanisms aimed at 
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addressing bad corporate behaviour. It further examines the laws/legislations governing 
corporate conduct as well as other non-statutory forms of regulation. A case study of 
corporate governance regulation in Nigerian Banks is also incorporated. This chapter 
further aims to add to the literature on corporate governance regulation by providing an 
assessment of the role of government in corporate governance.  
 
In Chapter 7, the author discusses the influences of external governance systems on 
Nigeria. Here the author particularly examines the corporate governance systems of the 
UK, Japan, China and India. The author further investigates what lessons can be learnt 
from the governance systems in these countries and the pitfalls to be weary of. The roles 
of the IMF, World Bank and OECD and other Anglo-Saxon conceived initiatives at 
global corporate governance monitoring and development are also cross-examined. These 
are done in relation to local institutional initiatives, particularly those of the African 
Development Bank (AfDB). In this regard, the extent of Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance imposition on developing countries is investigated.  
 
Chapter 8 examines the specific drivers of good corporate governance in Nigeria. 
Following on from preceding analysis and inferences, it highlights nine key drivers of 
good corporate governance in Nigeria.   
 
This thesis is summed up in Chapter 9. Here, in an attempt to harness previous 
discussions and make more sense of the determinants, important deductions were made 
from previous chapters.  An apposite understanding of the determinants was further 
ensured with a view to improve the standard of corporate governance in Nigeria and her 
bargaining power to attract foreign investments.  The academic, practice and policy 
contributions of this research are also summarised. Lastly, the reality of corporate 
governance in today’s business environment is examined, drawing out implications and 
making recommendations for future research on Africa and across the world.  
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CHAPTER 2 – AN APPRAISAL OF RELEVANT LITERATURE ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
“The origins of the word - governance - can be found in the Latin – gubernare-  meaning 
to rule or to steer, and the Greek – kybernetikos -  which means . . . (steering, eds.). 
Norbert Wiener used the Greek root as the basis for cybernetics - the science of 
communication and control in the animal and the machine. The idea of steersman - the 
person at the helm - is a particularly helpful insight into the reality of governance” 
                 Tricker (1984:9) 
 
“Governance is a cybernetic concept.……Cybernetics critically refers to the feedback 
and control mechanism by which a system, and any system for that matter, keeps itself 
oriented towards the goals for which it was created” 
                       Rwegasira (2000: 258) 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The academic research in the field of corporate governance has developed rapidly since 
the 1992 Cadbury report in the UK and more recently since the 1997 literature review of 
Shleifer and Vishny. Furthermore, the seminal papers of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
that of Fama and Jensen (1983) remain well referenced in the corporate governance 
literature. However the shock of major corporate scandals and failures is sufficient to 
bring the discussion of corporate governance and responsibility back to its basics (Child 
and Rodrigues 2003). The debate on the definition and essence of corporate governance 
is being gradually revitalised and discussants are increasingly concerned about what the 
terms “corporate governance” and “good corporate governance” represent. What is the 
aim of corporate governance? What is it there to achieve? To what extent is it always 
important or becomes important only in the advent of a scandal?  Which is good or bad 
corporate governance? 
 
La Rocca, La Rocca, and Cariola (2008) argue that the profitability and overall 
performance of a firm are strongly influenced by the quality of managerial decisions. 
They further stressed that these depend on managers’ capabilities and on the incentives 
they have to make decisions which create value for stockholders. This brings to fore the 
need to understand areas where the incentives of managers and stockholders may diverge 
in order to appropriate various governance mechanisms to align them (La Rocca et al. 
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2008). However, this basic discourse of the corporate governance function has taken on 
board several multi-dimensional tasks, which has made the scope, concerns, and 
boundaries of the subject less clear. Indeed one cannot overemphasize scholars’ 
disagreement on the subject. While corporate governance is globally seen as key to 
corporate vitality, there is a variability of approaches towards the subject across 
countries.  
 
Corporate governance research has no doubt focussed on many areas of interest. For 
example, the academy has longed sought to establish a relationship between corporate 
governance and firm’s performance (Weston, Siu and Brian 2001). There has also been a 
great attention devoted to evaluating the shareholder and stakeholder models of corporate 
governance (Doremus, Keller, Pauly and Reich 1998; Gamble and Kelly 2001). The 
importance of independence in board composition (Higgs 2003) is also among the 
cornerstones of corporate governance research. The academic discipline of corporate 
governance continues to grow with several variants. For example, Belcher (2003) 
described corporate killing as a corporate governance issue. Certainly, discussions on 
corporate governance could easily become distorted. While the volume of research on the 
subject is increasing, often times, its aims can become vague and its objectives rather 
ambiguous.  There is a growing debate on the corporate governance motive (Adegbite 
2007). 
 
The seemingly endless list of corporate governance definitions requires scrutiny due to 
the apparent incoherence. Whilst some discussants have called it a fancy term for the way 
by which directors and auditors handle their responsibilities towards shareholders, some 
others have used the term as though it was synonymous with shareholder democracy 
(Maw and Craig-Cooper 1994). The underlying philosophy of corporate governance can 
be ranked on a continuum. At one end of the continuum, corporate governance can be 
perceived as the ways in which investors assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investments (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). At the other end, it can constitute the system of 
checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that 
companies discharge accountability and social responsibility to all stakeholders (Solomon 
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2004). Grounded in agency theory, the former definition perceives corporate governance 
as a means to align managerial interests with that of shareholders. The sole goal of this 
alignment is to maximise shareholder value. The latter definition is based on a broader 
orientation which stipulates that managers should strive to balance and maximize the 
interests of all parties with a stake in the firm. Given the varying ideological definitions 
which range between this Shareholder--------Stakeholder continuum, this chapter offers a 
less normative approach to the subject but one with clearer perspectives. As a result, it 
generates a useful discussion based on insights from a multi-disciplinary theoretical 
review. This creates a better understanding of the subject as well as acts as a solid 
background to subsequently investigate the determinants of good corporate governance in 
Nigeria.  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: first, the author provides an overview of 
the evolution of intense discussions on corporate governance, emphasising the impact of 
relevant recent and current occurrences, and following on, the subject of the firm, which 
is core to the corporate governance phenomenon, is discussed. Thereafter, the author 
conducts a survey of the literature on corporate governance definitions whilst registering 
the associated multi-disciplinary, multi-contextual and multi-ideological disparities. This 
further enabled a collation of the limitations of Anglo-Saxon scholarly approach towards 
the subject, especially with regards to the conceptualisation of corporate governance in 
developing countries. The evidence of convergence of the two theoretical models were 
subsequently analysed to investigate the extent to which these indicate the “hybrid” 
conception of good corporate governance. Lastly the author lays out the thesis’s 
perspective in relation to the term “good” corporate governance’. 
 
2.1 THE INTENSITY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATES:  
      RATIONALE  
The term “corporate governance” is relatively new in both public and academic debates, 
even though the issues it addresses have existed for ages (Farinha 2003). However, recent 
history has been characterised by high profile corporate scandals which have seriously 
undermined the confidence of the investing public in corporate governance. Here the author 
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examines some of these notable scandals, and how they have transformed the corporate 
governance landscape. The Maxwell scandal, as at the time it occurred, could be described 
as the biggest example of corporate corruption.  Consequently it injected the matter of 
corporate governance and accountability into academic minds. For example, corporate 
governance in the UK originated from a series of corporate misconducts in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, following the scandals at BCCI bank and Maxwell pension funds (FRC 
2006). The Maxwell’s scandal specifically highlighted the need to separate the role of the 
chairman from the CEO, and further marked a scrutiny of the functions of non-executive 
directors as well as audit firms. 
 
Furthermore, corporate governance is hardly taught in today’s lecture rooms without 
reference to the Enron scandal. The former seventh largest company in America has 
taken its place as one of the largest corporate bankruptcies in history. The scandal 
particularly drew attention to the following; the need for auditors to scrutinise executive 
directors’ excesses; the importance and responsibilities of non-executive directors; and 
the need for all corporate stakeholders (shareholders, senior management, board directors 
and auditors) to behave responsibly (FRC 2006). The aftermaths were global spontaneous 
reactions including the rapidly passed Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US and the revisions to 
the UK Combined Code. In the post-Enron age, the paradigm of corporate governance 
changed. However, current global economic crisis has further highlighted the need to 
challenge the postulate upon which our understanding of the corporate governance 
phenomenon is based. Is there an alternative to the “over-liberated” freedom of modern 
capitalism? In the following section, the author examines the relevant theoretical 
backdrop upon which corporate governance is discussed among academic circles. Here, 
the author reviews the literature on the theory of the firm, given that this is central to our 
understanding of corporate governance. 
 
2.2 THE FIRM: THEORIES AND RATIONALISATIONS  
“There are a few things anyone who comes in touch with a firm should know: the first is 
that there are people called “owners”. They put in the money, thanks to which the firm is 
able to operate, and in exchange, society recognizes their right to call the shots. So 
despite the boss’s self-sufficient airs, he is a mere stand-in for the real boss, the owners. 
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Next, owners put their money in the firm expecting rewards. They do not do so out of 
selflessness, love of neighbour or some other lofty ideal. They expect to earn more money 
after a given time. That is the logic of investment” 
                    Sison (2007: 471) 
The theory of the firm has always been one of the cardinal elements of the economics’ 
literature (Hawkins 1973). As early as 1937, Coase stressed the need to provide a 
definition for the firm which is realistic and tractable.  By realistic, he meant that the 
definition must correspond to what is regarded as a firm in the real world. This definition 
must also be tractable by the instruments of economic analysis which are the concepts of 
margin and substitution (Coase 1937). His publication enabled a fundamental scrutiny of 
the concept of the firm from the perspective of economic theory. In this regard, a firm is 
generally accepted to be a “nexus” of contracts; which includes (1) the persistence of 
certain types of contracts in the nexus, (2) the variation detected in other types that are 
somewhat included in the nexus, and (3) the range of activities covered by these contracts 
(Demsetz 1988). 
 
The theory of a firm in a neo-classical theory is more straightforward; a firm simply 
maximizes profits (Cyert 1988).  The more conventional control theory and the 
behavioural theory of the firm further allow for periods of uncertainty within the firm, on 
the basis that critical aspects of behaviour involve the control actions which firms take 
when performance are below expectations (Cyert 1988). The behavioural theory of the 
firm resulted out of the inability of neoclassical economic theories to account for actual 
decision making behaviour within organisations due to the latter’s assumption that 
economic actors are perfectly rational (Bowen 2007). Indeed the behavioural character of 
the firm provides a more grounded theory of organisational goals, expectations, and 
choices (Bowen 2007). In the same vein, but from a different angle, Barney and Arikan 
describe the resource-based theory of the firm as “a theory of persistent superior firm 
performance using a firm’s resource as a unit of analysis” (2001: 134). They made a case 
for firm’s resource heterogeneity and immobility which explains why certain firms 
achieve competitive advantage in an industry while others do not (Bowen 2007). 
Nevertheless, since most firms operate within a competitive environment, the objective of 
the firm is generally perceived to be profit maximisation.  
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Anglo-Saxon theories of the firm thus dictate academic and institutional approaches to 
corporate governance throughout the world, even though their underlying assumptions 
have been widely criticised (Learmount 2002). Indeed they have become so dominant in 
the literature that they are almost automatically accepted (Bradley et al. 2000). Who owns 
the firm? Shareholders do. They are also entitled to the profit generated by the firm; 
shareholders part with their capital to be used by managers productively thus acquiring a 
degree of risk which may be proportional to the possible gains (Sison 2007). An 
individual also forms part of a firm when he or she signs a contract which could be an 
employment contract, a supplier’s contract or a buyer’s contract; from a legal perspective, 
the firm can be defined as a bundle of these contracts (Sison 2007). Thus the core 
structural characteristics of the business corporation are:  legal personality, limited 
liability, transferable shares, centralised management under a board structure, and shared 
ownership by contributors of capital (Hansmann and Kraakman 2004).  
 
The concept of a firm’s ownership is thus a precursor to conventional treatments of 
corporate governance (Learmount and Roberts 2002). It is generally accepted that 
discussions on corporate governance arose due to the problem created by the separation 
of a firm’s ownership from its control.  Jensen and Meckling, (1976) whilst building upon 
the earlier works of Coase (1937); Knight (1957); and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), posit 
that the incentives of managers to maximize shareholder value are proportional to the 
fraction of the firm’s shares they personally hold (Bradley et al. 2000). No doubt, in a 
situation where firms are not controlled by their owners, especially in large firms, there 
must be a mechanism in place to ensure that corporate management seeks to maximize 
the interests of stockholders. Corporations are therefore legal institutions with an 
exclusive structure and a set of imperatives which direct the actions of people within it, 
so as to pursue the corporations’ interests (Bakan 2004). 
 
Large corporations have, nevertheless, amassed significant economic and political 
powers. Possible misuses of these powers by managers have been exemplified by recent 
corporate collapses. Notably, these developments have highlighted the fact that the 
impact of the modern day corporation’s decisions is felt beyond its immediate 
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environments. To this extent, a corporation can constitute a pathological institution as 
well as a dangerous possessor of power; it wields this power over people and societies 
regardless of the probable harmful consequences (Bakan 2004). As a result, whilst there 
is consensus that shareholders genuinely own the corporation and its voting rights (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999), the existence of the corporation is 
increasingly being perceived to extend beyond profit maximisation. Corporations shape 
our lives; we eat what they produce; wear their products; and work for them. 
Governments of the world depend on them for economic sustainability and 
competitiveness. Ideally they do not only shape our lives, but our future inclusive. 
Corporations are the engines of any market economy and their proper behaviour has 
become crucial to economic and human security (Okabe 2004). 
 
2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The vital importance of corporate governance to organisations around the world has been 
reflected in an explosion of research and writing in the field (Mallin 2006). Corporate 
governance definitions have consequently attracted extensive controversy and scrutiny.  
One of the probable explanations for this is that corporate governance enjoys multi-
disciplinary interests from accounting, economics, management, finance, law, politics, 
international relations, amongst others, which has led to the numerous definitions of 
corporate governance. Each of these disciplines tends to perceive corporate governance in 
differing ways as they focus on different issue (s) and component (s). As a result, 
discussants have come up with different definitions which reflect their specific interest (s) 
and bias in the field. Here, the literature on the various definitions of corporate 
governance is examined and insights into areas of scholarly consensus and dispute are 
provided, in an attempt to progress the debate. 
 
2.3.2 Corporate Governance Defined 
There are no agreed definitions or boundaries for investigating corporate governance 
(Turnbull 2000), and this has created a sense of intellectual vertigo in the ever increasing 
debate on corporate governance reforms (Pound 1993). Simply put, the definition of 
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corporate governance depends on one’s view of the world (Gillan 2006). The model of 
corporate governance has thus been defectively defined and perhaps the best way to 
describe the concept is to list a few of the different definitions rather than mentioning one 
(Maw and Craig-Cooper 1994). These definitions vary across countries/regions, being 
contingent on differing legal, political, economic, cultural and ethical environments.  The 
presence of several definitions in the literature is, however, an indication that the academy 
of corporate governance is a rich one (Maassen 2000). These definitions vary in focus, 
simplicity, scope and breadth.  
 
A narrow definition is that of Shleifer and Vishny (1997). They described corporate 
governance as a means through which suppliers of finance to corporations are assured that 
they get a return on their investment. Keasy, Thompson and Wright (1997) also defined 
corporate governance as the system of accountability of corporations’ senior management 
to shareholders. Both definitions refer to the existence of potential conflicts of interests, 
arising from the separation of firms’ ownership and control, over the partition of wealth 
generated by the firm (Farinha 2003). Issues relating to corporate governance thus “arise in 
an organisation whenever two conditions are present. First, there is an agency problem, or 
conflict of interest, involving members of the organisation……;second, transaction costs 
are such that this agency problem cannot be dealt with through a contract” (Hart 1995: 
678). Thus corporate governance has traditionally invoked a narrow consideration of the 
relationships between the firm’s shareholders and management, as mediated by its board of 
directors (Bradley et al. 2000). 
 
A fairly broader definition which is consistent with that of Cadbury (1992) is provided by 
the OECD (1999). This definition describes corporate governance as a set of relationships 
between a company’s board, shareholders and other stakeholders, which provides the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled. Corporate governance is thus 
concerned with structures within which a corporation receives its basic orientation and 
direction (Rwegasira 2000). Here, both definitions refer to corporate governance as a tool 
which must ensure transparency, accountability and control.  
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O’Sullivan, (2003) defined corporate governance as concerned with the institutions that 
influence how business corporations allocate resources and returns. She further argued that 
corporate governance shapes who makes investments decisions in corporations, what type 
of investments are made, and how returns are distributed. Corporate governance can 
therefore be said to describe all the influences affecting the institutional processes involved 
in organizing the production and sales of goods and services (Turnbull 1997a). John and 
Senbet (1998) also defined corporate governance as the mechanism through which 
stakeholders exercise control over corporate insiders and management in order to ensure 
that their interests are protected.  
 
In an attempt to harness the aforementioned definitions, corporate governance becomes an 
umbrella term relating to concepts, theories and practices of corporate participants as well 
as the inter- relationships between  boards, stockholders, senior management, regulators, 
auditors and other legitimate stakeholders (Cochran and Wartick 1998; Maasen 2000). 
Monks and Minow (2001) stressed that these inter- relationships must work in ways which 
ensure that the right questions are asked, and that they get the right answers. They further 
argued that the aim must be to create sustainable value for the firm. The OECD (2001) 
report also describes these inter- relationships as involving various rules and incentives, 
which provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, the 
means of achieving them, as well as the ways to monitor performance. 
 
Gillan (2006) argued that scholars generally view corporate governance mechanisms as 
falling into one of two groups: those internal to firms and those external. As a result, he 
broadened the balance sheet model of the firm to examine a wider set of governance 
influences, incorporating elements that may not traditionally be viewed as part of corporate 
governance structures. He divided corporate governance into two broad but interconnected 
classifications:   
 
“Internal Governance, comprising of 5 basic categories: 1) the board of directors, 
including their role, structure, and incentives, 2) managerial incentives, 3) capital 
structure, 4) bylaw and charter provisions/anti-takeover measures, and 5) internal 
control systems) and External Governance, also comprising of 5 categories: 1) law and 
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regulation, specifically federal law, self regulatory organisations, and state law, 2) 
Markets 1, including capital markets, the market for corporate control, labor markets, 
and product markets, 3) Markets 2, emphasizing providers of capital market information, 
such as that provided by credit, equity, and governance analysts, 4) Markets 3, focusing 
on accounting, financial and legal services from parties external to the firm such as 
auditing firms, directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, and investment banking 
advice, and 5) private sources of external oversight, particularly the media and external 
lawsuits”  
          (Gillan 2006: 5) 
 
In a similar vein, Cunningham (2000) divided corporate governance into three categories. 
The first category constitutes those internal governance mechanisms which address the 
relationship between those in control of the corporation and all other constituents such as 
the shareholders, workers, lenders and communities. He referred to this category as the 
vertical internal mechanism. The second group, which is the horizontal internal 
governance mechanisms, directly regulate the inter-relationships between these various 
constituencies. Lastly the third group constitutes the external governance mechanisms 
which describe the rules and regulations imposed upon corporations, including rules 
about competition, antitrust, national trade and security.  
 
Conclusively, corporate governance describes how the authority (decision power) and 
responsibility of management are allocated and exercised in relation to the need to protect 
the interests of all stakeholders (La Rocca et al. 2008). According to Ira Millstein,5 
corporate governance thus becomes that “blend of law, regulation and appropriate 
voluntary private-sector practices which enables the corporation to attract financial and 
human capital, perform efficiently, and thereby perpetuate itself by generating long term 
economic value for its shareholders, while respecting the interests of stakeholders and the 
community as a whole” (World Bank, 1998: 7). 
 
2.3.3 Discussions 
The (1997a) study of Turnbull outlined the conceptual, cultural, contextual and 
disciplinary scopes of corporate governance and registered that there is ambiguity in its 
meaning. He went further to assert that this ambiguity extends to other terminologies 
                                                   
5 Ira Millstein, former principal advisor on corporate governance to the OECD and World Bank. 
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often associated with the subject, for example, “control” and “regulation”. In an attempt 
to understand the corporate governance definitional discrepancy, figure 2.1 highlights the 
differing “points of emphasis” which are evident in notable definitions. Figure 2.1 is 
clearly not an attempt to box scholars into particular corners, as this comes with difficulty 
given that many definitions do seem to have more than one of the focal points highlighted 
below. As a result, the figure represents an attempt to depict a definitional discordance, 
based on the major points emphasized by the scholars. 
  
Focus Direction, 
Control, 
Regulation 
Performance Shareholder 
Protection 
Stakeholder 
Protection 
Social 
Responsibility 
Experts Cadbury 
1992; 
OECD 1999 
Keasy, 
Thompson  
and Wright 
1997; 
O’Sullivan 
2003 
Shleifer and 
Vishny 
1997; 
Parkinson 
1993; 1995 
Monks and 
Minnow 
2001; 
Aguilera 
2005 
Solomon 2004 
    
Figure 2.1 The corporate governance definitional discordance 
 
Whilst the definitional variance helps to enrich academic discussions, future debates need 
to address these issues before deciding what might be achieved. Clarity of the goal of 
corporate governance is imperative to sustainable good corporate behaviour. As a result, 
whether corporate governance is seen as a subject or as a goal, a healthy definition is 
instrumental to any successful governance reform.  
 
2.4 THE LIMITATIONS OF ANGLO-SAXON SCHOLARSHIP  
Anglo-Saxon scholarship implicitly assumes publicly traded firms as the sole subject of 
analysis, which limits corporate governance discussions to approximately 260 firms in 
Nigeria and around 60,000 firms world-wide; Turnbull (2000) pointed out that these 
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represent a very low percentage of world’s economic activity. He therefore concluded 
that the notable and influential Anglo-Saxon corporate governance scholarship has 
limited application as it seriously undermines investigations into the most efficient 
institutional arrangements for undertaking productive activities. Furthermore, Anglo-
Saxon researchers often discuss the subject as solely involving a relationship between the 
firm and its shareholders. According to Bradley et al. (2000), corporate governance does 
not only transcend the relationship between a firm and its capital providers but also 
implicates how the various constituencies that define the business enterprise serve, and 
are served by, the corporation. They further stressed that seeing corporate governance as 
predominantly involving shareholders and the firm underestimates the implicit and 
explicit relationships between the corporation and its employees, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, local communities, government and the inter-relationships among these 
constituencies.  
 
Turnbull (2000) pointed out another normative overkill which trail Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance research. This is the covert assumption that firms generally operate 
a unitary board system without an influential shareholder; this limits the relevance of 
much of Anglo-Saxon research because dominant shareholders often act like a 
supervisory board and they are not uncommon, as witnessed, for example, in Japan 
(Nakajima 1999). Therefore attempts to describe corporate governance in the context of 
developing countries should undoubtedly reflect the above mentioned fundamental 
concerns with regards to relevance and applicability, given that the notion of the term 
differs from one context/country to another. Lastly, the issue of what “good” corporate 
governance constitutes has been less debated in the literature than one would expect 
despite its importance. In order to make significant and sustainable achievements in the 
academy and practice of corporate governance, these fundamental issues must be 
addressed and the subject of “good” corporate governance should be central to future 
discussions. 
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2.5 GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: INSIGHTS FROM THE 
CONVERGENCE DEBATE 
2.5.1 Introduction 
In an attempt to progress the foregoing discussions on the corporate governance agenda, 
it is important to look into the subject of convergence, in order to investigate the extent to 
which it points to the direction of a universally accepted definition/motive of corporate 
governance. But first, are national systems of corporate governance converging? If they 
are, to what extent does convergence indicate the globally accepted postulate of good 
corporate governance? There are two dominant systems of corporate governance: the 
Shareholder (outsider) model prevalent in the UK and the US and the Stakeholder 
(insider) model which is prevalent in Germany and Japan.  
 
Shareholder Stakeholder 
executive and non-executive 
directors are fiduciaries of 
shareholders; 
executive and non-executive 
directors are fiduciaries of a 
variety of claimants; 
executive and non-executive 
directors should adopt 
policies consistent with the 
maximisation of shareholders’ 
wealth; 
executive and non-executive 
directors should balance 
pluralistic claims; 
profitability and economic 
efficiency are the standards 
of efficacy; 
profitability and economic 
efficiency are important in 
addition to survival, long-term 
growth and stability; 
the corporation is 
subordinate to the interests 
of shareholders. 
the corporation is seen as a 
superordinate entity. 
 
Figure 2.2 Shareholder and Stakeholder Perspectives of Corporate Governance 
                               Source: Gedajlovic (1993:53-54) 
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Figure 2.2 shows that when these competing perspectives are taken into consideration, 
the corporate governance concern becomes less clear, such that definitions of corporate 
governance and the roles of corporate boards can move on a continuum from a purely 
shareholder view to a purely stakeholder view (Maassen 2000). The shareholder –centred 
model includes dispersed ownership, strong legal protection for shareholders and 
traditional disregard to other stakeholders. The priority is to enhance shareholders’ value. 
The stakeholder model requires that all parties affected by managements’ decisions, 
including managements themselves, shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, the 
local and global environments, and the government must all be considered fairly. As a 
result, whilst shareholders occupy a significant position, managements seek to balance 
the interests of a large group of stakeholders in ways which aim to ensure that the 
decision making process is consensus-oriented. The focus of the stakeholder model is on 
the whole network of formal and informal relations which determine how control is 
exercised within corporations and how the risks and profits are distributed among various 
stakeholders (Lane 2003).  
 
2.5.2 Evidence of Convergence?  
The growing economic globalisation has stimulated a brilliant debate on the similarities 
and differences between national corporate governance systems; it has particularly 
highlighted the emergence of a single “best” approach to corporate governance 
(McCahery and Renneboog 2002). To what extent does a particular corporate governance 
model have a clear-cut competitive advantage over the other? Given that countries across 
the world would have to adopt the most competitive model, this question is key and 
underlying to the subject of convergence. Research evidence as represented in the extant 
literature on corporate governance suggests that the shareholder model is winning the 
debate. Discussants, notably law and economics academics proclaim the superiority of 
the Anglo-Saxon oriented corporate governance model (Goergen, Martynova and 
Renneboog 2005). Consequently, there are traces of convergence. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) reported that corporate governance systems in Germany, Japan, and the US 
indicate a trend towards uniformity. Some of the principal factors driving economies 
48 
 
towards convergence include the failure of alternative models and the competition for 
global commerce, (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Braendle and Noll 2006).  
 
For example, whilst large shareholders are on the increase in US firms, board structures 
in German and Japanese firms are also moving towards the US model of a relatively 
small single-tier board (Braendle and Noll 2006).  Wojcik (2001) further observed that 
the level of ownership concentration in German firms fell significantly over the period of 
1997 through 2001, and therefore concluded that German firms are moving towards the 
Anglo-Saxon model. In Japan, the pattern of shareholding is also changing. Notably there 
has been a decline in stable shareholdings as well as cross-shareholdings and the last 
decade has witnessed the rise of foreign institutional investors. Patrick (2004) also 
reported that Japanese CEOs have begun engaging in investor relations and travelling 
regularly to the United States to meet with institutional investors; as a result, more 
Japanese firms are being listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). In the UK and the US, the separation of the CEO and the 
Chairman of the Board, as well as the introduction of audit committees and the increasing 
proportion of non-executive directors, could also be interpreted  as a potential move 
towards the two-tier board system (Braendle and Noll 2006; Kaplan 1997). To a large 
extent, these developments represent a substantial push factor towards convergence. 
Convergence has also been largely driven by modifications in legislations across different 
countries. These modifications are also closely linked with the efforts of the World Bank, 
IMF and other globally influential authorities.  
 
However, we must take an important caution. Palepu, Khanna, and Kogan (2002) argue 
that whilst nations may formally adopt corporate governance systems which resemble 
those elsewhere, the acceptance of the enshrined principles may significantly lag in their 
legislations. Although, functional convergence is a reality (Halpern 1999), this brings to 
bear the extent to which convergence indicates the convergence of principles and 
philosophies about the corporate character or simply a convergence of structures. 
Furthermore, the traces of convergence around the world generally appear to point in the 
direction of the Anglo-Saxon model.  Indeed, to what degree does convergence mean 
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major restructuring in stakeholder oriented countries and mere 
improvements/modifications in shareholder oriented countries. In order words, is there a 
convergence towards another model which is not the same as any of the two principal 
models or a convergence to a slightly modified Anglo-Saxon model?  
 
As discussed in subsequent chapters, corporate governance models should not be seen in 
isolation of the rest of the institutional underpinnings of the economy (Guillen 1999). The 
dominant view here is that the existence of different national institutions means that 
increased global competition as well as the integration of financial markets would not 
express themselves in the same ways in different national governance systems. Since 
different systems of capitalism will produce different responses to similar pressures, total 
convergence is unlikely to occur. In this regard, firms remain institutionally embedded. 
Therefore, the conventional knowledge that the cross-border activities of multinationals 
will compel a convergence to the “superior” Anglo-Saxon model requires immense 
scrutiny. For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) noted that 
the proportion of the world’s foreign investment accounted for by Anglo-Saxon countries 
fell from 66 percent in 1980 to just over 50 percent in 1997, while the combined shares of 
Stakeholder countries grew from 34 to 49 percent over the same time period. Could it be 
assumed that there will be a significant convergence towards shareholder countries when 
their share of total foreign investments is falling? 
 
However, if the evidence of convergence are not convincing, is there any evidence of 
divergence? To start with, while there has been the recognition of the importance of the 
stock exchange in both France and Germany, the stock markets in these countries remain 
comparatively less important as the UK or US for raising new funds (O’Sullivan 2003). 
Indeed French and German firms’ listings in the US are primarily as a result of intended 
or actual merger activities (O’Sullivan 2003). There has not been a major change in 
ideology and intent. Also the adoption of long-term incentives and stock options to 
encourage CEOs to maximize shareholder’s wealth still appear to be incentives only used 
extensively in Anglo-Saxon countries. Another clear indicator which suggests that 
corporate governance models may not be converging is in relation to the market for 
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corporate control; here, the occurrence of hostile takeovers is still not a worldwide 
phenomenon, but one largely confined to the US and the UK, both in terms of targets and 
acquirers (Guillen 1999). O’ Sullivan, (2003) also argue that whilst co-determination 
(strong employee representation at all levels, which is common in stakeholder oriented 
countries) has weakened, it has not been dismantled and remains very important.  
 
2.5.3 Conclusion 
Following a discourse on the contrasting shareholder and stakeholder orientations, the 
analysis which followed indicates that the convergence debate is far from being settled. 
Indeed the process is essentially on-going. Whilst the equilibrium of evidence appears to 
be tilted in favour of a convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon model, the literature 
remains puzzling and contradictory. In an attempt to reconcile both models of corporate 
governance, some scholars have talked about the “enlightened shareholder value” or 
“instrumental stakeholder theory” or “strategic corporate social responsibility” or “the 
good firm” (Parkinson 1995; Jones 1995; Kay and Silberston 1995; Filatotchev, Jackson, 
Gospel and Allcock 2006), as the hybrid model. This hybrid possibly points in the 
direction of good corporate governance, given that it harmonises the strengths of the two 
traditional models.  
 
2.6 PARAMETERS OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
The foregoing discussions have clearly shown that there is no universally accepted 
definition for the term “good” corporate governance.  Indeed whilst this thesis makes no 
attempt to resolve the debate between shareholder and stakeholder orientations, it is 
important to note that both perspectives share some common prescriptions in promoting 
basic accountability of executive directors for the stewardship of company assets 
(Filatotchev et al. 2006). In this vein, the notion of good corporate governance can be 
usefully discussed. It certainly imbibes elements from the two traditional models. For 
example, good corporate governance entails the maximisation of shareholder value 
legally, ethically and in a sustainable way while ensuring fairness to all stakeholders, 
including customers, employees, partners, governments and local communities (Murthy 
2006). A good corporate governance structure is the one which “selects the most able 
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managers and makes them accountable” Tirole (2001: 2). This structure will not only 
ensure that executives respect the rights and interests of stakeholders, but also make sure 
that stakeholders act responsibly with regard to the resources invested in and generated 
by the enterprise (Filatotchev et al. 2006). To this extent, good corporate governance 
becomes a reflection of a company’s values, culture and policies, in relation to its 
stakeholders, and its commitment to these values (Murthy 2006). This may also imply 
significant public interest elements which regulate the purposes for which managerial 
power over the corporation may be legitimately administered (Parkinson 1993). 
 
How can firms ensure good corporate governance? What mechanisms promote good 
governance? Filatotchev et al. (2006: 83-95) highlighted 18 drivers of good corporate 
governance, based on a profound analysis of corporate governance in relation to 
associated economic, strategic, social, and legal configurations. The drivers include the 
following;  
 
1. Board independence 
2. The diversity, human and social capital within the board 
3. High engagement in board processes 
4. Presence of large-block shareholders 
5. Shareholder activism 
6. Breadth and depth of public information disclosure 
7. Breadth and depth of private information sharing 
8. Independence of the external auditors 
9. Competence of the audit committee 
10. Presence of internal control systems and support of whistleblowing 
11. Long-term performance-related incentives:  
12. Transparent and independent control of the remunerations committee 
13. An active market for corporate control 
14. Transparency and protection for shareholders and stakeholders during 
mergers and acquisitions  
15. Board power regarding takeover bids, subject to shareholder veto 
16. Stakeholder involvement within corporate governance 
17. Voice mechanisms for debtholders 
18. Employee participation in financial outcomes and collective voice in 
decision-making 
 
A summary of the drivers is provided in appendix 1. The authors rightly noted that their 
analysis focused on certain isolated sets of corporate governance practices. They argue 
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that since the effects of corporate governance structures are contingent on the presence or 
absence of other corporate governance elements, some caution must be exercised in 
looking at the “drivers” as a cross-country benchmark for good corporate governance. 
Indeed in the context of developing countries, considerable caution must be taken in 
seeing these drivers as universally applicable. In particular, the relevance of these drivers 
were investigated in the case of Nigeria, and as discussions in chapter 8 further indicate, 
some of the drivers were found to be of minimal importance in the Nigerian context. 
Nevertheless, whilst their evidence was based on a UK specific study, they nevertheless 
give important indications into how good corporate governance can be facilitated. 
Furthermore, in limiting the barriers to good corporate governance, especially in 
developing countries, Koppes (1999: 12-13) argues that the following structural and 
cultural issues must be addressed:  
 
A. Structural Issues: 
 
1. Does the board include members who have conflicting interests that prevent them from 
effective representation of all shareholders? 
2. Does the compensation of directors encourage them to act in shareholders’ interests? 
3. Are new director candidates nominated using a process that is controlled by insiders? 
4. Are incumbent directors nominated for re-election without a thoughtful consideration 
and evaluation of the continuing skills and perspectives that they bring to the board, and 
the time they have available to commit to board service? 
5. Does the director nomination process include the opportunity for effective shareholder 
input? 
6. Do insiders control key committees? 
7. Has the board failed to establish and evaluate appropriate performance criteria for the 
board, for individual directors, and for the CEO? 
8. Are directors provided with insufficient training or education (both on a one-time and 
continuing basis) regarding the business of the company and the role of directors? 
9. Are directors able to both access internal and hire independent resources, as needed to 
make informed decisions and exercise effective oversight? 
10. Have directors and managers instituted anti-takeover measures to entrench 
themselves? 
 
B. Cultural Issues:  
 
1. Do directors overly identify themselves with management of the company? 
2. Are directors overly prone to yield to the CEO? 
3. Do the directors insufficiently recognize their accountability to shareholders? 
4. Do directors participate actively in the decision-making process? 
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5. Have directors made an adequate commitment of time to every company on whose 
board they serve? 
6. Does management provide directors with incomplete 
or inadequate information? 
7. Is the board excluded from major company decisions (such as strategic planning and 
decisions affecting the company’s capital structure)? 
8. Are directors unable to express disagreement and yet continue to work as a collegial 
board? 
9. Does the board micro-manage (i.e., focus on daily operations instead of strategic 
direction)? 
10. Is there a significant percentage of shareholders who do not vote and are shareholders 
knowledgeable about the issues and do they make informed voting decisions? 
             
Good corporate governance can thus be described as a voluntary ethical code that 
specifies the process of structuring and controlling a company, and further enables it to 
operate efficiently and effectively through a sound board monitoring system which 
ensures that the best interest of the company is put first at all times (Sapovadia 2007). 
The bedrock of good corporate governance is thus to conduct the affairs of a company in 
ways which ensure fairness to all stakeholders through quality leadership, good values, 
transparent management, clear vision and goals, respect for the rule of law, and a sense of 
social and communal responsibilities (Waknis 2007). Consequently, good corporate 
governance will enhance “the performance of corporations, by creating an environment 
that motivates managers to maximize returns on investment, enhance operational 
efficiency and ensure long–term productivity growth” (Murthy 2006: 1-2) 
 
Lastly, according to the Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council, 
corporate governance should represent the system by which a company gets directed and 
managed, including how the company’s objectives are set and achieved, as well as how 
risk is minimised and performance is maximised (ASX 2003). Good corporate 
governance structures will thus encourage companies to create value (through 
entrepreneurial activities, continuous innovation, and development) whilst providing 
robust accountability and control systems that are commensurate with the risks involved 
(ASX 2003). 
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2.7 THE WORTH OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
The field of international corporate governance research has been transformed in the last 
decade. Pitelis and Clarke (2004) noted that there have been several publications of 
corporate governance codes across many countries; numerous global and regional 
initiatives at corporate governance developments and monitoring; huge development in 
corporate governance activity, sources and databases; as well as the development of 
several corporate governance agencies and research centres across the world. If good 
corporate governance truly benefits businesses, it is rational for companies to generally 
subscribe to it.  
 
It is possible to conclude that good corporate governance is advantageous to business. 
Having discussed the relationship between good corporate governance and efficient 
corporate governance regulation, it must be stated that any serious company in 
developing economies that is actively seeking foreign investments must have a good 
corporate governance system irrespective of the necessity of this for local investments. 
Clearly good corporate governance maintains investor confidence in the markets (Milne 
2006). Corporate governance is an important determinant of inward foreign investments 
and plays a determining role in the bargaining power of developing countries to attract 
foreign investments, especially low-income countries (Rueda-Sabater 2000). Bad 
corporate governance is costly whilst good corporate governance is highly beneficial. 
Good corporate governance generates wealth and manages risk in a simultaneous and 
continuous manner (Pitelis and Clarke 2004).  
 
Indeed good corporate governance has long been considered crucial for enhancing the 
long-term value of corporate stakeholders; in today’s technology-driven information age, 
good corporate governance is much more than good business practice but an 
indispensable component of market and business discipline (Levitt 2000; Cohen, 
Krisnamoorthy and Wright 2002). There is evidence which suggests that investments in 
firms which have bad corporate governance systems yield abnormally negative returns 
for prolonged periods of time while firms with good corporate governance have higher 
stock market valuations and increased profitability (Causey 2008). Assessing corporate 
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governance thus become more than a box ticking exercise; the board structure, 
compensation practices and shareholder rights must be examined individually as well as 
collectively to ensure that they protect the interests of the shareholders (Milne 2006). The 
presence and effectiveness of these factors produce good corporate behaviour. 
 
Anson, White and Ho (2005) concluded that good corporate governance pays well based 
on evidence from the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CALPERS). 
Good corporate governance builds credibility, first at the company level, then at the 
industry and country levels. High degrees of credibility and reliability are crucial 
elements necessary to generate investor confidence in developing countries.  Given that 
the private sector is the main driver of a country’s economic growth in today’s market 
economies, good corporate governance will increase the integrity and effectiveness of the 
private sector (DFID 2003). It will further make markets operate more effectively which 
will boost the investment climate of developing countries and amongst others have the 
following secondary effects (DFID 2003; 2):  
 Prevent business scandals, which damage trust in business.  
 Increase the value placed on good corporate governance by institutional investors. 
 Enable increased involvement of the private sector in service delivery.  
 Prevent and deter corporate corruption.  
 Allow deregulation and integration of capital markets.  
 Facilitate the harnessing of domestic savings for economic growth.  
 Reduce the risk of financial crisis and contagion.  
The quality of corporate governance influences the kind of foreign investment that a 
country is able to attract; good corporate governance attracts good investments into 
important areas of the economy (Rueda-Sabater 2000). According to Jack Keenan 
(former CEO of United Distillers and Vintners), “good corporate governance can save a 
company from the trash heap!” (Pitelis and Clarke 2004). Good corporate governance 
will enhance the quality of managerial stewardship and eventually result in more efficient 
capital markets (Cohen, Krisnamoorthy and Wright 2002). 
 
Legislation alone cannot dictate how each conflict of interests among corporate 
stakeholders can be resolved, but it must assure all stakeholders that the structures and 
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processes are in place to sensibly maximize the interests of all parties; interaction and 
responsiveness in this wider societal context is the ultimate test of good corporate 
governance (Morrison 2004). Good corporate governance could also indicate good 
overall corporate practices; if a company is good at corporate governance, it would 
probably be good at accounting, risk management (Milne 2006), strategic decision 
making and entrepreneurship. For developing countries, corporate governance issues do 
not only affect the distribution of income and wealth but also affect their competitiveness 
and growth potential (Rueda-Sabater 2000). There is no substitute for good corporate 
governance. As Dalton and Daily (1999) posit, good corporate governance makes board 
members to proactively develop the strategy and long-term direction of the firm, 
otherwise, as Jensen (1993) points out, corporate governance matters will only come to 
the forefront in times of corporate crisis or collapses (Cohen, Krisnamoorthy and Wright 
2002). 
 
2.8 CONCLUSION: RATIONALE BEHIND THE DERIVATION OF RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
A country’s corporate governance framework is vital to the health of her companies, their 
access to capital, and ultimately the wealth created and retained in the country. The 
following deductions can be made from the foregoing discussions. To start with, the 
overview of academic debates on corporate governance (including references to relevant 
historical developments) provides a rationale behind the extensive scholarly and media 
attentions, which the subject has enjoyed in recent times. The discussions on the theory of 
the firm also help to enrich scholarly knowledge with regards to the corporate governance 
bedrock. A further survey of the corporate governance definitional contest draws 
attention to the fact that Anglo-Saxon theories based on the peculiarities of highly 
developed markets may be limited in their ability to prescribe the dimensions of good 
corporate governance to developing countries such as Nigeria. Furthermore, taking a 
normative approach to good corporate governance would be inherently limiting and over-
assuming, as this would only lead us to judge good corporate governance thinking, 
structures and practices solely by Anglo-Saxon standards. The analysis of the 
convergence debate enabled an investigation into the extent to which national corporate 
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governance systems will converge to the best (good) corporate governance model. 
Thereafter, discussions were able to highlight the parameters of good corporate 
governance.  
 
The huge comparative lacuna with regards to corporate governance in sub-Saharan Africa 
has been severally noted in Chapter 1; particularly as one of the motivational factors 
behind this study. The particular importance of Nigeria as the empirical site, in which this 
study is situated, has also been addressed. Notably, the evolving literature on corporate 
governance in Nigeria (Wallace 1987; Yahaya 1998; Okike 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007; 
Oyejide and Soyibo 2001; Yakasai 2001; Ahunwan 2002; Nmehielle and Nwauche 2004; 
Sanda, Mikailu and Garba 2005; Bolodeoku, 2006, 2008; Ajogwu 2007) has achieved a 
coherent description of the state of the subject in the country, and as a potential outlook 
to view corporate governance in most of the other countries of the sub-Sahara. In 
augmenting the achievements of these works, this thesis adds to the literature on 
developing countries by conceptualising the dimension of the subject in developing 
countries, from an institutionalist perspective, in order to account for the state of 
corporate governance in the countries of the sub-Sahara. In complementing this 
institutionalist background, the regulatory dimension and external influences on corporate 
governance in Nigeria further helps our understanding of the determinants of good 
corporate governance in varieties of capitalism. It is based on a critical reflection on these 
literature deficiencies, that the following exploratory research questions were prompted, 
around which a research design was developed (Harrow and Palmer 1999), as detailed in 
the following chapter.  As a reminder, the main research question - what are the key 
determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria?  - has been divided into the 
following interrelated sub-research questions, which are explored for this doctoral study: 
 
(1) Which firm and national level institutional environments matter most in 
corporate governance, especially in developing countries? To what extent are 
these institutional environments complementary with good corporate 
governance?   
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(2) Why do corporate governance systems remain largely unchanged despite 
regulatory reforms? What is the role of government in corporate governance? 
(3) What effects do external corporate governance systems have on Nigeria? To 
what extent is an imposition of “good” corporate governance on developing 
countries? 
(4) On the basis of the institutional, regulatory and external determinants, in what 
ways can good corporate governance be promoted, particularly at the firm level 
in Nigeria?  
 
Subsequent discussions will clearly indicate that developing countries face peculiar 
corporate governance challenges. The means of facilitating good corporate governance 
would thus differ from one institutional context to the other. The viewpoint adopted in 
this thesis is that “no one size fits all.” Indeed, given that each country has its peculiar 
legal system and business traditions, there can be no “one size fits all” model of corporate 
governance (Allegrini, D'Onza, Paape, Melville and Sarens 2006). However, the pursuit 
of good corporate governance, despite the existence of disparaging definitions, remains 
imperative to corporate and economic sustainability and survival. According to 
Sapovadia (2007), the corporate sector is confronted with huge challenges that corporate 
governance on its own cannot solve, but which good corporate governance can solve. He 
further argued that whilst corporate governance can be imposed by legislation, good 
corporate governance is essentially an addition to the minimum required adherence to 
rules, and that which comes from within the promoters and directors of corporations. 
Good corporate governance is the mechanism of wealth maximisation for all stakeholders 
(Sapovadia 2007). Good corporate governance can thus be usefully discussed, given the 
basic principles of honesty, accountability, transparency and fairness that it promotes. 
This chapter has provided a multi-theoretical and practical scrutiny of the corporate 
governance phenomenon, and thus provides a solid background for subsequent 
presentation of findings on the determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria. 
The following chapter discusses the research methodology and data collection processes. 
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CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
The comprehensive review of relevant literature in the last chapter provides a well-
grounded theoretical insight into corporate governance. It has also helped in the 
identification of the appropriate research methodology for this study. This chapter 
outlines the research design, and discusses the methods and methodology employed in 
this study to answer the research questions and provides insights into the key themes 
explored. Due to the nature of the issues being addressed in this study, the research 
method adopted was qualitative. Particularly, given the nature of the research questions 
and objectives, the author adopted a mix-method qualitative strategy for this research.  
Qualitative research methods are valued in the development of knowledge, in the 
exploration of experience and context, in understanding multiple perspectives on an issue 
or topic, and in understanding the complexity in which a phenomena exists (Morse, 
Swanson and Kuzel 2001; LeCompte and Schensul 1999; Creswell 1998; Yin 1994). 
According to Aaker, Kumar and Day (2001), qualitative methods have a more flexible 
relationship with the respondents; consequently, the resulting data will have great depth 
and greater richness of context. This study adopted a mix of the following qualitative 
research methods: in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, direct observations and 
case studies.   
 
This chapter is structured as follows: the next section examines the appropriateness and 
benefits of qualitative research methodology for this research. The analytic induction 
research method which is employed in this study is subsequently evaluated, also with 
respect to its suitability. Following on, the data collection strategy of this research is 
examined. The afore-mentioned mix of qualitative research instruments is thereafter 
discussed. Relevant information is also given with regards to their appropriateness and 
advantages. Furthermore, the mechanisms employed to manage the researcher’s 
obtrusiveness in data collection, specifically with regards to the in-depth interviews, 
focus group discussions and direct observations are discussed. Issues relating to the 
researcher’s flexibility and data saturation are also addressed. Thereafter, an analysis of 
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the sample and findings from this survey of this research is discussed. Lastly, the 
appropriateness of this research strategy, methodology and methods, with adequate 
references to relevant literature, are presented.   
 
3.1 QUALITATIVE METHODS: BENEFITS AND APPROPRIATENESS  
Qualitative research methods are the most suitable for investigating research questions 
which focus on “how”, “why” and “what”, in an attempt to describe, interpret or explain 
a certain social phenomenon (Lee 1999). Qualitative methodologies, thus, refer to 
research procedures which produce data, with respect to subjects’ account of observable 
behaviour (Bogdan and Taylor 1975). Qualitative research approaches rely on 
understanding processes, behaviours, and conditions, in order to determine causal 
relationships through methods rather than by establishing counterfactuals (Wang 2006). 
A qualitative research is “highly descriptive and often recounts who said what, to whom, 
as well as how, when, and why” (Gephart 2004: 455). Qualitative research aims “to 
describe, decode, translate or otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the 
frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world” 
(Van Maanen 1979: 520). Therefore, a good qualitative research normally adopts a multi-
method strategy that uses an interpretive and naturalistic approach to its subject matter 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1994). Indeed qualitative data consist of detailed descriptions of 
events, situations and interactions between research subjects, thus providing depth and 
detail (Patton 1980). 
 
Bogdan and Biklen (1982) suggested five characteristics of qualitative research which 
give further illumination into the appropriateness of a qualitative approach for answering 
the previously mentioned research questions. They include the following: 
 
1) Qualitative research commonly takes place in a natural setting, where individuals are 
most directly involved in what is being studied. Context is important; behaviour can be 
understood more fully when observed in its own setting.  
 
2) The data generated is considered to be descriptive and "rich" in that it retains as much 
of its original meaning as possible. The data can include transcripts, photographs, 
videotape, official documentation, and personal correspondence.  
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3) The researcher places primary importance on the process, rather than on the outcome. 
Collecting the data, probing and uncovering meanings that may be new or common to 
situations or that may explain variations or new dimensions to themes, is the process that 
helps to explain phenomena or changes that have occurred.  
 
4) It relates to how theory is developed through induction. In this regard, qualitative 
research builds theory from observations. Inductive reasoning is often referred to as 
grounded theory and suggests that generalisations are grounded in the observable data.  
 
5) It concerns meaning. As a qualitative researcher, one asks, what is the meaning of a 
particular social construct to the participants; what are their experiences and 
perspectives? 
           Inglis (1992: 175-176) 
 
Clarity can be gained by contrasting qualitative research with quantitative research; the 
latter “emphasizes measurement and analysis of causal relations among variables” 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 8). Morgan and Smircich (1980) made a case for qualitative 
research in social science. They argue that the quantitative methods used in the social 
sciences draw principally on the methods of the natural sciences, in an attempt to capture 
a view of the social world as a concrete structure. Furthermore, they noted that this 
reduces the role of human beings to elements which are subject to the influence of a more 
or less deterministic set of forces. They subsequently stressed that social scientists can no 
longer remain as only external observers, measuring what they see; they must move to 
investigate from within the subject of study and employ research techniques which are 
appropriate to that task. According to them, many of such techniques offer themselves as 
a basis for qualitative forms of investigation, each adaptable to different kinds of 
assumption about ontology and human nature.  
 
Qualitative research directs itself at settings as well as the individuals within those 
settings in an holistic manner; as a result, the subject of the study, be it an organisation or 
an individual, is viewed as a whole, and not reduced to an isolated variable or hypothesis 
(Bogdan and Taylor 1975). Qualitative research approaches aim at the production of 
serendipitous findings and are in many cases broader in perspective than quantitative 
tools (Das 1983). Whilst quantitative research methods focus on empirical measurements 
of relationships, qualitative methods remain firmly grounded in the social science 
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discipline and seek to investigate, beyond surface levels, causal relationships and 
explanations. This is done in a deep fashion which generates in-depth insights that would 
normally elude the scope of a quantitative approach. No doubt, qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to the study of organisations are not mutually exclusive (Das 
1983). Whilst the two research genres may overlap, qualitative research can be conceived 
of as inductive and interpretive (Van Maanen 1998).  
 
Therefore, the author does not see the two research approaches as competing models, 
given that they clearly have their respective strengths and weaknesses. It is, however, 
evident from the foregoing discussions that a qualitative approach would best suit the 
research agenda as well as answer the previously highlighted research questions. This 
will further generate well enriched and robust data required to understand as well as 
produce universal explanations with regards to the institutional, regulatory, external and 
specific determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria. This is because 
qualitative research is not simply non-numerical, but able to penetrate the experiential 
social worlds of intentional and self-directing actors (Mangen 1999) whether through 
spoken or written words. Qualitative research methodology combines the rational with 
the intuitive approach to knowledge creation; the focus is on the unfolding process rather 
than the structure (Das 1983). Thus, it addresses questions about how social experience is 
created and gives meaning and explanations/representations of the world in ways which 
make the world visible (Denzin and Lincoln 2000) and understandable. It seeks to 
understand the meaning of naturally occurring events and actions through the 
interpretation given by active participants (Henwood 1996).  The strengths of a 
qualitative approach to this study further lies in their ability to reconcile complexity, 
detail and context (Mangen 1999), which is particularly important, given the institutional 
setting of the Nigerian corporate environment. This is particularly useful because 
qualitative methods are flexible, and can be tailored to meet specific requirements (Wang 
2006).  
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3.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
This research lends itself to an analytic induction research method. This is a research 
method described by Znaniecki (1934) who named the method and systematized many of 
its associated ideas (Ratcliff 1994). Robinson (1951) argued that analytic induction can 
be described as a research procedure; as a method of causal analysis; and as a method of 
proof. He argued that as a research procedure, analytic induction begins with an 
explanatory hypothesis and a definition of something to be explained. As a method of 
causal analysis, he stressed that analytic induction takes a number of instances in which a 
phenomenon occurs and finds certain conditions which always accompany the 
phenomenon. As a method of proof, he argued that analytic induction proves that the 
generalisations to which it leads will be substantially applicable and generalisable.  
 
Analytic induction research method enables the making of universal statements which 
may be modified later if exceptions are discovered, but ultimately can reflect exhaustive 
knowledge of what is researched (Znaniecki 1934). It facilitates reasoning and allows for 
modification of concepts and relationships throughout the research process, with the goal 
of most accurately representing the reality of the situation (Ratcliff 1994). Analytic 
induction therefore calls for the progressive redefinition of the phenomenon to be 
explained and of relevant explanatory factors, such that a perfect relationship is 
maintained (Smelser and Baltes 2000). 
 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) emphasize that analytic induction involves generating and 
testing theory concurrently. Thus the theory produced by analytic induction can be 
described as universal and precise (Ratcliff 1994), given that analytic induction aims to 
develop the most economical set of inquiries which are capable of unveiling the 
distinctive processes that constitute a social phenomenon (Smelser and Baltes 2000). 
Notably inductive research is a way of thinking which enables researchers to approach 
their research sites with an open mind and watch for emergence of patterns and processes 
in order to identify core variables and then gradually develop hypotheses, typologies and 
or provide detailed descriptions of their observations (Gilgun 2001).  
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As a result, this methodology was used to build explanations in qualitative analysis by 
constructing a set of causal links between relevant literature, events, findings and actions 
and the iterative extension of these to emerging issues. This research logic allowed the 
scrutiny of corporate governance and allowed a cross-national and cross-disciplinary 
survey, collection of data, development of analysis, and organisation of the presentation 
of findings (Smelser and Baltes 2000; Katz 2001). Analytic induction further allowed a 
constant “back and forth” interaction with the data, theory and research methods 
throughout the research process, with the overall aim of theory building, as depicted in 
Figure 3.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Analytic Induction. Source: Adapted from Bryman (2004:10)  
 
3.3 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
This study adopts a mix of qualitative research methods in order to provide an 
informative and a comprehensive account of the key determinants of good corporate 
governance in Nigeria. According to Flick (1992:194) the “combination of multiple 
methods in a qualitative study depicts the researcher’s intention to add rigour, breath and 
depth to his/her investigation.” This strategy also increased the richness, validity, 
reliability and potential acceptability of findings. It also facilitated the presentation of 
robust conclusions. A mix of qualitative research methods also enabled respondents to 
give very valuable insights into the state of corporate governance in Nigeria, without any 
confinement to box-ticking and ratings, which are normally the case with quantitative 
designs. The qualitative methods employed include in-depth interviews, focus groups, 
direct observation and case studies. These were employed to conduct a survey of 
corporate governance professionals within the academia, practice, and the Nigerian 
polity.  
 
Observations/Findings 
Theory 
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Part of the data collection process necessitated a two month field work in Nigeria, 
between May and July, 2008. The overall methodology further allowed a judicious access 
to numerous corporate governance specialists, with sufficient capacity mix.  Sufficient 
industry mix was also achieved. Respondents were drawn from diverse industry 
backgrounds including business, banking, law, management, amongst others. Adequate 
mix was also ensured in terms of the discipline/research field of the academic 
respondents. All in all, these brought high degrees of objectivity and reliability into the 
process of identifying the determinants of good corporate in Nigeria. Furthermore, this 
strategy enriched data, prevented similitude, and served as an experimental control 
mechanism upon which different views were assessed and rated against one another. 
Lastly, it is important to note that the survey respondents are leading contributors to the 
corporate governance debate in Nigeria.  
 
3.3.1 Access 
In a qualitative inquiry, the problem of access to a particular research site is often 
increased due to the need for access at different levels, such that researchers are faced 
with the challenge of securing the initial participation of potential participants (Flick 
2002). Thus, from the outset, the key contributors to the corporate governance debate, 
ranging from the academia, through practice to the regulators in Nigeria were identified. 
Exhaustive attempts were then made to contact them via emails and subsequent follow-
ups with telephone calls, outlining the research agenda. The influential contacts of the 
author’s supervisors were also very helpful with respect to negotiating access, given that 
the author initially experienced a degree of difficulty with regards to obtaining access to 
certain high profile respondents. Some of their other efforts include the writing of official 
letters to potential respondents, as well as having discussions with potential respondents 
and other influential persons, at various international conferences, many of which the 
author was also in attendance. Furthermore, it must be noted that the author is a member 
of the organising secretariat for the annual Cambridge International Symposium on 
Economic Crime. The eight day annual symposium, which is held at the University of 
Cambridge, attracts significant number of Nigerians, who are influential in the country’s 
private and public sectors. As a result, it is important to state that the author benefited 
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from useful relationships (developed at this annual symposium) with many of these high-
calibre individuals. They include senior politicians, senior officials of relevant regulatory 
agencies, CEOs, chairmen and board directors of listed African corporations, renowned 
academics, as well as corporate governance consultants. It should also be noted that the 
author is a member of the Society for Corporate Governance in Nigeria6, which further 
minimised access difficulties, given that many respondents are members of this society. 
Snow-balling technique also proved very helpful to gain access to these high-calibre 
respondents until data saturation was reached (see also Amaeshi, Adi, Ogbechie and 
Amao 2006). Third party informants such as research colleagues who have important 
industry links further helped to overcome the problem associated with gaining physical 
access (see also Aluko 2009). In line with this, networking and personal relationships 
further minimised access difficulty, as against the well defined protocols and procedures 
which one may have to follow strictly when researching in large organisations in 
developed countries. However, in few cases, a number of respondents required that the 
author writes a letter formally to their organisations, and have this approved before access 
was granted. Finally it is worth noting that the author enjoyed some degree of respect and 
repute, based on his affiliation with Cass Business School, which further minimised 
difficulty in gaining physical access to respondents. 
 
However gaining access to research sites involves 2 stages – gaining physical access and 
gaining mental access – (Soulsby 2004). In gaining mental access which involves the 
ability to understand the happenings, the author followed the advice of Stebbins (2001:6) 
which is to “approach the research setting with two mental orientations: flexibility in 
looking for the data and open – mindedness about where to find them” (see also Aluko 
2009). 
 
3.4 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS 
By utilising a variety of interconnected methods such as case studies, interviews, and 
observations, qualitative researchers are well positioned to get a better understanding of 
                                                   
6 The Society for Corporate Governance in Nigeria is a newly formed platform which provides its members 
and the general public with value-added services, benefits and regular activities to aid networking 
opportunities. Further discussions are provided on the society in Chapter 6. 
67 
 
the subject matter (Flick 1992). Whilst privileging no method over the other (Denzin and 
Lincoln 1998), the choice of the research instruments employed in this study is based on 
the aforementioned research questions and the research context of this study. Thus it is 
based upon these considerations that the following data collection tools are selected. The 
author will now proceed to explain their specific benefits for this study as well as the 
processes and procedures followed in employing them for this research. 
 
3.4.1 Interviews 
Kvale (1996) described qualitative research interviews as attempts which aim to achieve 
the following; understand the world from the subjects' point of view; unfold the meaning 
of peoples' experiences; and uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations. He 
further noted that interviews promote intellectual understanding and change. Whilst 
interviews are challenging, they are very rewarding forms of measurement in the social 
science discipline, given their personal sensitivity, adaptability, and ability to stay 
reasonably within the boundaries of a pre-designed procedure (William 2006). Sewell 
(2008: 3-4) highlighted the following advantages of qualitative interviewing, which are 
very relevant in the context of this research; 
 
 It allows the participant to describe what is meaningful or important to him or her 
using his or her own words rather than being restricted to predetermined 
categories; thus participants may feel more relaxed and candid. 
 
 Provides high credibility and face validity; results "ring true" to participants and 
make intuitive sense to lay audiences  
 
 Allows the evaluator to probe for more details and ensure that participants are 
interpreting questions the way they were intended  
 
 Interviewers have the flexibility to use their knowledge, expertise, and 
interpersonal skills to explore interesting or unexpected ideas or themes raised by 
participants 
 
The qualitative research interviews, conducted in this research, allowed the exploration, 
description and understanding of in-depth facts (Kvale 1996) as well as the implicit and 
explicit meanings of the respondents’ comments.  
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Interview guides, which contained questions and issues primary to the survey, were sent 
to potential respondents in order to facilitate their utmost preparation7. Lynn, Turner, and 
Smith (1998) noted that this is a good practice for interview surveys, as it helps to reduce 
the amount of efforts required to contact sample members and gain cooperation. Whilst 
some of the interview questions were drawn from the literature (see Filatotchev et al. 
2006), the interview questions were pre-tested to ensure their appropriateness. This also 
helped to ascertain potential respondents’ understanding and proper interpretation. Also, 
where appropriate, control questions were asked to ensure further validity and reliability 
of responses. Adequate professional conduct was ensured throughout interviews. Issues 
relating to respondents’ confidentiality were also addressed.  
 
During the interviews, closed and open questions were asked in order to gain a variety of 
responses drawn from real life business and personal experiences free from fear or bias. 
Sewell (2008) argued that this is a very efficient technique which does not only reduces 
bias but also helps to compare the responses of different respondents. The design of 
questions was modified to substantially adapt to respondents’ individual styles. Questions 
which pertain to particular areas of the corporate governance system in Nigeria were 
addressed to respondents that were best suited to comment on them. Essentially, 
planning, modification and implementation of the interview programme structure was a 
continuous process. Reliability and authenticity of the interview data were ensured by 
sufficient preparation of questions before hand and reflecting on responses before the 
next interviews. Furthermore, attention was given to the following: information given to 
the interviewees, their understanding of questions, style of questioning and behaviour; 
listening skills, and approach to recording information (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
2003). As advised by Valenzuela and Shrivastava (2008), attention was also given to the 
following: the need to ask one question at a time, the need to remain as neutral as 
possible, encouragement of deeper responses where appropriate, the need to provide 
transition between major topics, the need to write down any observations during 
interviews, and the need to occasionally verify that the tape recorder is working. 
                                                   
7 Please find details of the survey questions in appendix 6.  
69 
 
Questions were thus wide-ranging and explored corporate governance issues in sufficient 
details. The average duration of each interview was 60 minutes. Respondents were 
mainly high profile individuals, including present and former CEOs, Chairmen, board 
directors, renowned academics, corporate governance consultants, as well as senior 
officials of relevant regulatory agencies. Notably these are key stakeholders in the 
Nigerian corporate governance system. Given their positions, this research benefited from 
their insider views of the corporate governance situation in Nigeria. In order to bring 
further elements of objectivity and subsequent reliability, a number of Nigerian, but 
international contributors to the corporate governance debate were also interviewed. In 
all, there were 26 structured interviews, all face-to-face and tape-recorded. As subsequent 
discussions would indicate, the in-depth responses to questions provided many 
quotations, which constituted a rich source of raw data (Sewell 2008). As a result, 
quotations/extracts from respondents are used severally in this thesis in order to reveal 
respondents' levels of emotion, including the way in which they have conceptualised the 
corporate governance scenery, and their experiences, basic perceptions and thoughts 
about what is happening (Patton 1987). 
 
3.4.2 Focus Groups 
Focus group methodology can be described as a qualitative data gathering approach that 
takes advantage of structured interviewing techniques performed in a group setting; 
however unlike the traditional one-on-one interviewing, it encourages discussions among 
group members in order to stimulate ideas that would not have been available otherwise 
(Fontana and Frey 1994; Morgan 1988; Hartman 2004). Morgan and Spanish (1984) 
argue that the focus group method brings together several participants to discuss a 
particular topic or topics; it is thus a unique and independent form of data collection 
which can usefully complement other qualitative data collection strategies. They further 
argue that the strengths of the focus group method come from its ability to aggregate the 
strengths of other qualitative methods, especially participant observation and in-depth 
interviewing. They noted that like participant observation, focus groups allow access to 
the process of interaction; and like in-depth interviews, they allow access to the content 
of respondents’ experiences. Indeed the direct accessibility to data and the insights which 
70 
 
come from the group interaction is a key strength of focus groups, given that it allows 
respondents to articulate their experiences and values (Morgan 1988; Inglis 1992). 
Patterns which emerge from focus groups can forecast trends that interview research 
might miss, given that the comments of focus-group participants can give deep insights, 
especially with regards to disagreements with generally accepted ideas (Langer 1991). 
 
Since the interviews were predominantly structured, the utilisation of the focus group 
methodology thus enabled further discussions on corporate governance-related aspects in 
a more unstructured way which gave further insights into the overall picture (Filatotchev 
et al. 2006). In order to enhance the quality of the focus groups and to allow members to 
engage in the discussions without actual or perceived intimidation, the size of the groups 
were kept deliberately small at all times (see Ewings, Powell, Barton, and Pritchard 
2008). Certain degrees of overall representation were achieved with participants drawn 
from different backgrounds and functions, so as to harness a mix of different 
perspectives. As advised by Langer (1991), attention was further given to sensitive 
responses in order to detect a shift in prevailing values, and compare conventional ideas 
with the groups' ideas.  Adequate attention was also given to the following; the 
correlation of respondents' reactions with the author’s assumptions; the segments which 
appear to exist in the focus groups; the patterns which emerged after the focus group 
discussions; the interesting remarks coming from particular participant (s); the manner in 
which comments are made; and the intrinsic meanings behind the words of the 
participants (Langer 2001). Two separate focus group discussions were held; one had 9 
members and the other had 11, totalling 20 respondents. Discussions were also tape 
recorded and each of them took an average of 90 minutes. The two focus group 
discussions offered the opportunity to observe participants engaging in interactions that 
are concentrated on experiences which are highly relevant to the research agenda (see 
Morgan and Spanish 1984). 
 
3.4.3 Direct Observations 
Direct observation, as a qualitative data collection method, ensures a systematic 
observation and documentation of a phenomenon in its natural setting. Wells and Lo 
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Sciuto (1996: 227-228) highlighted two principal advantages of direct observations. 
According to them, direct observation, as a qualitative research method, gives in-depth 
insights into the following; 
 
1) What People Do, Not What They Say: Direct observation produces a highly detailed, 
nearly complete record of what people actually do. It does not depend on the respondent's 
ability to interpret a questionnaire question correctly, or on the respondent's memory of a 
not very important and perhaps not very recent event. It is not influenced by any tendency 
to rationalize behaviour to make it appear in the best light. 
 
2) Serendipity: A secondary but sometimes important advantage of this method is that it 
occasionally produces an idea that can be tested later. 
 
Furthermore, direct observation offers a very fast and focused investigation, such that the 
researcher is watching rather than taking part and become immersed in the entire context 
(William 2006).  
 
Apart from seeking respondents’ views about the determinants of good corporate 
governance in Nigeria, direct observations of the situation at hand were made in order to 
complement and validate some of the information collected through interviews and focus 
group discussions. The Annual General Meetings (AGMs) of two listed corporations 
were attended and observed. Here, unlike a participant observer, the author remained 
unobtrusive and detached from the observed situations, so as not to bias the observations 
(William 2006). The author was granted permissions to observe proceedings and 
interactions but not to tape-record or video-record. Significant note taking of proceedings 
and interactions thus constituted helpful alternatives.  Specifically, whilst the author 
remained as a silent observer, he engaged in useful conversations with research subjects 
in order to gain deeper insights into “what was going on”. Attending these AGMs 
allowed insights into the complex dynamics and relationships which inform AGMs and 
shape corporate governance in Nigeria.  
 
3.4.4 Case Studies 
The case study methodology is an in-depth study of a single person (s), group (s) or event 
(s): this technique is simply a description of individual research subjects (Ewings et al. 
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2008). Case studies offer very specific and intensive investigations. The case study is a 
research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within particular 
settings (Eisenhardt 1989a). It focuses on bounded and specific organisations, events, or 
phenomena, and scrutinizes the activities and experiences of the subjects involved, as 
well as the context in which these activities and experiences occur (Stake 2000). A case 
study research may address several research questions, examine several processes, or 
survey a large sample of individuals or research subjects; as a result, case studies reflect a 
broad variety of designs (Jensen and Rodgers 2001).  
 
Nevertheless, whilst the term case study is commonly used as an all-purpose catchall 
name for “other” research methods, case study research is underpinned by a specific 
philosophical orientation and a set of qualifying guidelines (Remenyi, Money, Price and 
Bannister 2002). Yin (1989) argues that case studies are suited to answer the “how” and 
“why” questions. Cooper and Morgan (2008: 160) also argue that the case study research 
approach is useful to investigate the following; 
 
• Complex and dynamic phenomena where many variables, including variables that are 
not quantifiable, are involved 
• Actual practices, including the details of significant activities that may be ordinary, 
unusual, or infrequent  
• Phenomena in which the context is crucial because the context affects the phenomena 
being studied, and where the phenomena may also interact with and influence its context. 
 
The use of this qualitative method enabled further investigations with respect to key 
issues which were generated from previous methods. It must be noted that respondents 
gave very in-depth comments and intriguing insights with regards to the perpetrators of 
bad corporate governance practices in Nigeria. In order to ascertain validity, these 
responses were further investigated by looking deeper into the specific situations and 
contexts. In this regard, the author conducted case studies of certain listed corporations 
(such as Halliburton, Siemens, Oceanic Bank Plc and Cadbury Nigeria Plc), regulatory 
agencies (such as the Corporate Affairs Commission, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Nigerian Stock Exchange), and 
conceptual issues (such as the political theorisation of shareholder activism). These 
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facilitated a richer set of findings and increased the overall objectivity, validity and 
reliability of the data. It further facilitated the “development of converging lines of 
inquiry, give that any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more 
convincing and accurate if it has been based on several different sources of information, 
following a corroboratory mode" (Yin 1984: 91). Two of the major sources of 
information were documents and archival records. Documents included memoranda, 
corporate agendas, media reports, and regulatory administrative documents which relate 
to the governance of listed corporations in Nigeria.  Archival records included past 
companies’ annual reports and accounts, annual general meeting minutes, chairmen’s 
statements, past regulatory records, amongst others. This further facilitated the 
triangulation of evidence across different sources in order to identify the principal 
determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria. 
 
3.5 MEASURES TAKEN TO MINIMISE BIAS 
In conducting a qualitative survey of the determinants of good corporate governance in 
Nigeria, the issue of potential bias based on respondents’ position needed to be 
addressed. As advised in a somewhat similar study (Aluko 2009) on the South African 
venture capital industry, this type of potential bias was identified and addressed 
accordingly.“The position bias” relates to when informants’ under or over report past 
organisation events and strategies, or present themselves and their organisations in a 
socially desirable image (Miller et al. 1997; Aluko 2009). The principal measure taken to 
control for the likelihood of the position bias is that advised by Hughes and Preski (1997) 
which is to select organisational informants who satisfy the purposive sampling 
requirement of competence (Aluko 2009). As a result, top managerial staffs were the 
ones predominantly surveyed because they are able to describe the organisational 
environment more than other organisational members do (Payne and Mansfield 1973). 
 
3.6 MEASURES TAKEN TO MINIMISE NEGATIVE OBTRUSIVENESS IN 
DATA COLLECTION  
It is important to note that the interviews and focus group discussions were the principal 
data collection techniques employed in this qualitative study. These techniques require 
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active and somewhat intrusive participation by the researcher. While researcher’s 
obtrusiveness is usually considered a methodological flaw in qualitative research, 
Harrington (2002) argues that obtrusiveness can constitute an important asset, which 
enhances both data-gathering and eventual credibility. In this regard, the author ensured 
adequate methodological self-consciousness throughout the data collection process to 
avoid potential bias in data collection and interpretation. The author specifically ensured 
that his functions as a researcher and the administrator of the data collection process did 
not interfere nor affect the data collected.   
 
Furthermore, given the previous and very useful relationships the author maintained with 
potential respondents, problems associated with respondents’ lack of trust in the 
researcher were minimised. Adequate time was also allowed in order to familiarise 
myself and the research with respondents, prior to interviews and focus group 
discussions. As a result, respondents’ were comfortable enough to give sincere and in-
depth comments. An ethical commitment was also made to treat responses with required 
confidentiality. Furthermore, in relation to the direct observations, the author observed 
ongoing activities and made records in field notes with regards to what could be seen, or 
what could be heard, and other experiences in a considerable passive and non-intrusive 
manner (Lee, Mitchell and Sablynski 1999). 
 
3.7 RESEARCHER FLEXIBILITY AND DATA SATURATION 
Given that the data collected was the foundation of subsequent discussions, including 
theory testing and building, the author maintained conceptual flexibility, especially when 
interviewing respondents (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  This was necessary because themes 
which initially seemed to demonstrate great significance could disappear as more 
participants were interviewed; conversely, a concept that was originally absent from 
interviews may ultimately become highly significant (Patten 2006). Therefore, as earlier 
stated, the interview structure was constantly modified during the research process to 
ensure sufficient scope and breadth. This also ensured that all relevant data were 
collected.   
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Furthermore, data saturation in terms of breadth and depth was reached in this survey. 
Data saturation refers to the stage at which the data already collected seems to cope 
adequately with new data without requiring continual extensions and modifications (Dey 
1999). The saturation, with regards to the breadth of the data, refers to the point when the 
respondents are providing no new observations about the research topic, while depth 
saturation of data refers to when all of the individual and conceptual issues raised by the 
respondents have been examined thoroughly (Patten 2006). The achievement of these 
meant that the data was saturated (Glaser and Strauss 1967) and marked the end of the 
two month data collection period. 
 
3.8 SAMPLE, FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS  
The aforementioned data collection methods were employed concurrently and as required 
during the data collection process of this research.  Indeed this research relied on both 
primary and secondary data. As expected, the mixed-method research approach enabled 
the collection of data from notable stakeholders in the Nigerian corporate governance 
system. This ensured a significant mix of views. Data were acquired from corporate 
governance experts in the academia, in practice and in the polity, including board 
directors; managers; current and former CEOs and chairmen across different industries; 
senior officials of regulatory institutions; shareholders' associations; as well as 
professional accounting and audit associations. Data were sourced in order to 
conceptualise and analyse the determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria in 
relation to the country’s institutional settings, external influences and regulatory 
infrastructure. The thesis presents facts and figures concerning the nature and status of 
the situation, as it exists at the time of study but also adopts a futuristic perspective to 
conceptualise the factors that would drive good corporate governance, especially in 
developing countries.  
 
This survey has enjoyed a good response rate.  Experts responded well to the request to 
participate in interviews and focus group sessions due to the factors mentioned earlier, 
and the vast amount of work and time invested to prepare for the data collection field 
work in Nigeria. The total number of respondents for the interviews and focus group 
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discussions was 42. In terms of the professional/disciplinary backgrounds of the experts, 
a reasonable spread was reached. Figure 3.8.1 shows the break down. In terms of 
respondents’ capacity, there were more regulators and academic respondents, than 
practitioners. As Figure 3.8.2 further suggests, there was not a sufficient clear cut 
demarcation as there were respondents who fell into more than one group (s). An 
example is a former CEO and Chairman of a listed corporation who is now a full time 
academic. In terms of respondents’ institutional expertise, the breakdown is shown in 
Figure 3.8.2. 
 
Background/research field Number of experts 
Economics 4 
Business, Management 4 
Finance and Accounting 15 
Law  11 
Sociology 3 
Others (Manufacturing, HRM, Sciences etc) 5 
 
Figure 3.8.1: Professional/Disciplinary Background Spread of Experts 
 
Institutional 
expertise 
Regulatory Academia Practice 
Regulatory 17   
Academia  4 5 
Practice   16 
 
Figure 3.8.2: Institutional Expertise/Capacity Spread of Experts 
 
Since the overall methodology employed ensured that relevant stakeholders of modern 
day corporations in Nigeria were taken into account, the concerns from all parties became 
evident. This facilitated subsequent filtering and collation of results. It also allowed the 
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identification of specific issues confronting the Nigerian corporate governance system, as 
well as the means to address them. No doubt, the principal data analysis technique which 
was employed used qualitative information based on comparisons and inferences from 
both secondary and primary data. The good quality of information gathered helped to 
identify key themes to explore, and provided the basis for fruitful analysis which gave 
useful conclusions aimed at advancing tentative propositions, rather than drawing 
generalised inferences (Child 2002).  
 
The data generated through this mix of qualitative methods were analyzed with the Nvivo 
8 software. This enabled the handling of the survey data in ways which facilitated the 
removal of many of the manual tasks associated with analysis, such as classifying, sorting 
and arranging information. This, subsequently, allowed more time to build and test 
theories and ultimately arrive at useful conclusions. The mixed-methods strategy also 
compensated for weaknesses inherent in individual methods and enriched the research 
data. 
 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
The methodology and strategy of this research are in considerable alignment with the 
evolving literature on corporate governance in developing countries (Wallace 1987, 
1989; Yahaya 1998;; Yakasai 2001; Ahunwan 2002; Mensah, Aboagye, Addo and Buatsi 
2003; Ajogwu 2007; Okike 2007; Amao and Amaeshi 2008; Adegbite and Nakajima 
2009). Given that the corporate governance subject is still burgeoning in developing 
countries, qualitative methods are well suited to capture and conceptualise the diverse 
configurations shaping the subject.  This research’s methodology is also consistent with 
similar studies on “the determinants of good corporate governance” in other countries. 
For example, Filatotchev et al. (2006) employed a mix-method research strategy to 
identify the drivers of good corporate governance, and the appropriateness of 
governmental policies, in the UK.  
 
This research methodology has been further designed to ensure an adequate conceptual 
grounding whilst adhering to methodologically sound and accurate strategies, in order to 
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make significant methodological (Bartunek, Bobko and Venkatraman 1993) and 
theoretical contributions. The mixed-methods strategy and the adequate mix of 
respondents have further contributed to the theoretical grounding and methodological 
soundness of this study. Several useful discussions with notable international experts on 
corporate governance, whom the author met at various top international conferences, 
further provided a constructive scrutiny of the views put forward in this thesis and 
contributed to the richness of data process. Very importantly also, advice with regards to 
the data collection procedure and subsequent meaningful analysis were garnered through 
regular discussions with the author’s supervisors, which further helped to ensure an 
inductive qualitative data analysis involving both empirical evidence and theory building. 
It is anticipated that this thesis on the determinants of good corporate governance in 
Nigeria represents a much needed stride in the literature. In chapter 1, the key themes 
explored in this research were introduced. Chapter 2 examines the major theoretical 
background of this study. The research design and methodology have also been discussed 
here. Chapters (4 to 8), which follow, present the findings of this research.  
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CHAPTER 4 – THE STATE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing global economic crisis is reiterating the importance of good corporate 
governance for the health of the world economy and humanity as a whole. From the 
foregoing, however, it is evident that most studies on corporate governance in the last two 
decades have focussed on developed countries particularly the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Japan. Whilst there has been a massive growth in corporate 
governance research, the literature remains enormously deficient with regards to 
developing countries. This chapter attempts to fill this vacuum through an encompassing 
overview of the nature and practices of corporate governance in Africa’s most populous 
nation. Indeed, corporate governance in developing countries is becoming increasingly 
important globally. Given current global financial conditions, institutional investors 
across the world are beginning to develop substantial interests in emerging markets. 
However, less is known about the processes by which corporate entities, particularly 
public liability companies in the developing world, are directed and controlled.  
 
The debate on corporate governance in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Nigeria, is at a 
developmental stage. One of the key reasons for this is because the viable institutional 
machineries for effective corporate governance are still evolving in developing Africa. 
For example, whilst the stock exchange plays a crucial role in the mobilisation of new 
capital in countries where it is well established, the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) has 
traditionally been a non-stock exchange based financial system (Demirag 1998; Okike 
2007). The implication is that Nigerian corporations have conventionally not seen the 
stock exchange as a means of raising new capital. Habitually, this impeded the ability of 
the stock market to act as a market for corporate control. The economic reform agenda 
embarked upon, in 2004, by the Nigerian government, however, led to the revival of the 
NSE. Subsequently, the total market value of securities listed on the exchange has risen 
from ₦2.9 trillion (£13.2 billion) at year end 2005 to ₦9.56 trillion (£43.5 billion) at year 
end 2008 (NSE 2006; 2009). Commensurate with the need to protect burgeoning 
investors’ wealth, corporate governance in Nigeria has become a matter of brooding 
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disquietude for academics, practitioners, regulators, as well the government. The 
response has been corporate governance reforms which have highlighted and attempted 
to tackle specific issues relating to the governance of listed corporations in Nigeria.   
 
As a result, publicly quoted companies in Nigeria, particularly banks and other financial 
institutions, are increasingly posturing to demonstrate their commitment to good 
corporate governance. This is achieving some international recognition. For example, the 
“Nigeria Capital Markets Day” which was held in London on June 8th 2007 aimed to 
signal to potential foreign investors (individual and institutional) that it is safe to invest in 
Nigeria. The event, which was organised by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 
conjunction with the NSE and Africa Practice, further provided an overview of 
investment opportunities in Nigeria, particularly in the country’s banking sector (LSE 
2007). A further attestation that Nigeria is increasingly being perceived to be a safe 
investment location is the recent listings of some of the country’s banks on the LSE. For 
example, Guaranty Trust Bank, one of Nigeria’s major banks, has become the first 
Nigerian company and first African bank to be listed on the LSE. In the same vein, 
Diamond Bank, another major Nigerian bank, has also been listed on the LSE. In 
addition, Oando, a giant Nigerian oil company, has recently been listed on the South 
Africa’s Johannesburg Stock exchange (JSE). Furthermore, Nigeria has been recently 
rated average in the World Bank investor protection index, which covers issues relating 
to transparency of transactions, liability for self-dealing and shareholders activism (Amao 
and Amaeshi 2008).   
 
Notwithstanding these achievements, the current corporate governance dilemma in the 
country’s banking sector does little to suggest that Nigeria has much practical positive 
results to show for the increased stakeholder advocacy for good corporate governance 
and executive accountability. Indeed this has been highlighted by the recently concluded 
investigations into the years of corrupt practices perpetrated by the top executives of 
major Nigerian banks and their business collaborators, by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) and relevant regulatory bodies. For example, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
under its new leadership has recently (on the 14th of August 2009) dismissed the Chief 
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Executive Officers and executive directors of five major Nigerian Banks, including 
Intercontinental Bank Plc, Union Bank Plc, Afribank Plc, Oceanic Bank Plc and FinBank 
Plc, for bad corporate governance and fraud. Following a preceding CBN audit of banks, 
they were found to have serious liquidity problems due to several billions of naira of 
unpaid and unserviced loans by debtors including top business moguls and politicians.  
Weeks after, the CBN completed its audit process and with the further sack of  the chief 
executives of three other banks; namely Bank PHB Plc, Equitorial Trust Bank Plc and 
Spring Bank Plc, for issues bothering on liquidity, capital adequacy, corporate 
governance and corruption. 
 
As a result, given the yet again renewed emphasis on the need to promote and sustain 
good practices in corporate Nigeria, this study provides a detailed overview of the 
corporate governance system in the Nigerian business sector. Discussions highlight the 
barriers to effective corporate governance and accountability in Nigeria. This chapter is 
thus structured as follows. First, following on from Chapter 2, a theoretical discussion of 
corporate governance in Nigeria is presented, followed by details of relevant historical 
underpinnings and their impact on the country’s traditional corporate governance 
structure. Furthermore, a discourse on the predominant ownership structure of Nigerian 
corporations with regards to its characteristic implications for governance is discussed. 
Subsequently, the state of corporate governance in Nigeria is presented. Here, the 
dimensions of specific corporate governance relationships and problems with regards to 
their peculiarities in Nigeria are examined. These include a discourse on the following; 
agency problems; lack of an effective market for corporate control; the forms and shapes 
of the evolving stakeholder activism mechanism; and the eccentricity of corporate social 
responsibility.  Extracts from the survey data were utilised to create an in-depth 
understanding of these corporate governance issues in the context of Nigeria. Lastly some 
important conclusions are presented. 
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4.1 A DISTORTION IN THE THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA  
Whilst issues relating to corporate governance and investor protection are imperative to 
Nigeria’s economic development and prosperity (Yakasai 2001), the relevance of a 
corporate governance theory has traditionally been in doubt due to the unstructured and 
informal nature of the Nigerian economy (Yahaya 1998). Nigeria obtained its 
independence from Britain in 1960. However, prior to independence, the British colonial 
government put in place an Anglo-Saxon based system of corporate law and regulation. 
As a result, Nigeria inherited an Anglo-Saxon defined framework of corporate 
governance. However, as previously noted, whilst the conceptual configuration of 
corporate governance and accountability in Nigeria has been influenced by several other 
theories associated with the subject, Nigeria’s cultural setting and dominant ideology 
appear to be stakeholder oriented (see Yakasai 2001). Consequently, there evolved a 
mixed theoretical frame for corporate governance in the country, where agency and 
stakeholder theories were majorly prominent in shaping the Nigerian corporate 
governance structure. Nonetheless, one must however note that the configuration of 
corporate governance and accountability in the country has been a mix of several other 
theories on the subject. In the summary below, Yakasai identified five major theories in 
this regard and specifically examined their Nigerian applications (2001; 239-240):  
 
(a) Stewardship hypothesis with the requirement that directors show a fiduciary duty 
towards the owners of the company. Implied in this theory is the fact that the power of 
directors over the enterprise is derived from their democratic appointment by 
shareholders at the Annual General Meetings (AGMs). In most less developed countries 
(LDC’s) today, this largely remains a theory that has not and might not ever be practised 
especially in those nations with dictatorial regimes. In Nigeria, until recently, the AGMs 
of many of the large corporations were fait accompli just to rubber stamp government 
appointments and directives. 
 
(b) Organisational theory which traditionally recognises the peak of organisational 
structure as the chief executive officer (CEO) and that the board of directors (BOD) is a 
mere imposition on such a structure. And for as long as functional reporting obeys such a 
structure, the BOD will remain a mere rubber stamp of the CEO's decisions. This theory 
draws its predominant application in LDC's due to the ownership and control structure of 
enterprises most of which are family businesses and too small in size to warrant the type 
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of corporate democracy witnessed in multinational companies such as HSBC, BT, House 
of Fraser, General Electric, etc. 
 
(c) Stakeholder hypothesis which gathered momentum in the 1970s reflecting a societal 
fear that the large multinational corporations (MNCs) had become too imperialistic and 
powerful to be held accountable solely through the classical stewardship hypothesis. 
Environmentalists and consumerists particularly find a perfect ally in the stakeholder 
theory. The role of environmentalists in the oilproducing areas of the world such as the 
Niger Delta region in Nigeria is a classic example. Furthermore, the genesis of 
government's domineering investment in the oil sector in Nigeria derived from this theory 
that oil was so strategic to the country that the whole nation became the all-important 
stakeholder. The same arguments were proposed as the premises for promulgating the   
moribund Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Acts of 1972, 1977 and 1989. 
 
(d) Agency theory postulates a different perspective of the nature of man seeking self-
interest rather than an altruistic goal and as such cannot always be trusted. This is a real 
problem in any untransparent developing nation whereby corporate executives milk their 
companies and become “fat cats” while the investors become anaemic, a situation very 
prevalent during the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) years in Nigeria. 
 
(e) The classical theory of the firm which recognises four factors of production, the most 
important being the entrepreneur, who organises and manages other inputs and he is 
responsible for the decisions, control and direction of the company. For the third world 
countries, things are not as straight-jacketed because of many factors/problems such as 
the consequences of colonisation, the interventionist role of domestic governments, the 
poverty level and the impairment of private initiatives, amongst others. 
 
As a result of the impact of these theories, opinions typically differ with regards to the 
content, boundary and relevance of corporate governance in developing countries, and 
Nigeria in particular (Tricker 1996). This theoretical distortion further suggests that 
countries matter for corporate governance. They matter because they determine what 
firms benefit or loose, when they adhere to notions of good corporate governance 
principles (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 2004). Whilst there is no corruption-free society, in 
a developing country such as Nigeria, corporate governance issues are often discussed 
amidst the larger problem of endemic corruption. Particularly, firms have traditionally 
been less encouraged to adopt good corporate governance principles. This has 
conventionally left investors (especially minority shareholders) without efficient 
protection.   
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To what degree has globalisation as well as the need to access foreign capital driven 
firms in developing countries to adopt good standards of corporate governance? Doidge 
et al. (2004) argue that firms with access to foreign capital are less dependent on their 
countries’ development. They argue that they should therefore learn from the investor 
protection structures of countries where protection is higher. To what extent is this 
incentive valid in the Nigerian case? First let us take an historical look. 
 
4.2 RELEVANT HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES FOR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
The history of corporate governance in Nigeria can stretch to the colonial days. The 
greater part of the colonial era witnessed the dominance of British companies, subject to 
British laws, but in the Nigerian business environment.  As a result, issues relating to the 
conduct and governance of Nigerian corporations, which are contained within the 
provisions of the company legislation, have their roots in the country’s colonial past 
(Okike 2007). Nigeria thus inherited the British corporate governance system.  
Furthermore, whilst Nigeria’s attainment of independence led to the replacement of the 
Companies Ordinance of 1922 by the 1968 Companies Act, the UK corporate law 
remained a huge influence; for example, the 1968 Companies Act extensively mirrored 
the UK Companies Act of 1948 (Okike 2007). Although there have been several 
company law reforms over the years, the legal system of corporate governance in Nigeria 
has remained fashioned along the Anglo-Saxon model. 
 
Nigeria’s inheritance of the British corporate governance system suggests that good 
corporate governance should be promoted, at the basic. However, there are significant 
doubts that UK corporate laws are complementary, reflective and applicable to the 
Nigerian business climate. Thus while the legal underpinnings are a reflection of the UK 
framework, it would be unwise to assume that Nigeria mirrors the UK in terms of 
application (Okike 2007) and particularly in terms of entrenched principle. Nigeria’s 
legal operating framework for corporations has not been developed on the basis on the 
country’s peculiar business environment. Nigeria has therefore traditionally failed to deal 
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with company law and governance problems that are specific to her socio-cultural and 
political environments (Okike 2007).  
 
During the colonial era, the Nigerian private sector was dominated by British companies, 
after British interests. Following political independence from the British government in 
1960, one of the key economic liberation/ development strategies immediately pursued 
by the then Nigerian government was to foster domestic ownership and control of the 
Nigerian private sector.  Traditionally, this had significant implications for corporate 
governance. By restricting significant foreign ownership that potentially could have acted 
as external checks and balances, the resulting indigenous owners and major shareholders 
were able to perpetuate several corrupt deals at the expense of minority investors. 
However, it must be noted that the restriction in foreign ownership under the Nigerian 
Enterprise Promotion Act of 1972 and 1977 still allowed foreign participation for up to 
60 percent or 40 percent depending on the industry. Indeed many foreign corporations 
were still able to devise strategies (such as buying stakes through local investors or 
indigenous firms) to circumvent the regulations in order to hold percentages in Nigerian 
corporations higher than those provided for in the law (Achebe 1989). It is thus important 
to balance the view that less restrictive foreign ownership could have impacted positively 
on Nigeria’s corporate governance system, particularly with increasing examples of 
corporate scandals in multinational companies and joint ventures operating in Nigeria. 
Some ongoing corporate scandals such as the Cadbury Nigeria accounting scandal of 
2007, the Halliburton scandal in Nigeria of 2008, and the Siemens bribery scandal of 
2009 do little to suggest that foreign majority ownership leads to better corporate 
governance and accountability.8  
 
Nevertheless, the aftermath of Nigeria’s independence in 1960 saw a surge in economic 
nationalism. This resulted in an indigenisation programme which gave way to State 
participation and majority ownership in core areas of the economy (Nmehielle and 
Nwauche 2004). However, this strategy, which operated in the environment of weak 
                                                   
8 Given the relevance of these scandals to the discussions presented in this thesis, more detail is provided 
on them in subsequent discussions.  
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market institutions (Ahunwan 2002) and corruption, resulted in a faulty and 
uncompetitive corporate governance system. As a result, there was limited challenge to 
management's running of corporate enterprises which led to the lack of independent and 
off-sight supervision, and of intervention in matters of accountability (Yakassai 2001) 
and governance.  The Nigerian corporate governance scenery has thus been littered with 
consistent practices of non-transparent disclosure of information and corrupt dealings 
between managers, directors and officials of the equally corrupt government shareholder.  
 
The pursuits of several economic reform agenda, especially starting from the 1980s, led 
to the privatisation of government-owned enterprises and the subsequent rise of the 
private sector as a principal vehicle of economic growth. These have fuelled the corporate 
governance debate in Nigeria. More recently, the financial performance of companies 
listed on the NSE, especially banks, particularly between the years 2004 and 2007 has 
further catalysed the corporate governance debate, with shareholders, employees, 
regulatory bodies and the general public demonstrating their zeal to acquire information 
about companies, especially in the area of corporate governance.  On the international 
corporate scene, recent occurrences such as the Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat scandals 
specifically highlighted the potential disasters of bad corporate governance to Nigeria. 
Ongoing local corporate scandals are also helping to refocus Nigeria’s attention on the 
need to ensure an effective and credible domestic corporate governance system. Current 
global economic crisis is further adding momentum to the growing debate. Corporate 
governance in Nigeria and indeed in Africa has thus become a matter of significant 
importance for academics, practitioners and policy makers.   
 
4.3 WHO OWNS NIGERIA’S CORPORATIONS? IMPLICATIONS FOR 
GOVERNANCE  
4.3.1 Introduction 
When firms are not controlled by their owners, there must be a mechanism in place which 
ensures that managers act in the interest of shareholders. This is the core of the agency 
theory literature. Agency theory unequivocally assumes that managers will always want 
to pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholders. This in turn, will make them 
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keep vital information with regards to the company’s position (information asymmetry) 
from outside owners, which makes the latter’s monitoring of the company rather 
impossible or very costly. A free-rider problem thus emanates. This is a problem created 
when individual (small) and dispersed shareholders, who practically stand to gain little 
from a very expensive monitoring cost, become complacent and somewhat undisturbed 
by managerial behaviour. The free-rider problem further empowers managers to use 
companies’ assets to maximize their own interests.  However, large block of shareholders 
such as pension funds, institutional investors and major individual shareholders should 
have a greater incentive to monitor managers. Given that they can make use of their 
voting powers to influence management’s behaviour, they are able to minimize the free 
rider problem. The aforementioned issues clearly highlight the importance of ownership 
structures in the eventual governance of corporations. Therefore, an exposition on these 
issues, which specifically relate to the extent of the separation of firms’ ownership from 
their control, in the context of Nigeria, is provided.  Essentially, the implications of the 
ownership characteristics of Nigerian firms for corporate governance, is examined. 
 
4.3.2 Discussions 
As previously indicated, Nigeria adopted a post-independent economic development 
strategy to foster domestic ownership and control in principal areas of the country’s 
economy. These include the “oil and gas” and the “science and technology” sectors. As a 
result, the Foreign Exchange Control Act (FX Act) of 1962 and the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree (NEPD) of 1972 were enacted. However, Achebe (1989) argues that 
government’s intentions were not been fully accomplished. As earlier mentioned, the 
author noted that there have been several cases of Nigerians fronting for foreigners in 
order to satisfy the ownership requirements of the 1962 FX Act and the NEPD 1972. 
However the government’s economic liberation strategy shaped the corporate ownership 
structure of present day Nigerian corporations. Ahunwan grouped the ownership structure 
of Nigerian corporations under the following four categories (2002; 271-272):  
 
Category "A" can be conceived as composed of corporations wholly-owned by 
government. Both the federal government and state governments operate wholly-owned 
corporations, including four major petroleum refineries (owned by the Federal 
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Government), petrochemical plants, insurance companies, banks, hotels and a range of 
other enterprises. 
 
Category "B" comprises joint venture arrangements between the federal government and 
foreign crude oil producing corporations. Although the government operates joint 
venture arrangements in other sectors, it makes sense to include this sector as a separate 
category due to its immense importance to the national economy. A key indicator of the 
importance of this sector is the fact that the government of Nigeria derives about 97 
percent of its total revenue from joint ventures in oil and gas.  
 
Group "C" consists of publicly listed corporations. Here foreign investors operate with 
local investors in the industrial and commercial sector. The foreign investors are mostly 
subsidiaries of multinational enterprises, and foreign investors hold a majority or 
controlling interest in many of the corporations.  
 
Finally, Group "D" consists of privately owned corporations that are not listed on the 
stock market. Most of the corporations are familyowned. A majority of them are small 
companies, owned and operated by families and friends and lacking business 
sophistication. Some of these enterprises, however, are quite large, with a capital base 
comparable to many listed corporations. Banks, insurance and various industrial 
corporations come under this category. Both foreign and local entrepreneurs operate in 
this category. 
 
A number of deductions can be made from the above classifications. To start with, 
corporate governance in the Anglo-Saxon context has generally been discussed in terms 
of aligning management’s (agents) interests with that of shareholders (principals). The 
above classifications indicate that the principal-agent problem has traditionally been 
silent in Nigeria. Often times we refer to the same set of individuals, given that many 
companies have their principal shareholders or their appointees (in the persons of 
relatives, friends or associates), involved in the daily running of the company. As a non-
executive director of a large Nigerian corporation puts it;  
 
“In Nigeria, there has always been a tendency to tailor business as a one-man or family 
business thing” 
 
Traditionally the need to protect the “passive outsider owner” has thus been irrelevant in 
Nigeria. Given that significant block ownership concentrates too much power on few 
individuals, more recent developments in the country have led to the reduction in block 
stock ownership. These include several corporate governance law reforms. The need to 
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access capital in order to remain competitive has also led to partial dilution of traditional 
block/family stocks.   For example, family run businesses seeking to list on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange would have to loose some of their “family grip.” However findings from 
this survey suggest that a considerable number of new listed firms are still able to retain 
their family members and close associates on the boards and managements of these 
companies. The implications of this for corporate administration and governance are 
severe. In the words of a senior official of a regulatory agency; 
 
“By having their family members on the board, several issues relating to the company 
are discussed in a family like manner, outside board meetings. This also creates an 
avenue for several corrupt practices to go unchecked”.  
 
As in most countries, the foundation of most businesses in Nigeria is the family. However 
the over-bearing influence of the family-owner is self-sustaining in Nigeria. This is 
achieved through continuous appointments of relations and close friends unto the boards 
and managements of companies, even after they become listed.  A good example is 
Oceanic Bank Plc, one of the largest banks in Nigeria, where a board member and 
another member of the management team belong to the same family with the CEO, prior 
to the recent board dissolution by the CBN, as previously mentioned. Whilst most 
examples are not as apparent as this, family administered businesses remain vibrant in 
Nigeria. A former executive director of a listed corporation points out an implication of 
this. In his words;  
 
“Funny things happen in the Nigerian corporate governance environment. Take a 
situation where a bank needs a head office and gives loan to a director (family member of 
the CEO) to build the head office who subsequently leases to the bank at an exorbitant 
price. Worst still, this senior management/board corruption goes in a top - down manner 
to negatively impact the behaviour of non-senior staff and their behaviour when they 
become senior” 
 
Another respondent who is the vice-chairman of a large Nigerian corporation further 
points out another caveat of family ownership/strong presence of family members. She 
notes that; 
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“Family disputes are often brought into board matters to disrupt normality” 
 
Furthermore, family owners in Nigeria are generally reluctant to loose their controlling 
stake, and hence are normally hesitant to dilute/sell their shares. Consequently, unlike the 
traditional principal-agent problem highlighted in the Anglo-Saxon literature, the major 
agency conflict in developing countries has largely been between majority and minority 
shareholders (Ahunwan 2002). Findings from this survey show that majority shareholders 
have one-stop access to relevant information with regards to the financial state of 
companies, and are thus able to drive firms in ways which promote their personal 
interests at the expense of information-deficient minority shareholders. From Ahunwan’s 
ownership classification, it can be deducted that an outstanding characteristic of the 
ownership structure of Nigerian corporations is “majority” (or substantial minority) 
ownership. One can also deduce that apart from the 100 percent government-owned 
corporations in Category A, the government generally exercises majority ownership in 
Category B. Furthermore, majority ownership may be vested in government, foreign 
investors (especially transnational corporations) or local entrepreneurs in category C. In 
Category D, family ownership and control is the norm. Table 4.1 shows the shareholding 
structure of categories B and C. This suggests that minority investors have traditionally 
been disadvantaged with no access to vital company information. Conventionally, the 
annual company reports and accounts have always been manipulated, thus lacking 
relevant information to guide a minority shareholder’s investment decision.  
 
However the last five years have witnessed some changes in the Nigerian corporate 
ownership structure, due to increasing reforms. Furthermore, these reforms have largely 
concentrated on the Nigerian banking sector. On the 6th of July, 2004, the Central Bank 
of Nigeria announced a banking reform programme which required all banks to raise 
their capital base to a minimum of ₦25 billion (£100 million). Whilst this led to the 
injection of new capital by shareholders of some banks, it required many banks to seek 
external funds on the stock market. This led to the reduction of majority stake ownership 
in the Nigerian banking sector. More importantly, the banking reform resulted in several 
mergers and acquisitions. These developments have further challenged the predominant 
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family ownership structure of Nigerian corporations. Companies seeking investments and 
merger partners have also had to demonstrate their commitments to good corporate 
governance. These developments may mark the beginning of a major change in the 
ownership structure of Nigeria’s corporations with increasing diversification of 
ownership as against concentrated ownership which Ahunwan described. Furthermore the 
increasingly robust rules of regulatory authorities have also contributed to the reduction 
of majority ownership. 
          
 Table 4.1: Some Group B and C companies and their shareholding structure 
CATEGORY  Name of Company    Shareholding Structure (%) 
Foreign  Government 
B Shell Petroleum Nig Ltd 45 55 
Chevron Nigeria Ltd 40 60 
Mobil Producing Nig Ltd 40 60 
Nigeria Agip Oil Ltd 40 60 
Elf Nig Ltd 40 60 
C  Foreign Others 
Nigeria Breweries 41.67 58.33 
Guinness Nigeria Plc 42.21 57.77 
Nestle Foods Nigeria Plc 56.90 43 
Mobil Oil Nigeria Plc 60 40 
Total Nigeria Plc 60 40 
    Source: Adapted from Ahunwan (2002: 272-273) 
 
 
4.3.3 Conclusion 
Whilst the Nigerian Stock Exchange remains one of the biggest equities market in Africa, 
it nevertheless houses only about 260 companies (NSE 2008). Oyejide and Soyibo (2001) 
argue that most businesses in the Nigerian formal business sector are not publicly listed. 
They further noted that about 38 percent of the companies operating in the formal sector 
do so outside the provisions of the company law.  They also pointed out that 87 percent 
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of formal sector businesses operate outside the legislation governing the Nigerian stock 
exchange. This suggests that the Nigerian corporate ownership structure is still largely 
non-diversified. Thus, the problems associated with majority ownership remain vibrant. 
Some of these are discussed in the following sections. 
 
4.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN NIGERIA 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, and has an estimated population of 145 
million. It is also the largest African market for goods and services. The Nigerian oil and 
gas sector contributes 99 percent of the country’s export revenues and 85 percent of 
government revenues; with her large reserves of human and natural resources, Nigeria 
has the potential to build a prosperous economy (World Bank 2009). However, 
corruption thrived and became a “way of life”, during the military regimes which 
followed the country’s independence from Britain. Corruption has traditionally been at 
the centre of corporate governance issues in Nigeria. Nigeria has a history of a 
considerable number of high-profile and often inconceivable frauds which have been 
perpetrated by managers and directors of listed corporations. In the early 1990s, the 
country’s financial sector experienced a major turbulence which resulted in the collapse 
of several financial institutions, and led to the erosion of investors’ confidence (ROSC 
2004). This was as a result of several corrupt practices and dealings which involved 
managers and directors of listed banks. Furthermore, this undermined customers’ trust 
and highlighted the importance of good corporate governance for corporate vitality and 
economic stability.  
 
Following the return to democratic leadership in 1999, the government has been keen to 
restore the lost confidence of investors, as well as to attract significant foreign 
investments into the country. With FDI into Nigeria reaching US$2 billion in 2005 
(World Bank 2007), there is increasing awareness that  Nigeria needs to commit to good 
and globally accepted principles of corporate governance in order to compete for 
international investments.  In the following sub-sections, the different corporate 
governance issues in Nigeria are examined in order to provide a current and 
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comprehensive account of the nature of corporate governance in Nigeria. Discussions 
further highlight details of recent developments and their implications for corporate 
governance. First, the agency problem is discussed in more detail. Then, the role of 
market forces in corporate governance is examined followed by some evidence of 
stakeholder activism. The author further discusses the nature of corporate social 
responsibility in Nigeria. Useful case studies of corporate scandals in Nigeria are 
incorporated into the discussions, in order to ensure a more profound basis for analysis. 
 
4.4.2 Agency Issues 
Corporate governance is concerned with the ways in which all parties interested in the 
well-being of the modern firm attempt to ensure that managers and other insiders take 
measures or adopt mechanisms that protect their interests (Sanda, Mikailu and Garba 
2005). This becomes necessary given that the ownership of the modern firm is separated 
from its control. Anglo-Saxon corporate governance scholarship, especially the 
economics and finance literature (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997) have thus traditionally focussed significantly on resolving this problem. 
Scholars have thus concentrated on the use of incentives to align the interests of firms’ 
equity owners with their management. Whilst previous discussions on the Nigerian 
corporate ownership structure highlights the fact that the major agency conflict in 
developing countries has traditionally been between majority and minority shareholders, 
this does not mean that the classical principal-agent problem does not arise (Ahunwan 
2002), particularly in the past 6 years, which has witnessed a sharp increase in the 
number of financial stakeholders of many Nigerian companies. Ahunwan (2002) also 
argued that this agency problem is heightened by the endemic culture of corruption and 
bribery, ethnic tensions and rivalries, poorly functioning markets and lack of adequate 
infrastructure. As summarised below, Ahunwan (2002: 274) further highlighted a case of 
Unilever, Nigeria Ltd, a listed firm in Nigeria, in order to show-case the principal-agent 
problem as it arises in the Nigerian context;  
 
“The agency problem as it arises in the Nigerian context is exemplified by the case of 
Unilever, Nigeria Ltd. Unilever, Nigeria  Ltd,  is a public listed company in Nigeria. The 
Unilever Group U.K. has a 52 percent stake in the company. Between 1996 and 1998, 
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there were reports of abuse by senior management, including insider dealings, shares 
racketeering and the awarding of supply contracts to companies in which senior 
management had interests (Ogbu 1998). Sources also disclosed that one of the key 
officers of the company had up to 18 official cars, while almost all of the company's 
major contracts were handled by a company registered in his wife's name. The reports 
further revealed that employment and other management decisions were based more on 
ethnic solidarity than efficiency considerations (Ogbu 1998). Corporate abuse in 
Unilever, culminated in serious financial irregularities.”  
                                           
On the basis of this case, Ahunwan (2002) registered the inability of majority 
shareholders to monitor managers positively in the Nigerian context. He further argued 
that whilst the Unilever Group in the United Kingdom exercised majority ownership, this 
did not ensure efficient monitoring of local management. He thus concluded that this 
makes Schleifer and Vishny’s (1997) argument that the effectiveness of large 
shareholders' in controlling management, through the use of voting rights to oust 
management, of minimal relevance in the Nigerian context. Findings from this survey 
show that foreign majority owners generally lack in-depth local knowledge of the 
Nigerian peculiar corporate governance environment. The Nigerian corporate governance 
system has traditionally been riddled with severe and endemic corruption. Whilst some of 
these problems are not in any way restricted to developing countries, the conventional 
inefficient regulatory system has allowed corporate corruption to flourish and go 
unchecked. According to a senior official of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), a corporate governance regulatory agency in Nigeria;   
 
“Managers and board directors of listed corporations have already become used to 
abusing the powers bestowed on them by shareholders to reap private benefits”  
 
Directors’ misconduct and corruption have thus traditionally been at the centre of 
corporate governance problems in Nigeria, especially in the country’s banking sector. 
According to a director in a listed Nigerian bank; 
 
“Notably, bank directors have become used to using their positions to defraud their 
organisations. This has, in many cases, led to the collapse of such banks”  
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Umoh (2007) highlighted some common directors’ excesses. These include the lack of 
disclosure of interests in loans, offices or properties rented/leased/sold to the bank as well 
as services provided by own companies to the bank.  There have also been cases of 
directors who have taken loans which exceeded shareholders’ fund, and subsequently left 
them unsecured and non-performing. Umoh (2007) further noted that some of these 
directors even got interest waivers on their loans whilst remaining on the board. No 
doubt, there are increasingly robust regulatory measures being put in place to address 
many of these conventional practices. Part of these is the 2006 Central Bank of Nigeria’s 
Code of Corporate Governance, which was designed to address some of the 
aforementioned challenges in the country’s banking industry. The Nigerian corporate 
governance regulatory structure is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.  
 
In progressing discussions on the agency issues peculiar to the Nigerian environment, it is 
important to scrutinise the role of government. As evident from earlier discussions on the 
ownership structure of Nigerian corporations, the government remains a majority 
shareholder in many corporations. Whilst there have been commendable efforts towards 
privatisation, the government retains major shareholdings, especially in key sectors of the 
economy.  The Nigerian government, as a majority shareholder, exemplifies another 
possible dimension of the agency relationship. This relates to government’s “undue” 
influence on the corporation, especially in the traditionally government owned banks. 
Conventionally, governments have been able to secure loans from these companies on the 
basis that they are owners. This has resulted in several irresponsible and damaging 
practices, especially during decades of the military era. In commenting on this matter, 
these were the words of a chairman of a listed bank in Nigeria: 
 
“Directors’ excesses were widespread in banks that were traditionally government owned 
or family owned. Governments, especially at the state level, simply secure loans for 
governmental projects, from these banks. These are always done without any 
consideration for other stakeholders.  They eventually killed many of these state owned 
banks” 
 
The traditional political structure and culture of Nigeria, as discussions in chapter 5 
would further indicate, enables governments to engage in these negative practices without 
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being challenged. As a result, corporate governance practices and partisan political 
considerations intermingle resulting in board and senior-managerial appointments based 
on political affinities, ethnic loyalties, and/or religious faith as opposed to considerations 
of efficiencies and capabilities (Yerokun 1992; Akanki 1994). However, more recent 
evidence and developments suggest that Nigerian regulatory agencies are demonstrating 
increasing commitment to address many of these issues. Measures are thus being put in 
place to combat the endemic managerial excesses and corruption, as this survey further 
indicates.  
 
4.4.3 The Market as a Form of Corporate Control 
4.4.3.1 Introduction 
The contractual theory of the corporation holds that managers and owners have incentives 
to design corporate governance contracts in ways which maximises shareholder value, 
and in turn, the corporation’s value (Butler 1989). A private way of enforcing good 
corporate behaviour, in addition to legal/statutory requirements, is thus entrenched in 
market forces. Market forces represent institutions which should potentially reduce the 
principal-agent costs. Whilst they are often considered to be imperfect, they are expected 
to work independently in ways which limit managerial self-serving tendencies. However, 
whilst market forces play key roles in the corporate governance systems of developed 
countries, the extent of their influence is reduced in developing countries such as Nigeria. 
No doubt, there have been recent noteworthy activities in the Nigerian capital market. 
Nonetheless, the degree to which market forces are legitimate in the Nigerian 
environment is unknown. Often times, they play very ambiguous roles. In this section, 
three types of market forces which are commonly discussed in the literature are 
presented. The presence of these market forces, and their capacity to promote good 
corporate governance in Nigeria, are examined. These are the product markets, manager’s 
markets and capital markets. As expected, a major emphasis is made on the role of capital 
markets in governing corporate behaviour. 
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4.4.3.2 Discussions 
Product market competition 
The product market competition can constitute an incentive scheme which ensures good 
corporate governance (Hart 1983). It specifically assumes that managers would do 
everything necessary to keep their jobs, even if this means good governance. This, in 
turn, is expected to create more shareholder value and firm vitality.  Two types of product 
market competition are commonly highlighted in the extant corporate governance 
literature.  The first relates to the direct/immediate competition in the firm's product 
markets. Here, managers are expected to restrain from pursuing their self-interests, given 
that this would increase costs and render the firm's products uncompetitive which ideally 
should lead to the removal of management (Butler 1989; Ahunwan 2002). However this 
does not happen in the real world as the firms’ competitors are also subject to the same 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976) which consequently neutralises the product 
markets’ effects (Ahunwan 2002). Furthermore many product markets are oligopolistic 
themselves and do not effectively subject senior management to pressure (Ahunwan 
2002).  
 
In Nigeria, the ability of product market competition to discipline management has 
traditionally been in doubt given that the Nigerian market may be described as one which 
does not necessarily reward managements according to their products’ efficiency or 
innovative abilities (Ahunwan 2002). Ahunwan based this argument on the strong 
consumer preference for foreign products at the expense of local ones, by Nigerians. 
Whilst this might have been the traditional consumer characteristics of affluent Nigerians, 
his argument does not account for industry specific factors which make certain local 
goods and services not just more preferable, but the only option.  Furthermore, his 
arguments did not consider the rapid economic development and expansion that Nigeria 
has experienced in very recent times. These developments have been largely concentrated 
in the non-oil sectors, especially the banking and telecommunication industries. Local 
firms in these industries are thus increasingly engaged in intense rivalry and the prospects 
for product market competition to act as an incentive for good corporate governance is 
arising.  Findings from this survey suggest that there is increasing evidence of product 
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market competition in large companies. It is thus expected that this will gradually 
influence managerial conduct. As a result, the role of product markets as a force to 
govern corporate behaviour in Nigeria should not be totally nullified.  The second type of 
product market competition relates to the product competition in the market of the firm’s 
owners, especially in the case of mutual funds and institutional investors. Findings from 
this survey show no substantial evidence of this. 
 
Managers’ market competition 
Managers’ market competition refers to the market for management services or 
managerial labour. Fama (1980) argues that the forces of managerial markets work in 
ways which compensate good managers with prospects of promotion, and at the same 
time deters managerial misdemeanour through the fear of job loss. To what extent are 
managerial interests thus aligned with that of their owners in Nigeria? Ahunwan (2002) 
registered that the effects of managerial market competition are ambiguous, especially in 
wholly-owned state corporations and joint ventures. He argued that in these 
organisations, loyalty to political mentors and administrative patrons, rather than the 
measure of executive performance ensure senior- management’s job security and dictates 
their potential compensation packages. Findings from this survey are in agreement with 
this. According to the former CEO and Chairman of a major Nigerian corporation; 
 
“CEOs and directors in Nigeria would rather spend their time establishing cordial 
relationships with politicians and senior government figures, than spend their time in the 
company. Frankly, these relationships are crucial to their business” 
 
Furthermore, a chairman of major Nigerian bank typically noted as follows; 
 
“I would rather spend my time more in Abuja (Nigeria’s capital), mingling with key 
politicians, as they matter most to the success of your business in this country” 
 
Capital market competition  
Manne (1965) argues that the market for corporate control gives shareholders power and 
protection which are commensurate with their shareholdings in the company. He further 
maintained that this is based on the high positive correlation between corporate 
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managerial efficiency and the company’s share value on the stock market. The capital 
markets are at the centre of corporate control in most developed economies. Capital 
market competition links the value of company stocks to managerial performance and 
behaviour, and in turn, good corporate governance. It allows investors to know the value 
of a particular company and enable shareholders and prospective investors to assess 
management’s performance through share price movements. Consequently, it makes 
management susceptible to hostile take-overs in situations of poor performance. However 
Fama (1980) posits that there is empirical evidence (Fama 1976) to suggest that the 
capital market generally makes rational assessments of the value of a firm based upon 
imprecise and uncertain information.  
 
Particularly, developing countries such as Nigeria are characterised by less developed 
capital markets and lesser liquidity. The market control function of Nigeria’s capital 
market has thus been historically inefficient. Findings from this survey also show that the 
Nigerian capital market operators have traditionally lacked sufficient competence and 
expertise. Consequently, the performance and behavioural conduct of managers have 
seldom reflected in their firm’s stock prices. The recent scandal at Cadbury Schweppes’s 
subsidiary in Nigeria - Cadbury Nigeria Plc - summarised below, further highlights the 
limitations of the Nigerian capital market, as an active force for corporate control (Amao 
and Amaeshi 2008: 127-128): 
 
“International interests have been attracted to Nigeria recently due to the discovery of 
Enron like Scandal in the subsidiary of Cadbury Schweppes in Nigeria: Cadbury Nigeria 
Plc. Concerns have been raised particularly because of the company’s high profile in the 
private sector and domestic economy and as a major player on the NSE. The fact that it 
took Cadbury Schweppes, the parent company’s intervention to discover the 
irregularities have called into question the capacity of the Nigerian corporate 
governance environment and framework. It must be observed that the financial accounts 
in question were scrutinised and approved by the NSE…..In this connection, investors, 
including pension fund managers, have since the revelation lost a lot of money. Since the 
exposure of the company’s misrepresentation of their financial statements, the shares of 
the company declined from its high of ₦70 on the 18 of August, 2006 to ₦32.46—a 
reduction of 46 percent—on December, 2006 translating into a loss estimated to be in the 
region of ₦41.3 billion in shareholders equity”. 
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The above case clearly indicates the extent to which the role of the Nigerian capital 
market as a driver of corporate control and managerial discipline has been very ruinous. 
The Unilever case, discussed earlier, does not only demonstrate an agency conflict in 
Nigeria but also highlights the functional deficiency of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. In 
commenting on this, a senior official of a corporate governance regulatory agency stated 
that: 
 
“Corruption in the private sector is largely covered up. Taking the Cadbury scandal for 
example, if not for some external interests that were in the matter, shareholders’ fund 
would have been eroded without anyone noticing. The Nigerian stock exchange does 
limited scrutiny of submitted reports by companies. In Nigeria, I am not convinced that 
stock prices reflect managerial performance”  
 
Furthermore, the historically small size and less liquidity of the Nigerian capital market, 
coupled with the corporate ownership structure, are indications that the threat of a 
takeover has played virtually no role in disciplining management and protecting minority 
shareholders’ interests (Ahunwan 2002). As an interview respondent, who is a non-
executive director of a listed company puts it; 
 
“Take-overs occur in Nigeria, but they have never been as a result of poor firm 
performance. Hostile take-overs seldom happen in Nigeria even during the bank reform 
process”  
 
Findings from this survey further suggest that the minimal evidence of market for 
mergers and acquisitions, as a control mechanism for good corporate governance, 
function differently in Nigeria. Traditionally, Nigerian corporations rarely seek to acquire 
underperforming or inefficiently run companies on the basis that they are able to run 
them better in order to achieve better performances and better firm value.  According to 
the chairman of a large Nigerian bank; 
 
“Nigerian companies merge or acquire other companies simply because they want to 
grow larger or the company being acquired is actually performing well. Some mergers 
are, however, largely strategic and based on the recognition that the merger product firm 
will be more competitive than the two separate firms combined” 
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Lastly, findings from this survey show that institutional shareholders are better positioned 
to instigate mergers and acquisitions. They can achieve this by persuading the poorly 
coordinated individual shareholders of underperforming companies to sell their shares. 
However, the few active institutional shareholders present in Nigeria have not made 
significant impact in this area. 
 
4.4.3.3 Conclusion 
The dimensions of the market for corporate control in Nigeria further bring to bear the 
need to understand corporate governance mechanisms as being shaped by specific 
institutional configurations, such as the ownership structure, political environment and 
culture, economic climate as well as social networks. These are discussed in detail in 
chapter 5. 
 
4.4.4 Stakeholder Activism 
Nigeria is rich! It is rich in mineral wealth and ranks tenth in the world in terms of oil 
reserves. Nigeria has a proven reserve of 1.3 trillion barrels out of which it has a total oil 
production of 84,597,000 barrels per day and exports 13,707, 000 to the US (EIA 2007). 
Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and ranks twelfth in the world. The oil sector 
is the life of the Nigerian economy with the country’s economic strength almost solely 
based on its oil and gas resources.  
 
Nigeria is poor! Paradoxically Nigeria, albeit blessed with enormous mineral resources, 
has its citizens majorly living in abject poverty with shortage of potable water and 
electricity. Indeed, the people of the Niger Delta region which houses the oil wealth live 
in overwhelming poverty. Their environment suffers from constant degradation including 
oil spillage and gas flaring. Consequently, these have prevented the inhabitants of the 
Niger Delta, South-Eastern Nigeria to conduct their daily business of subsistence 
agriculture (farming and fishing).The extent of the damages caused as a result of oil 
pollution occasioned by multinational companies (MNC’s) in the Niger Delta is alarming. 
Gas flaring, which has ceased to occur in most developed countries, is still the order of 
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the day in the Niger Delta. Nigeria flares more natural gas than any other country in the 
world. The consequences of these developments are severe.  
 
However, particularly for our discussion, the author will focus on the implications of 
these for corporate governance, administration and responsibility. Here, it must be noted 
that widespread environmental devastation including enormous threats to life has been 
fuelling the rigorous campaigns (both violent and non-violent ones) by the inhabitants of 
the Niger Delta. This activism by the Niger Deltans has survived decades with notable 
violent protests including the kidnap of several foreign oil workers and relations of top 
political elites. These have further generated global media concerns especially with 
regards to the safety of expatriates and their families in Nigeria. 
 
More importantly, these issues are adding momentum to the stakeholder activism debate 
in Nigeria. Whilst recent measures have been adopted to salvage the Niger Delta crisis, 
particularly the amnesty deal for militants by the Federal Government, stakeholder 
activism, in the form of militant activities in the Niger Delta, has severely impacted 
Nigeria’s oil production potential by reducing her total oil production by 20 percent (EIA 
2007). More recently the Niger-Delta women added a new dimension to the activism 
against the illegal and damaging behaviour of multinational oil companies. Their protests 
specifically led to the shutting down of ChevronTexaco oil flow operations. Let us 
consider this particular case as it highlights the culture specificity of the evolving 
stakeholder activism phenomenon in Nigeria (Daniel 2002): 
“The protests began when women from the Itsekiri tribe in Delta State, Nigeria, wrote to 
Chevron insisting on better living conditions ….. Infuriated by the lack of response, 150 
women ……marched silently and unarmed took over Chevron's Escravos export facility. 
Their action was calculated. More than 700 Nigerian and expatriate employees of the 
company were trapped in the facility. Planes and helicopters were unable to land, and 
boats were unable to dock and unload fresh supplies to the terminal………The women 
took advantage of the patriarchal attitudes of their society and of the organisation they 
were battling. Chevron has used armed forces to quell similar protests and takeovers, but 
its armed security men had never received any training on how to contain an invading 
army of women singing solidarity songs. The women demonstrated political 
sophistication by adopting a tactic which rendered government's military option non-
effective as the government was also aware of the political consequences of attacking 
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unarmed women with the whole world watching. The women also effectively invoked a 
local taboo - they threatened to take off their clothes if the security officers attacked 
them”  
This case and subsequent developments resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between the Niger-Delta community and Chevron. The MOU 
mandated Chevron to make substantial commitments in areas of infrastructure, education 
and employment. Furthermore, technological forces, especially the internet is promoting 
effective stakeholder activism in Nigeria. For example, Ahunwan (2002) noted that the 
emergence of several Nigerian social websites provides an important forum for the 
discussions of different social, economic and political issues, which relate to corporate 
governance. He also noted that these websites freely provide relevant information with 
regards to the communal responsibilities of corporations in Nigeria. Findings from this 
survey also suggest the emergence of notable non-governmental organisations which are 
also creating a platform upon which stakeholders and corporations can constructively 
interact. These include the Convention of Business Integrity (CBI), Transparency Nigeria 
and the earlier mentioned Society for Corporate Governance in Nigeria.  
 
4.4.5 Corporate Social Responsibility  
No doubt, discussions here will follow on from preceding analysis. Substantially, the 
underlying factor of the emergence of stakeholder activism in Nigeria is the neglect of 
social responsibilities by corporations especially the oil giants. In this section, the subject 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is discussed as constituting a strategic part of 
corporate governance. This is with a general understanding that the concept serves as a 
bridge between governance issues and notions of equity and fairness in society (Deakin 
and Whittaker 2007). It thus differs from the traditional conception of the subject in terms 
of corporate philanthropy and basic compliance with standards relating to corporate 
behaviour (Deakin and Whittaker 2007). Consequently, CSR is discussed as a set of 
practices or mechanisms, which have managerial, regulatory, financial (Deakin and 
Whittaker 2007), institutional and governmental dimensions. CSR in this context includes 
actions that further social good beyond the immediate interests of the firm and that which 
is required by law (McWilliams and Siegel 2001). A firm’s extent of CSR activities will 
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thus depend on its size, level of diversification, consumer income, labour market 
conditions, stage in the industry life cycle (McWilliams and Siegel 2001), country of 
origin as well as its country of operation. 
 
Whilst there have been trans-national efforts to design and implement universal CSR 
standards (Waddock, Bodwell and Graves 2002), it is important to note that CSR is 
country-specific and that CSR issues often differ from country to country. CSR issues can 
occur in two forms: global and local issues. Global CSR issues are those that transcend 
national boundaries and about which considerable consensus is emerging such as human 
rights and environmental protection (Husted and Allen 2006).  William and Aguilera 
(2007) argue that local CSR issues peculiar to doing business in Africa entails the 
concerns of particular communities, such as HIV-AIDS. They noted that whilst this has 
not become a global CSR agenda, every company doing business in Africa needs to 
address it. Furthermore, most CSR discussions in Nigeria have concentrated on the Niger 
Delta region. Indeed a major issue that multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria 
must consider, as evident from preceding discussions, is the provision of social good to 
the inhabitants of the Niger Delta area. However the adoption of CSR policies and 
corporate–community relation strategies by these oil companies has failed to reduce 
violence within the region. Idemudia and Ite (2006) argue that this is due to their failure 
to seek, understand and integrate community perceptions into their CSR policies and 
practices, as well as the Nigerian government’s failure to provide an enabling 
environment. No doubt, effective CSR can make significant positive contributions to the 
lives of disadvantaged Niger Deltans in particular and Nigeria as a whole.  Notably, the 
average Nigerian has lost confidence in the government, with regards to the provision of 
the basic necessities of life. As a result, Nigerians, albeit more emotionally correct than 
theoretically sound, look up to MNCs as beacons of hope.  MNCs can therefore improve 
the lives of Nigerians, through effective CSR initiatives which focus on sustainable 
development (Ite 2004). Ite (2004) further noted that this must be done in co-operation 
with civil societies in order to avoid mistakes which, rather than help, damage the 
communities politically, socially and economically. 
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4.5 CONCLUSIONS  
In this chapter, the state of corporate governance in Nigeria has been analysed. 
Discussions have examined the complex dimensions of the subject in developing 
countries.  This chapter has specifically analysed the conceptual, theoretical and practical 
constructions of corporate governance in Nigeria. It has employed useful case studies and 
interview extracts to further facilitate useful discussions. The specific challenges which 
confront corporate governance in Nigeria have also been discussed. More importantly, 
the underlying rationales behind these problems have been investigated. The discussions 
on specific corporate governance issues and the peculiar forms and shapes they take in 
the Nigerian business environment have further allowed a robust treatise of the subject, 
especially with regards to established postulates of corporate governance.  Some of the 
limitations of Anglo-Saxon scholarly orientations, in explaining and addressing specific 
corporate governance challenges in the Nigerian business environment, have also been 
discussed.  
 
This chapter adds to the literature on corporate governance in sub-Saharan Africa.  It 
further provides evidence which suggests that whilst countries may share similar 
corporate governance challenges, the translation of these challenges and the means of 
addressing them, differ depending on certain contingencies. These include the following; 
the ownership structure of firms; the influence of the state in their governance; the ethical 
climate of business conduct; the presence and role of a viable market for corporate 
control; the extent to which stakeholder activism is institutionally encouraged; as well as 
orientations towards corporate social responsibility.  It can be deduced from these 
discussions that corporate governance is country specific and that the peculiarities of 
some countries, especially developing economies, do not promote good corporate 
governance.  
 
Traditionally Nigeria’s corporate governance system and practices have been riddled with 
corruption, an endemic problem which has penetrated all areas of the country’s economy. 
Indeed the problems of corporate governance in Nigeria are part of a larger problem of 
the Nigerian society which is characterised by political instability, bad leadership, ethnic 
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and religious tensions, firmly embedded in massive corruption. In today’s environment of 
global competition for FDI, good and competitive corporate governance is imperative. 
Globalisation as well as pressures from current and potential foreign investors has 
catalysed the recent corporate governance reforms in the country. As subsequent 
discussions will indicate, some of the reforms have not been originally “Nigerian” but 
that with significant external influences and inputs. As a result, there are concerns (Okike 
2007) with regards to the extent to which the reforms represent what Nigeria actually 
needs or a Western influenced response to global economic activities. No doubt, 
irrespective of any influence, Nigeria must put in place a vibrant corporate governance 
structure to encourage both local and foreign investments. However, Nigeria must note 
that elements borrowed from the corporate governance structures of other countries must 
be reassembled in a coherent manner to meet with the challenges of her peculiar 
historical, social, economic, political and cultural environments. The present state of 
corporate governance in Nigeria is also largely due to significant regulatory failures. In 
chapter 6, the corporate governance regulatory infrastructure, including the role of 
government, is discussed in more detail.   
 
While this analytical overview undoubtedly sheds more light into the structure and 
practices of corporate governance in Nigeria, it has also provided a background upon 
which subsequent research findings can be presented. Part of these is the influence of 
external governance mechanisms on Nigeria, which are discussed in chapter 7. But first, 
how did we get here? How has the state of corporate governance in Nigeria come about? 
Why are regulatory initiatives aimed at promoting good governance less successful? In 
the following chapter, an institutional explanation for the state of corporate governance in 
Nigeria is presented.    
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CHAPTER 5 – INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF GOOD CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter illustrates that national corporate governance systems are endogenous 
responses to certain national and firm-specific institutional environments. In today’s 
world of corporate, economic and political globalisation, how (and to what extent) is 
corporate governance shaped by firm and national level institutional environments? What 
are the different institutionalised expressions of corporate governance in varieties of 
capitalism? Which institutional parameters and arrangements constrain good corporate 
governance in emerging markets? Whilst the previous chapter has undoubtedly 
highlighted the unique application and benefits of agency theory in the Nigerian 
corporate governance fabric, the very influential agency theory does not explain these 
relationships. Therefore, this chapter conceptualises corporate governance structures and 
practices as institutionally determined and guided. This is imperative to an inimitable 
understanding of corporate governance, particularly in developing countries. Specifically, 
it is argued that corporate governance models, especially in developing countries, would 
be highly inapplicable if they are not institutionally based and explained. The evidence 
from a developing country is presented in order to show that institutions are very 
powerful forces which shape corporate governance. In particular, the extent to which 
certain underlying national conditions, such as the political, economic, legal and social 
environments as well as firm/industry values, culture, ethics and history, play a 
determining role in corporate governance in Nigeria is examined. 
 
No doubt, modern corporate governance discussions originated from the agency problem 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) which arises when the ownership of firms is separated from 
their control, a common feature of today’s corporations. However, since investors in 
corporations require assurance that their contributions will generate a return, the study of 
corporate governance has come to embody the institutions that make this possible, from 
boards of directors, to legal structures and financial markets, to wider cultural 
understandings about the role of the corporation in a modern society (Davies 2005). 
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Indeed, while the evolution of corporate governance is shareholder-centric, defining the 
term in this manner reflects decades of intense scholarly as well as practical research and 
associated scrutiny. Part of this scrutiny has resulted in the recognition of institutional 
effects on corporate governance. Therefore, in setting the tone of this chapter, the need to 
augment the financial economics’ favoured spectacles of the Anglo-Saxon agency theory 
is presented in order to highlight the relevance of key institutions in the workings of 
corporate governance systems, particularly in developing countries. Indeed the literature 
is dominated by Anglo-Saxon constructs. Scholars have significantly studied corporate 
governance within the framework of agency theory, viewing the “corporation” as a nexus 
of contracts between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers), where mechanisms 
must be in place to align the interests of both parties (Aguilera and Jackson 2003) so as to 
assure shareholders of getting a return on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). A 
variant of agency theory will thus constitute a cornerstone of corporate governance theory 
(Jensen 1998; Lubatkin, Lane, Collin and Very 2005, 2007). The main thesis here is that 
corporate governance is multi-dimensionally influenced by institutional environments.  
 
Whilst there have been recent efforts towards the embeddedness framing of governance 
and opportunism in order to ensure a cross-nationally accommodating theory of agency 
(Lubatkin et al. 2005, 2007), in this chapter, steps are taken beyond the assumptions of 
the conventional agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976), by 
arguing that institutions matter in corporate governance. As stated earlier, whilst the 
focus is on Nigeria, discussions have significant theoretical implications. There is an 
increasing body of evidence (Aoki 2000, 2001; Lubatkin et al 2007; Aguilera and 
Jackson 2003) in the budding literature on the institutional theory of corporate 
governance that institutions matter in corporate governance. Palepu, Khanna and Kogan 
(2002) argued that whilst nations may formally adopt corporate governance systems 
which resemble those elsewhere, the acceptance of the enshrined principles may 
significantly lag in their institutions. This has significant implications for the convergence 
debate and can explain the diversity of corporate governance structures and practices 
around the world despite pressures from globalisation. The discussions in chapters 2 and 
4 have clearly shown that corporate governance varies from country to country. However, 
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despite the rich descriptions of these different systems that can be found in the literature, 
there remains a challenging task of conceptualizing this cross-national diversity and of 
identifying the major factors that would explain these differences (Aguilera and Jackson 
2003). 
 
Institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987) offers an explanation. It 
focuses on the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure, considering the 
processes by which structures (schemes, rules, norms, and routines) become established 
as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour (Scott 2004). It is thus important that 
corporate governance discussions reflect a broader perspective of institutional domains 
(Aoki 2001). In this chapter, the evolution of corporate governance in Nigeria from an 
institutional theory perspective is explained. An analysis of how institutions have shaped 
and are shaping the corporate governance structure and practices of Nigeria is 
undertaken. As a result, important insights based on evidence from a developing country 
are provided. The lack of convincing evidence for the convergence of national systems of 
corporate governance and the reality that corporate governance systems and practices 
cannot be transplanted across countries without significant misfits (even in countries 
considered similar such as the UK and US) are indications that the agency framework 
does not fully encapsulate the multi-dimensional complexity and character of the 
corporate governance phenomenon. Indeed, in the context of developing countries, and 
Nigeria in particular, where good corporate as well as public governance is imperative to 
economic survival and growth, it is of the essence to understand the underlying rationale 
and machinery upon which business conduct and governance structures and practices are 
developed, nurtured and sustained over time.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. First, the author outlines the need to 
complement the agency theory, and advocate the institutional embeddedness of corporate 
governance. Following on, the author examines corporate governance in Nigeria in view 
of relevant data-generated internal and external institutional environments. The author 
also investigates the case of “deinstitutionalisation and institutional change” and their 
effects on corporate governance in Nigeria. I, thereafter, noted a case of institutional 
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maintenance, where regulatory reforms at the industry level are unable to change the self-
reinforcing institutional landscape. In the conclusion, the author makes a case for an 
institutionally based model to be employed to augment the dominant Principal/Agent 
based theoretical model of corporate governance theory.  
 
5.1 AGENCY THEORY NEEDS A COMPLEMENT 
Agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976) is important, but 
controversial (Eisenhardt 1989b). It has, however, become an oft-used tool researchers 
employ to examine the effects and conditions of corporate governance relations 
(Frankforter, Davis, Vollrath and Hill 2007). No doubt, agency theory embodies a 
different world-view and continues to remain a starting point for building any governance 
framework (Lubatkin et al. 2007). Whilst its assumptions may be considered restrictive in 
cross-national application, they nevertheless remain absolutely valid and worthy 
precursors for conventional orientations towards corporate governance. As a result, this 
chapter is not an attempt to undermine the highly novel agency theoretical construction. 
An agency relationship is a contract under which the principal(s) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on the former’s behalf, involving the delegation of 
some decision making authority to the latter (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The core 
assumption is thus based on the identification of a case of “separation of ownership and 
control”. This is a situation where decision agents do not bear the main share of the 
wealth effects of their decisions (Fama and Jensen 1983). The separation of decision and 
risk bearing functions is thus able to survive in organisations as a result of an effective 
common approach to controlling the resulting agency problems (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
 
Agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976), developed in the 
economics literature, models the relationship between principals and agents in such a way 
that the separation of security ownership and control can be structured to constitute an 
efficient form of economic organisation (Fama 1980). Agency theory thus concerns itself 
with the problems that can arise in a cooperative exchange between the principals/owners 
and the agents/managers (Fama and Jensen 1983). It assumes that both parties to the 
relationship are utility maximizers, and one can expect that the agent will not always act 
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in the best interest of the principal which constitutes agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). While economists like Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have considered the model to 
be a supra-national lens for evaluating all corporate governance issues, this 
Principal/Agent model is based on a number of assumptions which may undermine the 
complexity (Lubatkin et al. 2007) and multi-faceted character of the governance 
phenomenon. For example, Lubatkin et al 2007 further noted that whilst this may 
enhance the precision/accuracy and scholarly appeal of the agency theory, it engenders an 
under-socialised view of principals and agents. Furthermore, agency theory somewhat 
presupposes the operation of an efficient and competitive environment, where 
information asymmetries are minimized, and competitive pressures are maximized 
(Udayasankar, Das and Krishnamurti 2005). This is not always the case, particularly in 
developing countries and specifically as we have seen in the Nigerian case.   
 
However strong advocates of the agency theory still maintains its broad applicability. For 
example, Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (2007) describe the view held by Lubatkin et al 
(2007) as sympathetic. They argued that the Principal/Agent relations are clearly 
embedded in a social context which defines the self-interests pursued by agents and 
principals. They further noted that this subsequently determines the degree of potential 
incongruence between the objectives of both parties, as well as designs the efficient 
mechanisms for aligning their interests. They rightly pointed out that the most popular 
target for critics of agency theory is the Principal/Agent model by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). They argue that this only represents a special case of agency theory (that is most 
applicable to the market economy); they finally summit that it does seem a bit harsh to 
criticise an entire theory based on one application.  
 
In the author’s view, a debate between the agency and institutional theories is 
undoubtedly misguided, as they clearly have their strengths and limitations, which are 
contingent on their differing focus. Therefore, in this thesis, the author makes no attempt 
to condemn the agency theory based on its cross-national applicability limitations, but 
advocate the need to augment the seminal theorising of Eugene Fama, Michael Jensen, 
and William Meckling with an institutionalist perspective to ensure an in-depth 
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understanding of corporate governance systems, particularly in developing countries. 
Whilst the institutional theory does not in any way replace agency theory, nor serve as a 
better theoretical foundation for governance and opportunism in the modern corporation, 
it brings enriching insights to the Nigerian case and highlights the benefits of a multi-
theoretical approach to research and scholarly discourse. 
 
Indeed despite the afore mentioned scholarly achievements with regards to the 
embeddedness framing of governance and opportunism in order to ensure a cross-
nationally accommodating theory of agency (Lubatkin et al. 2005, 2007), there is 
increasing scholarly recognition (Boehmer 1999; Aoki 2001; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; 
Aguilera 2005; Leaptrott 2005; Liu 2005; Lubatkin et al 2005, 2007; Judge, Douglas and 
Kutan 2008) with regards to the institutional “embeddedness” of countries’ corporate 
governance systems and key players. The institutionalist approach is particularly needed 
in explaining corporate governance in developing countries, which are characterised by 
lesser economic development, weak legal infrastructures, as well as public and private 
corruption. As institutional theory encapsulates these fundamentals, the author proceeds 
to highlight the key assumptions of institutional theory and their relevance in corporate 
governance research. 
 
5.2 INSTITUTIONAL PREDICTORS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
“Many formal organisational structures arise as reflections of rationalised institutional 
rules. The elaboration of such rules in modern states and societies accounts in part for 
the expansion and increased complexity of formal organisational structures. Institutional 
rules function as myths which organisations incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, 
stability, and enhanced survival prospects” (Meyer and Rowan 1977; 340). 
 
The relevance of institutional theory has been authoritatively documented in the 
economics literature (Williamson 1985; North 1990); in political science (March and 
Olsen 1989); in organisational studies (Powell and DiMaggio 1991); and in strategic 
management (Peng, Li Sun, Pinkham and Chen 2009).  Reynolds (1981) presents a 
theory of regulation from an institutionalised perspective. Tolbert and Zucker (1983) 
present evidence which suggests that organisational polices and programmes are 
institutionally determined. Furthermore, Eisenhardt’s (1988) evidence from the retail 
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sales sector also confirms the importance of institutional theory in explaining firms’ 
compensation policies. More recent studies have also documented institutional effects on 
different areas of corporate governance and organisational studies. These include the 
institutional effects on family business (Leaptrott 2005); on corporate governance and 
director accountability (Aguilera 2005); and on corporate social responsibility (Campbell 
2007). On the country level, Liu (2005) documented the effects of China’s unique 
institutional setting in the pre-determination of its corporate governance model. Boehmer 
(1999) did a similar analysis with Germany as a case study. As Scott (1987) rightly 
estimated, institutional theory in organisations, following a period of rapid growth and 
energetic debates, has culminated into more deliberate development and self-scrutiny. In 
this chapter, the author advocates the institutional embeddedness of the Nigerian 
corporate governance system. Undoubtedly, institutional theory explains corporate 
governance structures and practices with regards to their diversity across sectors, nations 
and regions.  
 
The roots of institutional theory run firmly through the formative years of the social 
sciences, incorporating the seminal insights of Marx and Weber; Cooley and Mead; and 
Veblen and Commons (Scott 2004). As expected the concepts of institution and 
institutionalisation have been defined in diverse ways, with substantial variation among 
approaches (Scott 1987). Indeed, institutional theory is difficult to explicate, as it 
concentrates on the “taken-for-granted” assumptions at the core of social action (Zucker 
1987). It emphasizes that organisations should be seen as more than the means by which 
goods are produced and services are provided, but as social and cultural systems (Judge, 
Douglas and Kutan 2006). It offers a richer view of organisations: it argues that 
organisations are influenced by normative pressures, which could be external or internal 
(Zucker 1987). It further inquires as to how social structures are developed, diffused, 
adopted, adapted, fall into decline, and are disused over space and time (Scott 2004). 
 
Two defining elements are shared by institutional theorists in organisational studies; “(a) 
a rule-like, social fact quality of an organised pattern of action (exterior), and (b) an 
embedding in formal structures, such as formal aspects of organisations that are not tied 
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to particular actors or situations (non-personal/objective)” (Zucker 1987: 444). 
Institutional theory refers to the enduring systems of social beliefs and socially organised 
practices which are associated with diverse functional areas of societal systems such as 
religion, work, politics, laws, and regulations, therefore, one of the keys to understanding 
organisations and corporate governance systems is by studying the institutional 
environments which guide or constrain their legitimacy (Judge et al. 2006; 2008).  
 
The institutional process can thus be described as a neutral construction which infuses 
value beyond the formal requirements of an organisation and tests the expendability at 
which organisational practices are abandoned in response to new circumstances or 
demands (Selznick 1996). Furthermore, Selznick argues that an institutional theory of the 
firm will thus represent a voice of resistance to the culture and limitations of short-
sightedness which has been the consequence of allowing shareholder primacy in the firm 
to have a pernicious effect on scholars’ perception of corporate rationality. Institutional 
theory, therefore, provides a framework for descriptive models that explains certain 
organisational phenomena by tracing the emergence of distinctive forms, processes, 
strategies, outlooks and competences, from patterns of organisational interaction and 
adaptation to their internal and external environments (Leaptrott 2005; Selznick 1996). It 
thus provides guidance to our thinking in relation to corporate responsibility and speaks 
to issues of social concern without accepting conventional models of organisations as 
well as the unreflective principles of organisational management (Selznick 1996). This is 
particularly important for research in developing economies. Conceptualising corporate 
governance structures and practices as institutionally determined and guided enables a 
clearer understanding of the Nigerian corporate governance system.  
 
5.3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMING OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
NIGERIA 
5.3.1 Overview 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that formal organisations have traditionally been 
understood as systems of coordinated and controlled activities in which work is 
embedded in complex networks of technical relations and boundary-spanning exchanges. 
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They further argue that it has become clear that the 21st century formal organisational 
structures have risen in highly institutionalised contexts. The author proceeds to examine 
the Nigerian external and internal institutional environments and their influences on 
corporate governance. The aim is to explore the complementary relationships of these 
institutional environments and related practices with good corporate governance. 
Discussions, here, are presented under two headings. Macro level environments are those 
external institutional configurations which profile a firm’s corporate governance at the 
country level, consisting of Nigeria’s political, economic, social and legal environments. 
The micro level analysis focuses on those institutions which are internal to the firm or its 
industry, consisting of the firm’s/industry’s values, culture, history and ethics. Industry 
level discussions are deliberately not presented as meso-level analyses given the lack of 
sufficient demarcation between the firm-level and industry-level institutional 
environments of corporate governance, as suggested by the data. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that much of the emphasis in the institutional theory literature has been 
on institutional construction and convergent change processes, while 
“deinstitutionalisation”, which is the process by which institutions weaken and fade 
away, has been less explored (Oliver 1997; Scott 2001; Dacin, Goodstein and Scott 
2002). The author subsequently investigates the prospects of deinstitutionalisation and 
institutional change in Nigeria and how corporate governance in the country is 
responding to these. 
 
5.3.2 Macro (external) Institutions 
5.3.2.1 The political context of corporate governance in Nigeria  
It is becoming increasingly acknowledged that politics shape corporate governance (Roe 
1994; Fligstein 1990; Roy 1997), particularly taking more complex dimensions in 
developing countries. Notably, Nigeria brings enriching insights to add value to the 
budding political theory of corporate governance. Roe (2003) empirically demonstrated 
that politics interferes with firms’ ownership structures and boardrooms’ behaviour; it 
induces reactions since owners will try to mitigate against negative political 
developments. While Roe’s evidence were not gathered from developing countries, they 
nonetheless remain relevant. Indeed, the political environments of developing countries 
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offer a more in-depth perspective, where managers and directors of large organisations 
constantly strive to reap maximum benefits from political office holders.   
 
Following independence from Britain in 1960, Nigerians, until about a decade ago, have 
lived predominantly within a political environment characterized by military/tyrannical 
dictatorship, incessant political turbulence and violence, political assassinations and 
elections marked by massive vote rigging. Post independence, the following period of 
nascent indigenously administered democracy was short-lived. On January 15 1966, there 
was a military coup, which injected dictatorship into the Nigerian polity and governance. 
As such independent politics in Nigeria began with the promise of democracy and 
economic progress, which became entrenched in the language of politics and of public 
life generally, even though the hard reality did little to suggest that Nigeria would ever 
become a democratically governed state (Nolutshungu 1990).  
 
Indeed the Nigerian political environment witnessed several symbolic events which 
undermined the possibility of a successful democratic governance system. These include 
several military coups and intrusions into the democratic process, a 3-year civil war, 
continuing ethnic rivalries, religious tensions and human rights violations. Nigerian was 
under military dictatorship for about 30 years, cumulatively, until May 1999 when the 
country returned to democratic rule. In May 2007, President Yar'Adua became the first 
civilian leader to take over from another, following a very controversial election. Apart 
from the massive irregularities which plague political elections in Nigeria, the post 
independent political structure and culture reflects the country’s legendary corruption. 
Since Nigeria has traditionally lacked the institutional capacity to address corruption, the 
venom has become endemic. Political corruption has been inadvertently encouraged as 
there are limited pieces of evidence of successful prosecution of corrupt political office 
holders.  
 
The pervasiveness of corruption in Nigeria is corroborated by independent corruption-
indexes. For example, Transparency International, an anti-corruption NGO, ranks Nigeria 
121st out of 180 countries in its 2008 corruption perception index. The 180th on the list, 
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being the most perceived corrupt country. Both Denmark and Sweden were top on the 
list. The United Kingdom and the United States of America were ranked 16th and 18th, 
respectively. The country ranking of the Transparency International Index is further 
appreciated through the World Bank anti-corruption and governance index. The World 
Bank index is based on 6 broad measures of good governance: (1) Voice and 
Accountability, (2) Political Stability, (3) Government Effectiveness, (4) Regulatory 
Quality, (5) Rule of Law, and (6) Control of Corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
2008). The graphs in Figure 5.1 represent a comparative view of Nigeria, Denmark and 
the United Kingdom on the World Bank index. In addition, whilst recent Nigerian 
government regulatory measures to address corruption have attracted considerable 
admiration, it has also attracted significant skepticisms and criticisms with regards to 
their sincerity. Specifically governmental campaigns aimed at addressing corruption have 
been perceived to be witch-hunt exercises to settle personal grudges. It is based on this 
background that the author explores the implications of the corrupt and greed driven 
Nigeria polity for business conduct, corporate governance and shareholder activism. 
 
It is not surprising that the past decades of unrests in the Nigerian polity have had serious 
implications for business conduct and corporate governance. As evident from discussions 
in the preceding chapter, the political instability in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria 
continues to impact negatively on business operations in the region.  Examples include 
the distortion of business operations and the kidnapping of foreign oil workers, by 
protesters. No doubt business requires a conducive political atmosphere to thrive. Indeed, 
organisations that are impeded by political turmoil and thus unable to function properly 
are less valuable to investors; therefore dampening political turmoil or insulating an 
organisation from its effects constitutes a strong force in shaping an organisation’s 
ownership and its eventual governance (Roe 2003). This further brings to the fore the 
need to understand the correlations between a country’s polity and corporate governance.  
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Figure 5.1: A comparative view of Nigeria, Denmark and the United Kingdom on 
the World Bank Index 
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Politics affects a firm in many ways, given that it determines who owns it and the 
external finance it is able to obtain. It further determines its growth and profitability 
potentials and ultimately how authority is distributed within the firm (Roe 2003).  
Furthermore, politics and political affiliations play vital roles in the Nigerian business 
sector. According to the chairman of a large Nigerian corporation; 
 
“In Nigeria, firms (especially foreign owned ones) that would survive in this sort of 
politically challenging and risky environment will have on their boards and top 
management teams individuals with local knowledge of the political terrain. More 
importantly, these individuals must have the necessary political connections and support, 
especially from policy makers, such as the president and his aides”  
 
Indeed, in Nigeria, it is generally uncontested that top politicians (directly or indirectly) 
hold majority stakes in many organisations, which allows them to nominate board 
members and management. As a result, they are able to stifle the organisation to suit their 
political interests and in other situations use their political powers to benefit the 
organisation.  It is also not uncommon for multinationals to compromise their ethical 
standards in order to do business. A good example is the recent conviction of Siemens for 
bribing a number of top government officials in Nigeria in order to win 
telecommunication contracts. However, politically motivated corporate corruption takes 
different shapes and forms. Unlike Siemens which seemingly bribed government officials 
directly, survey evidence suggests that MNCs often pay bribes via “consultants” who 
negotiate the deal and win the business/contract. Consultants therefore act as the medium 
through which the bribes are paid to the corrupt government officials. While commenting 
on the issue, an interview respondent who is a senior regulatory officer stated that: 
 
“The case of Siemens is an exception; they were not just smart enough, they wanted to do 
the bribery for themselves, so they got caught” 
 
Traditionally the country’s corporate governance system and practices have been riddled 
with endemic corruption. Indeed, the private sector and corporate governance evolved 
and continue to evolve in an environment of systemic political corruption. The very 
recent Cadbury Nigeria Plc (a subsidiary of Cadbury Schweppes) scandal, which led to 
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the sacking of some of the companies’ senior officials including the CEO, represents 
another dimension of the political determinants of corporate governance in Nigeria. As an 
academic/corporate governance consultant observes: 
 
“Corruption in the private sector is largely covered up. Taking the Cadbury scandal for 
example, if not for some external political interests that were in the matter, shareholders’ 
funds would have been eroded without anyone noticing”.  
 
Companies firmly grounded in the corrupt Nigerian polity benefit in various ways. These 
benefits can include the following: tax evasion, getting away with non-compliance with 
regulatory standards, and more serious corporate crimes such as selling expired goods. 
Survey respondents unanimously agree that the private sector is gradually becoming the 
epitome of corruption in Nigeria. This has been facilitated by the public-private corrupt 
relationship which further renders regulatory powers irrelevant. An academic respondent 
gave an example of such; in his words, 
 
“You can expect weird situations in Nigeria. The Director General of the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange, who should be at the fore front of promoting good corporate behaviour, 
actually came about with what was coined “Corporate Nigeria”. This was a political 
instrument which was employed during the April 2007 elections. She used this 
“corporate Nigerian” slogan to harass corporations to donate funds to the ruling 
political party (People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Clearly this is against the provisions 
of the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1990, which stipulates that a company is not 
allowed to use its resources to fund political agendas and activities. More importantly 
this went unchecked and “Corporate Nigeria” enabled companies to donate billions of 
naira to the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)”  
 
Given that the government traditionally held significant shareholdings in major areas of 
the economy despite the considerable efforts to divest them, typical of all Nigerian 
government owned ventures, “people saw/see them as nobody’s business”. Therefore, 
politicians/office holders have traditionally used these government owned companies to 
fuel political agendas directly or indirectly. A senior official of a corporate governance 
regulatory agency gave an example of this; 
 
“Unity bank, when formed was solely owned by the 19 northern states in Nigeria. 
Following the 2005 reform of the banking sector, Unity bank was unable to source the 
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₦25 billion (£100 million) new capital base requirement for banks, and therefore had to 
divest their shareholdings, as well as open the account books of the bank for external 
scrutiny.  It was at this juncture that it became apparent that board members, managers, 
and senior government officials, as well as their political and business associates, have 
taken a considerable amount of un-secured, un-serviced and unpaid loans from the 
bank”.  
 
Furthermore, given the nature of partisan politics in Nigeria, politicians continuously 
seek financial support from corporations which further facilitates public-private corrupt 
dealings before and after elections. According to a former CEO and Chairman of a large 
Nigerian corporation,  
 
“Following victory at the polls, politicians upon assuming offices, see themselves as 
dispensers of favours to individuals, groups or companies who have supported their 
parties. These supporters get more “favours”, ranging from government contracts, fast-
tracking of trade licenses, whilst denying other qualified individuals or companies, 
especially if they are perceived as oppositions” 
 
Partisan politics is very influential with regards to how companies secure their businesses 
and remain competitive in developing countries. Especially, businesses generally require 
strong political will. However the business-polity relationship is bilateral. The benefits 
which a business/company can reap from a close relationship with the political party in 
power have already been mentioned. However, if the party looses power, following 
defeat at an election, the party’s corporate supporters/allies become less able to secure 
high yield businesses/government contracts, and as a result, may become less 
competitive. The Nigerian polity strives amidst corruption and illegality thus inhibiting 
good corporate governance. Large organisations including multinationals can only 
triumph and remain competitive with significant political will and support. It has also 
become common for corrupt politicians and ex-office holders to become elected as board 
members, thus hindering good corporate governance, more so as they often bring their 
entrenched public corruption behaviour into the private sector. This further allows 
protégées of the country’s political tyrants to govern some of its major corporations. The 
result is an unethical and discouraging investment climate. To specifically understand the 
influence of politics on corporate governance instruments, the author will proceed with a 
case study on the political reconstruction of shareholder activism in Nigeria. Findings 
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from this survey particularly show a strong relationship between the political climate and 
the evolving shareholder activism mechanism in Nigeria. This provides further insights 
into the extent to which corporate governance mechanisms are embedded in the broader 
political culture of a nation state. As a result, the author investigates the extent to which 
shareholder activism in Nigeria mirrors the country’s brand of politics.  
 
The Business Firm as a Political Actor: Exploring the political reconstruction of 
shareholder activism in Nigeria 
 
No doubt, the last two decades have witnessed the evolution of shareholder activism, as 
an important characteristic of financial markets with activist shareholders pressurising the 
managements of poorly performing firms in their portfolios for improved performance 
and enhanced shareholder value (Gillan and Starks 2000). These debates in the corporate 
governance literature have mainly taken a micro-level perspective of agency theory, 
albeit with an emergent interest in the institutional theory of corporate governance (for 
example, Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Jackson 2005).  The literature has in the main 
posited shareholder activism as a positive force – on the premise that shareholders, as 
activist owners, can check managerial opportunistic tendencies and, thus, promote 
effective corporate governance (Gillan and Starks 1998; 2000; Black 1992). As such, 
shareholder activism is often perceived as an enabler of conscious, sustained and 
organised challenge to corporate authority, especially over a perceived or actual 
grievance (Marens 2002; Tarrow 1994). However, shareholder activism can be very 
controversial (Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi 2006). Becht et al. (2006) argue that 
whilst it can resolve the monitoring and incentive problems associated with widely-held 
firms, in order to improve their performance (Black 1992), it can also constitute a 
disruptive, opportunistic, and ineffective mechanism employed by fund managers and 
other investors for personal benefits.  
 
Notwithstanding the progress made so far in incorporating the institutionalist approach to 
corporate governance literature (as evident from the foregoing), the interface between a 
country’s political culture and corporate governance is still very much under-explored in 
the extant literature. Undoubtedly, understanding shareholder activism requires a good 
understanding of the political environment in which corporate governance mechanisms 
are enacted (Roe 2003; Fligstein 1990). This is even more important to the understanding 
of corporate governance practices in developing economies, given their often weak 
political structures and corrupt-ridden political cultures. In this vein, while the rising 
unlimited potential for expanding the shareholder activism literature in developing 
countries (Sarkar and Sarkar 2000; Amao and Amaeshi 2008) can be positively 
perceived, it has become necessary to examine the surrounding institutionalised political 
environment of these countries. This section therefore examines these fundamental 
concerns and focuses on the political institutionalisations of shareholder activism as a 
mechanism for corporate governance and accountability in Nigeria. It is worth noting that 
the previously mentioned 2007 Code of Conduct for Shareholder Associations in Nigeria 
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has enabled an upsurge in shareholder activism in the country. Shareholders are thus 
becoming increasingly aware of their rights and responsibilities. Particularly, Nigeria is 
witnessing a rise in the number of shareholder associations. Nigeria further presents a 
good platform to address these concerns, given that the renewed advent of shareholder 
activism in the country has resulted in an array of relationships, networks and practices, 
which threaten effective activism. Also, Nigeria’s political history and current democratic 
dispensation provides a profound basis to understand and conceptualise the relationship 
between shareholder activism and the state of democracy. The political interaction and 
configuration of shareholder activism in Nigeria is summarised in the following sub-
sections. 
 The notoriety of shareholder activism in Nigeria 
Activists as irritations      
Nigeria can be regarded as having the second (to South Africa) most advanced 
shareholder activism structure and practice in Africa (Vaughn and Ryan 2006), on the 
basis of investor interests and activity in corporate matters, as reported by academic and 
non academic commentators. South African shareholders, within an environment of a 
more developed corporate governance regulatory structure, have questioned and 
challenged boards severally.  This indicates that they are generally aware of their rights 
and responsibilities. Their efforts have resulted in some instances of significant board and 
managerial re-think and decision reversal, especially in matters of board appointments. In 
Nigeria, Section 10 (a) of the Code of Corporate Governance states that: 
 
‘The company or the board should not discourage shareholder activism whether by 
institutional shareholders or by organised shareholders' groups. Shareholders with larger 
holdings (institutional and non-institutional) should act and influence the standard of 
corporate governance positively and thereby optimize stakeholder value.’ 
 
This is part of the efforts by the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promote shareholder activism and the rights of 
minority shareholders in the Nigerian corporate governance system. As such, the trend in 
developed economies, which enabled the rise of block voting through shareholder 
associations as a response to domination by majority shareholders, is gradually evolving 
in the Nigerian context facilitated by private initiatives and government’s encouragement 
(Amao and Amaeshi 2008). The Independent Shareholders’ Association of Nigeria 
(ISAN), the Nigerian Shareholders’ Solidarity Association (NSSA), Association for the 
Advancement of the Rights of Shareholders of Nigeria are among other shareholders’ 
associations made up of individuals that share common interests and are presumably 
united to give minority shareholders, in particular, a voice. Okike (2007) argued that 
shareholders’ associations have become considerably militant in assessing the 
performance of companies and in challenging managerial actions that were not taken in 
their interests. 
 
While shareholder activism in Nigeria is still in its early developmental stage, the 
findings of this study suggest an already rapidly evolving institutional misconception and 
misuse of the corporate governance mechanism. It is thus posited that shareholders need 
to be encouraged not only to exercise control but to exercise control responsibly. It has 
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been noted that shareholder associations sometimes “flex their muscles” to frustrate 
legitimate transactions and smooth running of the company (Okara 2003). Essentially 
activist shareholders have been conceived as irritations or terror to normality in corporate 
organisation and management.  Findings from this survey show that the rationale behind 
this is bilateral. Particularly, the manners through which shareholders’ associations carry 
out their activisms suggest a degree of terrorism9. On one hand, the manners through 
which shareholders’ associations carry out their activisms reflect similar degree of 
bullying and corruption inherent in the Nigerian political culture. For example, there have 
been several cases of massive and unwarranted disruptions to AGMs proceedings, 
perpetrated by executive members of these associations. Commenting on this, an 
interview respondent, who is an executive member of a notable shareholder association in 
Nigeria, said; 
  
“Some of our members conduct their activities in ways which dent our image and impede 
our achievements. They go around threatening corporate management with massive 
AGM disruptions, which normally attracts negative publicity” 
 
As another respondent, an active shareholder activist puts it:  
 
“Aggressive bullying is our weapon”  
 
There is no doubt that the setting up of shareholder associations was encouraged due to 
the need to coordinate several small, passive and dispersed shareholders; however the 
intended activism has been hijacked by individuals whose aims are to reap personal 
benefits, which is truly characteristic of the broader political culture of the country. In the 
quest of achieving this, several senior executives of shareholders associations bully 
corporate management through threats of AGM disruptions and negative media 
propaganda and have thus constituted themselves “terrorist gangs” who are now feared 
by corporate executives. At the other end, bullying would not have triumphed, if 
managers and board members were committed to effective corporate governance. Given 
that shareholders’ associations have become constitutionally empowered to challenge 
managerial and board excesses, they constitute a great threat to the status quo of 
traditionally unchecked corporate corruption and governance malfunction, if their powers 
are applied positively. However, this was not found to be the case. The shareholder 
associations were rather perceived to be ineffective. According to a non-executive 
director of a major Nigerian financial institution,  
 
“Shareholders associations are not very effective because all their executives want is 
money. Once you give them some money, they shut up and things continue as usual” 
 
Corrupt collaboration: Activism/terrorism silenced 
Findings from this survey also suggest that a corrupt collaboration of engagement 
between activist/terrorist shareholders and board/managers has subsequently evolved 
                                                   
9 Terrorism here is used figuratively to suggest the intensity and often illegitimate disruptions caused by 
these shareholder activists. 
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dynamically to further silence prospects of genuine activism. This constitutes an abuse of 
what should have been a powerful institutional check on managerial and board behaviour. 
As such, while Okike (2007) as well as Amao and Amaeshi (2008) have documented a 
huge increase in shareholder activism in Nigeria, more recent evidence suggests that 
shareholder activism has taken a negative turn in the country.  For example, executive 
members of shareholders’ associations now maintain close and personal relationships 
with the executives of the firms they are meant to check. This impedes their activism and 
further enables them to participate in several executive corrupt behaviours, at the 
detriment of the shareholders they ought to represent.  Indeed, several shareholders’ 
associations have sprung out in recent times and have become powerful lobbying groups 
that needed to be appeased by management of companies. This appeasement can occur in 
several forms – including through shares and allotments in public offerings as well as 
several personal favours, such as funding their organisations and sponsoring their events. 
As such, Annual General Meetings (AGMs) are largely stage-managed. According to a 
senior official of the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission; 
 
“We have been attending AGMs where directors are elected or re-elected, such 
proceedings are just formalities. Even the so called shareholder associations that attend 
such meetings are easily compromised by the board and management of these 
companies”  
 
It must be noted that regulatory agencies have legal provisions to attend AGMs as 
observers only, with no right(s) to interfere in the deliberations. As another respondent 
puts it:  
 
“Some AGMs are so predetermined that you notice from the onset that this is a doctored 
proceeding, but in some other AGMs things are done well”.  
 
These were also the words of a former CEO and Chairman of a listed corporation; 
 
 “I acknowledge that management and boards do hijack the independence and activism of 
shareholder associations, by giving them financial incentives/bribes. It got to a point that 
a president of one of the shareholder associations became a director on a company which 
was really bad”. 
 
Following these comments and observations, it is possible to conclude that shareholder 
activism in Nigeria is bogus. Currently, shareholder associations seem to go over their 
activities by becoming post-event/ex-post commentators, displaying pseudo activism 
when the damage has already been done, such as when companies’ poor performance 
results are made public. The author defines pseudo activism as a corruption motivated 
stage-managed conduct of shareholder activists, with no meaningful intention to promote 
effective stewardship and accountability of board directors and managers for corporate 
assets. Pseudo activism will almost certainly require a corrupt collaboration between 
supposed activists and corporate executive management. It has also become difficult to 
monitor directors of Nigerian corporations, essentially with regards to how their decision 
making is influenced by the anti-company/personal interests they often pursue. This 
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problem is heightened by the poor infrastructural development of the country especially 
with regards to information access/freedom of information, coupled with the traditionally 
corrupt practices of the supposed regulatory watch-dogs.  
 
Light at the end of the tunnel: The evolving institutionalised varieties of 
shareholders 
Despite the corrupt political capture of shareholder activism in Nigeria, this research 
study suggests that the country is witnessing the rise of two varieties of shareholders, 
who are contributing immensely to shareholder activism. The results of this study suggest 
that both classes have demonstrated a considerable amount of genuine activism. It is, 
therefore, anticipated that these emergent shareholder classes could be instrumentally 
helpful in rescuing shareholder activism from spin, if sustained.  
 
First it must be noted that while Nigeria is not immune from the current global economic 
crisis, the last three years have witnessed a high level of investor activity on the Nigerian 
stock market.  Particularly, several investors have made huge profits out of stocks and 
shares. As such there has been an increased interest in capital market investments among 
a wide array of Nigerians across different age brackets and financial status. The first 
classification of evolving shareholders are the emergent middle class (mainly employees 
and other professionals), who attend these AGMs as minority shareholders. This 
classification of minority shareholders does not have to necessarily belong to any 
shareholder association. They make efforts to attend AGMs regularly and in the process 
have developed a degree of sophisticated expertise over time, with regards to checking 
and analysing companies’ financial statements and accounts. They are also able to ask 
informed and quality questions on issues bordering on several aspects of disclosures – 
including financials, ethical investments, corporate social responsibility and employee 
relations. The author refers to this classification as “the sophisticated shareholders”. 
The recent boom in the Nigerian stock market has attracted a vast amount of investors, a 
considerable amount of which are not particularly savvy or financially literate. 
Furthermore, given the high level of illiteracy in the country, a lot of investors do not 
have the capacity to make reasonable deductions from companies’ financial statements 
and accounts to inform their investment decision. Considering their small equity 
ownership, it is also unjustifiable to seek seasoned financial advice. As such the 
sophisticated shareholders constitute a very helpful and powerful expression of activism. 
 
Similarly, the second classification consists of shareholders who are not necessarily large 
shareholders but are able to induce shareholder activism in corporations they are 
interested in. They are high-calibre individuals with a history of excellent behaviour and 
distinguished accomplishments. Specifically, the individuals have developed a reputable 
status over time on the basis of their track records of superlative performance and 
integrity in various high profile corporate or/and public positions. During AGMs, they 
constitute a major voice and are able to scrutinise the board and management, who would 
not want to be seen as going against the recommendations of highly regarded corporate 
leaders. The author refers to this class of shareholders as “the reputable shareholders.” 
Given the intense corruption which has engulfed the Nigerian state, it can be deduced that 
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persons of high standards of integrity continue to constitute a powerful and positive force 
for informed and veteran shareholder activism.  
 
The emergence of “the sophisticated shareholders” and “the reputable shareholders” has 
the potential of counteracting the negative trends introduced by the corrupt collaboration 
between activist/bully shareholders and board/managers. Indeed these negative trends 
constitute a great threat to the emergence of a meaningful and effective shareholder 
activism in Nigeria. Given the peculiarities of the Nigerian situation, it is posited that 
such internal changes to shareholder activism as opposed to external influences is crucial 
to the development of meaningful shareholder activism. Subsequent discussions in 
Chapter 6 further advocate the benefits of local institutional initiatives in promoting 
effective corporate governance and accountability in developing countries. 
 
 Deductions 
The political system, as a vibrant institutional force, has been pivotal to the study of the 
institutional effects on corporate governance. In an attempt to move the debate on the 
institutional determinants of corporate governance forward, The author has focused on 
the particular influence of a key institution – political system and culture- on a key 
corporate governance mechanism- shareholder activism. Findings from this survey show 
that national political culture impact on shareholder activism in corporations. More 
specifically, the findings have shown the extent to which shareholder activism does 
mirror the broader political climate of a nation state.  This case study specifically adds, 
insights from the perspective of a developing country, to the increasing scholarly 
attentions (Roe 1994, 2003; Fligstein 1990; Bainbridge 1995; Romano 2004; Gourevitch 
and Shinn 2005; Wärneryd 2005; Coglianese 2007; Belloc and Pagano 2009; Adegbite 
and Nakajima 2009; Adegbite, Amaeshi and Amao 2009) being paid to the political 
determinants of corporate governance. Again, while this study forges a necessary 
discourse of the particular influence of a country’s political culture on shareholder 
activism, it encourages further scholarly works in the line of building a political theory of 
shareholder activism. Therefore in enriching scholarly discourse in the area of 
governance and opportunism in the modern corporation, the author brings insights from a 
Nigerian case to add to the increasing scholarly recognition (Boehmer 1999; Aoki 2001; 
Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Aguilera 2005; Leaptrott 2005; Liu 2005; Lubatkin et al. 
2007, 2007; Judge, Douglas and Kutan 2008) with regards to the institutional 
“embeddedness” of countries’ corporate governance systems and key players. 
 
There is no doubt that effective shareholder activism in the broadest sense, involving both 
large and small individual and institutional shareholders will promote effective corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Amao and Amaeshi (2008) have recently called for effective 
shareholder activism as a prerequisite for more effective corporate governance and 
accountability in Nigeria. While the evolving shareholder activists are a positive 
development, the corrupt collaboration of shareholders’ associations and corporate 
executives must be vigorously and urgently addressed by innovative and effective 
regulatory initiatives10.  
                                                   
10 Recent regulatory initiatives aimed at addressing some of these concerns, particularly the 2007 SEC 
Code for Shareholders, are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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5.3.2.2 The economic context of corporate governance in Nigeria  
Despite her oil riches and promising economic fortunes, Nigeria is bedevilled by myriad 
economic problems which are entrenched in the political and economic structure of the 
country as well as in the psychology of the people (Ekanola 2006). Indeed, Nigeria 
advances but uncertainties abound. While Nigeria's dilemma in harnessing its resource 
rich economy into an epitome of globalisation is shared by many of the world's 
developing nations, the efficiency of markets and consumer participation in the economy 
is enormously limited by the lack of durable networks, stable electricity supply, potable 
water, efficient telecommunication facilities, as well as safe and efficient roads, railroads, 
and ports (Country Focus 2006). Small and medium enterprises capable of making 
immense contributions to the economy have thus been limited by the poor economic 
infrastructure of the country. Given that corporate governance in a particular country is 
an endogenous response to firms’ economic environment (Mulherin 2004), developing 
countries, such as Nigeria, with pervasive but inefficient government controls on 
economic activities and imperfect capital markets, automatically inherit a weak corporate 
governance system (Singh 2003).  
 
The degree of economic activity as well as the efficiency and independence of market 
operations are crucial to the shaping of corporate governance in a particular country. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, foreigners, especially British, owned most of the large 
businesses operating in Nigeria, prior to independence. Following the prohibition of 100 
percent foreign ownership in sensitive economic areas (such as infrastructure and oil), 
they had to divest their shareholdings to satisfy the new legislation. However, as there 
were insufficient domestic investible funds available, the Nigerian government and a 
small number of very wealthy Nigerian politicians ended up buying a majority of the 
divested shares (Yerokun 1992; Akinsanya 1983; Ahunwan 2002). Consequently, most 
large corporations that sprung up were State-owned and State-controlled and the 
corporate governance practices that developed were replica of the corrupt practices of the 
military and civilian governments that ruled Nigeria thereafter. According to the 
Chairman of a large Nigerian corporation,  
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“One would have expected that the foreigners, government and the wealthy individual 
Nigerians, that held significant shareholdings in these corporations, would have 
pioneered good corporate governance. But that was not the case. There was no vision for 
good corporate governance as a means to create long-term value for the firm and its 
stakeholders as well as to position the country on the path of economic sustainability”  
 
Essentially these corporations served as means for top government officials and their 
wealthy Nigerian friends to loot shareholders’ fund amongst other corrupt practices, 
which eventually led to the collapse of a considerable amount of the traditional Pan 
African corporations. Therefore, for any corporate governance reform in developing 
economies, particularly Nigeria, to make reasonable impact, it must, at the very least, 
understand and reflect the economic situations within which corporate governance 
structures and practices have evolved.  
 
5.3.2.3 The social context of corporate governance in Nigeria  
While there appeared to be a great deal of optimism in the 1960s about the developmental 
prospects of the newly independent Nigeria (Ahunwan 2002), nearly five decades later, 
the country is still optimistically regarded as developing. Candidly stated, Nigeria is 
undeveloped, lacking adequate social infrastructure and basic amenities of life. Poverty, 
high rate of unemployment, armed-robbery, bad roads, power shortages, amongst other 
vices, plague the Nigerian state. The result is a poor quality of life for majority of the 
populace, and the consequence of this is a general perception that everyone will have to 
(and must) “fend” for himself or herself as the government would not. This is the 
underlying cause of the endemic public and private enterprise corruption in the country. 
According to a senior regulatory officer; 
 
“In Nigeria, there is a general notion that you need to “take care of yourself”. It doesn’t 
matter if this amounts to corruption”.  
 
Furthermore the lack of adequate social amenities as well as the corresponding 
government’s lackadaisical approach is stimulating the debate on corporate social 
responsibility in Nigeria. As the Vice Chairman of a large Nigerian corporation puts it: 
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“Looking at social infrastructure, the government has failed its people and as such they 
look unto corporate bodies to fill in that gap. Indeed multinational corporate bodies can 
become role models for how things can be done”. 
 
The implication of this is that the burden of citizens’ welfare is being gradually bestowed 
on private corporations which have serious consequences for the burgeoning debate on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). In this regard, CSR is evolving as a compulsory 
corporate philanthropy, especially in the deprived region of the oil rich Niger Delta, as 
previous discussions have highlighted. More broadly and almost inevitably the 
governance of corporations becomes affected by these infrastructural and social 
determinants. While the agency theoretical construction concerns the possibility of self-
serving behaviours of corporate managers which may not be in alliance with that of 
shareholders, this problem is seriously aggravated and socio-institutionally 
accommodated in Nigeria. According to a former governor of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria: 
 
“The social structure of Nigeria can be described as “a fertile ground for bribery, 
corruption, idleness and the contrivance of get-rich quick attitude which are antithetical 
to hard work and discipline” (Ahunwan 2002; 271).  
 
This has serious implications for corporate governance. For example, Nigeria has lost a 
significant number of banks since the banking industry came into being in the country in 
1914 due to bad corporate governance largely facilitated by the corrupt and opportunistic 
behaviours entrenched in the country’s social environment. Again, while business 
connections can reduce agency conflicts by promoting efficient and informal information 
transfers, it can also constitute channels for favouritism (Kuhnen 2005). For example, 
business connections in Nigeria, especially through personal and family affiliations, 
interfere with the efficient management and governance of corporations, resulting in 
serious cases of insider dealing, appointments to corporate directorships based on 
personal affinities, use of companies’ properties by directors, managers and their 
associates for personal purposes, as well as leasing/selling personal and associates’ 
properties to the company at exorbitant prices. Indeed, as with most developing countries,  
a corrupt social mindset has engulfed both public and private enterprises allowing 
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activities such as  drug counterfeiting, environmental degradation, bribery, and corruption 
to become norms, such that doing things right has become an anomaly (Olebune 2006). 
Furthermore, massive corruption has traditionally been encouraged by laxity in 
regulatory enforcement fuelled by the corruption of regulators themselves.  
 
5.3.2.4 The legal context of corporate governance in Nigeria 
Formal rules are the laws and regulations (North 1990) which govern behaviour. As 
evident from Chapter 4 and as the author would further present in the following chapter, 
the legal context within which corporate governance has developed in Nigeria was 
dictated by English law and the latter still constitutes a substantial part of Nigerian law. 
Indeed, having described the political, economic and social operating environments of 
corporate governance in Nigeria, it is worth noting that Nigeria’s mimicking of UK laws, 
following independence, meant it failed to address company law problems that were 
specific to Nigeria’s socio-political environments and also did not tackle the economic 
and commercial challenges of the country (Okike 2007). According to an academic 
respondent: 
 
“What we have in Nigeria is a legal system that could best be described as non-
Nigerian” 
 
Nigeria has inherited the British corporate governance system and even after several 
company law reforms over the years, the legal infrastructure of corporate governance in 
Nigeria remains fashioned along the Anglo-Saxon model. It is unsurprising however that 
this misfit created by the UK mimic has allowed several governance malfunctions to 
traditionally flourish. Right from the colonial period through independence and even up 
till the 1990s, there was limited challenge to management’s prerogative to run 
corporations, no efforts directed to off-sight supervision with regards to ensuring 
transparent disclosure of information, and no substantial intervention in matters of 
accountability and corporate power administration and relationship (Yakasai 2001). 
Nigeria therefore needs a legal system which reflects and tackles the peculiar challenges 
posed by the institutional environments described above. This system must nonetheless 
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remain competitive in attracting both domestic and foreign investments by not stifling the 
independent dynamism that underlies modern capitalism.  
 
The British construction of the Nigerian legal system, even though directed to serve 
Britain’s interests, nonetheless set some good precedence. The generality of the company 
law in Nigeria has traditionally laid down the "rules of the game" for the internal 
operation of the corporation (encompassing certain issues such as shareholder rights and 
the organisational structure) as well as its external relationships (such as the wide range 
of contracts that corporations make with various external actors including service 
users/customers, suppliers, distributors, and joint venture partners) which are 
underpinnings of corporate governance. Nevertheless, what Nigeria lacks is the devotion 
and culture capable of enforcing these formal rights (Ahunwan 2002). In Nigeria, there 
has been a traditional disregard for the rule of law (Ahunwan 1998), although recent 
governmental commitment, especially through the setting up of anti-corruption bodies, 
are creating a general awareness that the law is there to govern and must therefore be 
allowed to. While the current focus of governmental campaigns appears to concentrate on 
public office holders, it is however expected that the trend will proceed to confront some 
of the deep rooted and highly complex corruption perpetrated by managers and directors 
alike, as a result of laxity in law enforcement. As a senior official of a regulatory agency 
puts it: 
 
“The problem in Nigeria is that of enforcement which is silent except when there is a 
public outcry”. 
 
Corporate governance laws and regulations should bring an element of morality and 
conscience into business and limit majority rule in a consistent manner. Corporate 
governance should further limit the strict application of the common law approach. This 
can only be achieved by addressing the various institutional impediments to good 
corporate governance in the laws and the “codes of conduct” governing corporations and 
corporate conduct which are the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1990, the 2003 
Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria, the 2006 Central Bank of Nigeria’s Code of 
Corporate Governance for Nigeria Banks, and the very recent 2007 Code of Conduct for 
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Shareholders’ Associations in Nigeria. Specifically, subsequent discussions in chapters 6 
and 7 examine the effectiveness of the Nigerian corporate governance regulatory 
infrastructure, as well as the extent of external influences in its development. 
Nevertheless, the rule of law must prevail in order to ensure good corporate governance 
in Nigeria. Findings from this survey also suggest that the Nigerian corporate governance 
legal machinery requires adequate expertise as well as a highly competent human 
capacity. 
 
5.3.3 Micro (Internal) Institutions 
5.3.3.1 Corporate/industry values as determinants of good corporate governance in 
Nigeria  
Corporate values constitute an internal institutional force which guides corporate 
behaviour. Lencioni (2002) organised corporate values into four categories: (1) 
core/inherent values which are the cornerstone principles that guide all of a company's 
actions; (2) aspirational values which are those needed to succeed in the future; (3) 
permission-to-play values which reflect the minimum permissible behavioural and social 
standards; (4) accidental values are those that arise spontaneously without being 
cultivated by leadership. The overall quality of the values of a corporation is a strong 
determinant of its corporate leadership and governance beyond the rigours of regulation. 
The practical implementation of corporate governance codes of conduct cannot be 
realised solely by a regulatory compliance program as the latter’s relevance and 
effectiveness in daily business conduct is determined by the moral values of the company 
(Wieland 2005).  Good corporate governance demands that companies’ management and 
directors should utilise their stewardship of companies’ resources to promote the latter’s 
interests and that of shareholders and relevant stakeholders. Nevertheless, the manner and 
extent to which this is operationalised is contingent on the values which the company 
uphold.  
 
Thus, good corporate governance is itself a value comprising of numerous other values 
including accountability, transparency, honesty, integrity, responsibility, fairness amongst 
others, as discussions in Chapter 2 have revealed. The subsequent translation into daily 
134 
 
practice of corporate governance codes and standards in a particular company or industry 
is dependent on the presence or absence of these values. A firm’s corporate governance 
practices are indicative of the overall values such a firm upholds, which in turn is 
generally a reflection of firm’s history, ownership structure, as well as society. Simply 
put, the corporate governance problem is a moral challenge. If all corporate participants 
including managers, directors, auditors and regulators behave at all times as they are 
expected to, most of the corporate collapses in recent history and their devastating effects 
could have been prevented. The argument here is not that future regulatory initiatives 
should shift focus to concentrate predominantly on imbibing these attributes in corporate 
players. However, while this is difficult to achieve, corporate governance discussions 
should encapsulate the underlying challenge posed by certain key values, whose degree 
of presence or absence can account for the variability of corporate governance practices 
across different firms and industries, even when they are governed by the same statutory 
laws and/or voluntary codes of conducts.  
 
A senior internal auditor of a large Nigerian corporation thus observes: 
 
“In Nigeria, as in other developing countries, values such as accountability and honest 
stewardship are hugely unsynonymous with most corporations. Whilst, some of these 
values might have been passed on by the British colonial masters, they have not been 
nurtured by past managements and directors of Nigerian companies”  
 
It is also important to note the traditional lack of adequate encouragement/promotion of 
professional values among key corporate governance watch-dogs. Apart from the major 
regulators, these include professional bodies such as the Nigeria Accounting Standards 
Board, Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria and the Association of National 
Accountants of Nigeria.  
 
Corporate Nigeria thus needs to incubate certain essential values and nurture good 
governance practices and curb corrupt behaviour. While robust regulatory initiatives will 
undoubtedly help the state of corporate governance in Nigeria, any successful fight 
against corporate corruption over the long term must, at the very least, inculcate and 
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promote these important values to a point where they become self sustainable and 
therefore can themselves generally infer good governance internally. Accidental values 
need to be developed in Nigerian companies to ensure good corporate governance 
practices in the short term but these values must become entrenched as core values to 
foster long term and sustainable good corporate governance practices. 
 
5.3.3.2 Corporate culture and corporate governance in Nigeria 
Culture is an exceptionally elusive construct (Jahoda 1984) and can be defined as “the 
learned, socially acquired traditions and life styles of the members of a society, including 
their patterned, repetitious way of thinking, feeling and acting” (Harris 1987: 6). 
Depending on the subject of inquiry, the society in question may be a nation, an ethnic 
group or an organisation (Salacuse 2003). Corporate culture thus becomes central to 
corporate governance and the ability of a nation to competitively attract investments. 
Corporate governance is itself a culture which is especially influenced by the overall 
corporate culture which dictates the behaviour and interaction of key players in a firm-
level corporate governance structure. 
 
Nigeria is a country with a rich cultural heritage and diverse customs and languages 
(Okike 1994). Findings from this survey show that the general corporate culture in 
Nigeria reflects the country’s national culture which varies across three major tribes 
(Northern Hausa, Western Yoruba and Eastern Igbo) but, nonetheless, share major 
prescriptions with regards to basic business conduct and relationships. Tackling corporate 
governance problems in Nigeria would thus mean digging deep to effect a significant 
change/improvement in the cultures of Nigerian corporations which have been 
sufficiently permeated by societal corruption (see Okike 1994; 2004). Okike (2007) noted 
that the two anti-graft bodies, set up by the former Nigerian President (Olusegun 
Obasanjo), which are the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) have 
already yielded some results in the public sector with several arrests of corrupt top 
government officials. However their impact is yet to be felt in the private sector (Okike 
2007). No doubt, economic reform and development is high on the agenda of the current 
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Nigerian president. Consequently, his government has demonstrated a laudable 
commitment to inculcating a culture of honesty and transparency in public office holders. 
Nevertheless, robust measures are required to instil such culture in Nigerian corporations, 
if Nigeria will ever be able to sufficiently utilise and maximize its huge potentials as a 
good investment location.  
 
No doubt this necessitates a zero-tolerance regulatory policy on corporate corruption but 
regulation alone cannot stop corporate misconducts especially in developing countries. A 
strong corporate culture that is in alignment with good principles of corporate governance 
needs to be developed to constitute internal checks and balances. Spirited corporate 
culture, one with very clear guidelines on expected behaviour (Deal and Kennedy 1982) 
could solve some of the corporate governance issues that plague developing countries 
(see Okike 1994; 2004). For example, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found empirical 
evidence which suggests that corporate culture is linked to the range and scope of 
voluntary disclosure practices. Manipulation of accounts, auditors’ compromise, non-
transparent disclosure and other fraudulent behaviours will thrive in a company that lacks 
the cultural strength to internally address them before they result in major scandals. 
Furthermore, survey respondents generally suggested that good culture must also 
permeate the regulatory authorities and the professional bodies who perform the 
oversight monitoring function of corporate governance. 
 
5.3.3.3 Path dependency: how corporate history shapes corporate governance in 
Nigeria 
Here the author investigates the path dependency (David 1985; Arthur 1989, 1990) of 
historical institutionalism on the governance of Nigerian corporations. David and Arthur 
maintained in their publications that inefficiencies can become institutionalised as 
industry standards and may persist for extended periods of time even when they have 
significant defects; economists (Leibowitz and Margolis 1990; 1995) have however 
criticized this proposition, arguing that market forces will not tolerate significant 
inefficiencies (Stack and Gartland 2003). Applying the theory of historical 
institutionalism to corporate governance research nevertheless brings another dimension 
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to our understanding of the subject, especially as a continuum. This continuum can be 
understood as the institutionalisation of a set of persuasive ideas that have been 
successful in describing reality solving problems over long periods of time (Peters, Pierre 
and King 2005).  These ideas may be good or bad. 
 
In the context of corporations, traditional practices sustained over a long period, may 
become difficult to change, but continue to be the norm even when better alternatives 
become available. A major thesis of the historical institutional theory literature is that 
organisational initiatives as well as policy making systems tend to be conservative and 
find ways of defending existing norms and patterns, which later become self-reinforcing 
institutionalised processes and configurations that are difficult to change once established 
(Pierson 2000; Peters et al. 2005), although they may be subtly modified to adapt to 
changing conditions. The path-dependency theory can therefore explain why certain 
corporate governance problems persist over time in some firms, industries and countries 
especially after rigorous regulatory measures have been specifically deployed to address 
them. Indeed, the convergence debate and path dependency premises remain competing 
hypotheses in our explanation of similarities and diversities of national corporate 
governance structures and practices.  
 
No doubt firms all over the world should compete for reputation status in institutional 
fields as corporate audiences rely on the reputations and histories of firms in making 
investment decisions, career decisions, and product choices (Dowling 1986; Fombrun and 
Shanley 1990). However, as the author has indicated earlier, corporations in Nigeria 
generally have a long history of corrupt behaviour which have been sustained over time 
and have become somewhat immune to regulatory reforms. Rather bad corporate 
governance in Nigeria constantly adapt to increasingly vigorous regulatory measures by 
changing in style and in the form in which it is perpetrated thus increasing in complexity 
and becoming more impervious. According to one academic respondent: 
 
“Managers and directors of typical Nigerian companies, as well as their auditors, have 
historically benefited hugely from several corporate fraud and seem not to be ready to 
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change but continue to transform and derive more complex means of perpetrating their 
crime to circumvent the claws of the law”.  
 
While the path dependency theory may lack sufficient evidence in its applicability to the 
Nigerian banking sector, which is the most regulated sector and characteristically can be 
described as the sector with the best corporate governance practices in the country, it 
does hold sufficient ground in less regulated sectors, such as manufacturing, insurance 
and telecommunications. 
 
5.3.3.4 Ethical climate and corporate governance in Nigeria  
76 percent of investors would move their investments from a company with which they 
are invested if they learned that the company is engaged in an unethical albeit legal 
behavior irrespective of the potential high returns (Corporate Board 2007). Indeed, there 
is further evidence that corporate stakeholders use ethics as a very important criterion to 
judge companies (Lewis 2003). As a response, many companies have implemented 
ethical programs (Schlegelmilch and Pollach 2005) aimed at establishing a good 
reputation in order to prevent customer churn and labour turnover on the one hand, and to 
attract new customers and high-calibre employees on the other, which altogether enable 
them to charge a premium based on their distinguished reputations (Fombrun 1996). The 
thesis here is that ethical companies can derive financial benefits, directly or indirectly. 
Simply put, ethics in the corporate world involves "ordinary decency" which 
encompasses integrity, honesty and fairness in the conduct of business (Sternberg 2000). 
Here the author’s focus is on the extent to which Nigerian corporations have 
institutionally imbibed the attributes of ethical business and the resulting implications for 
corporate governance.  
 
The science of ethics encompasses a reflective study of what we ought to do, or how we 
ought to live (Ekennia 1998), therefore corporate ethics relates to choices and judgments 
made with regards to business conduct (Erondu, Sharland and Okpara 2004). Decades of 
predominant military rule meant modern corporate Nigeria developed in an unethical 
climate, and corruption-riddled business practices were the norm. In the words of a 
corporate governance consultant: 
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“Perhaps the first thing that comes to mind for many foreign investors wanting to do 
business in Nigeria is corruption. They are correct to think that way. Corruption has 
engulfed Nigeria”. 
 
Okike (2004) has drawn attention to the problems of corruption in Nigeria and how it 
affects the accounting profession. No doubt, corruption in Nigeria is closely linked with 
the attitudes of individual Nigerians including the value placed on morals, coupled with 
the socio-political and economic environments of the country which have resulted in a 
bad leadership structure. However, such epidemic would not have flourished if external 
parties, especially foreigners doing business in the country, had not been beneficiaries of 
corruption proceeds. This further suggests that the subject of business ethics in Nigeria 
may remain in idealism for a long while. The absence of an ethical climate for business 
conduct, like the institutional problems discussed earlier, aids the negative conduct of 
corporate governance.  Nevertheless, following the establishment of democracy in the 
country, Nigeria has achieved giant strides in reducing (or rather managing) corruption 
and promoting good business practice and has since moved from being the world’s 
second most corrupt nation with a corruption perception index (CPI) score of 1.6 in 2005 
to 2.2 in 2007 (Transparency International 2008). It has also moved from an Ibrahim 
Index11 of African Governance score of 45.5 (position 41) in 2002 to 48.3 (position 37) in 
2005 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2007). These indices both suggest that corruption in 
Nigeria is reducing.  
 
5.3.4 Summary 
In summarizing the findings from this study, the author shows (in Figure 5.2) two classes 
of institutional effects on corporate governance: those external to the firm (macro) and 
those internal (micro). The external institutional environments which profile a firm’s 
corporate governance consist of the country’s social, economic, political and legal 
environments, while those internal to the firm consist of the firm’s/industry’s values, 
culture, history and ethics. While this framework is neither an extension nor modification 
of the Principal-Agent model of Jensen and Meckling, it represents an encompassing 
                                                   
11 The Ibrahim Index, like the Transparency International Index, is a seminal African index that measures 
the degree to which essential political goods are provided within the forty-eight African countries that are 
south of the Sahara. 
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framework which provides illumination on certain institutional effects and relationships, 
thereby encapsulating the complex dynamics and realities of governance in modern day 
corporations. It thus constitutes a useful context in which we can analyze corporate 
governance structures, across diverse countries, cultures, belief systems, traditions, 
industries, scholarly orientations and disciplines. It specifically adds to the literature on 
the institutional determinants of corporate governance (Boehmer 1999; Aoki 2001; 
Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Aguilera 2005; Leaptrott 2005; Liu 2005; Lubatkin et al 
2005, 2007; Judge, Douglas and Kutan 2008), with rich insights from a developing 
market African economy. 
 
              External (Country level)                       Internal (Firm/Industry level) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Institutional determinants of corporate governance  
 
The author argues that corporate governance practices do not develop out of vacuity. 
They are governed by institutions. The format and expression of governance in modern 
corporations across different countries are a reflection of their institutional environments. 
Two classes of these have been described and their interactions with corporate conduct 
and governance in the case of Nigeria have been analyzed.  More importantly, it must be 
noted that these institutions are interdependent and influence one another, as the 
discussions in this chapter (as well as Figure 5.2) have revealed. Furthermore, these 
institutional factors interact with one another. For example, the effectiveness of the legal 
environment is dependent on the political culture of the country, which is strongly as a 
result of the country’s social structure. Also, corporate/industry culture and 
corporate/industry values constantly interact, and influence firm/industry level practices. 
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The findings thus indicate that bad corporate governance practices in developing 
countries, such as Nigeria, can be institutionally explained, albeit within a 
complementary agency theoretical background. Therefore, in conceptualizing corporate 
governance in developing countries, particularly Nigeria, it is important to note that the 
overall nature of the country’s national and firm-level institutional environments are not 
complementary with good corporate governance principles, both at the national and 
corporate/industry levels. These have inhibited the developments of necessary corporate 
governance infrastructures such as rigorous regulatory enforcement, properly-functioning 
markets, honest and highly-regulated auditing and accounting firms as well as vibrant 
professional bodies. Nigeria requires the institutional capacity to promote, administer and 
maintain good principles of corporate governance. 
 
Institutions matter in corporate governance. There is no doubt that corporate governance 
practices have travelled the world and despite the existence of national corporate 
governance isomorphism, the reality remains a translation of practices to fit the national 
institutional settings of a particular country (Aguilera 2005). As such, despite 
globalisation pressures, corporations continue to be influenced by the institutional 
environments of their respective countries. In an attempt to summarise, it is important to 
recall the major characteristics of the Nigerian external and internal institutional 
environments. They include the following; political instability and tensions; bribery and 
corruption; easy circumvention of laws; ineffective legal structure;  lesser degree of 
economic activity; reduced dynamism and independence of market operations; lack of 
adequate infrastructure and basic amenities of life; poverty; high rate of unemployment; 
lack of honest values; and a less attractive investment climate. 
  
The interactions between the internal and external institutional environments within 
which firms operate in Nigeria shape corporate governance. However they shape bad 
corporate governance by creating obstacles for the successful implementation, 
enforcement and eventual success of corporate laws and regulations, as well as voluntary 
codes of conducts. Furthermore, these institutional environments have traditionally 
prevented the decisive prosecution of corporate offenders, thereby leaving them to go 
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free and continue to benefit from the proceeds of their crime at the expense of 
shareholders. Corporate governance does not develop in isolation but reflects the 
underlying institutions which affect the structures, rights and responsibilities of managers 
and directors and the ways these are organised in different countries. But in an attempt to 
move the debate on the institutional embeddedness of corporate governance further, the 
author proceeds to examine the relevance of these institutions in today’s and tomorrow’s 
corporate Nigeria. Do institutional forces weaken over time?  
 
5.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA: DEINSTITUTIONALISATION, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE OR INSTITUTIONAL MAINTENANCE?  
The author has given insights, from the standpoint of institutional theory, into the 
development of corporate governance structures, practices and legitimate expectations in 
developing countries. Critics (Oliver 1992) have however warned that the sole emphasis 
on legitimizing processes and organisational conformity by institutional researchers has 
undermined research into the factors that cause organisations to challenge and discard 
institutional norms. While Scott (2004) maintains that institutional change has always 
been present in the theoretical and empirical agenda of institutional theorists, the 
prevailing institutional arguments have been predominantly used to explain increased 
conformity to a given institutional environment such that isomorphism was taken to be 
the primary indicator that institutional processes were at work (Scott 2001; 2004). On the 
other hand deinstitutionalisation is the process by which the legitimacy of certain 
institutionalised practices, such as those described in this chapter, fade away or 
discontinue, meaning that there has occurred a delegitimisation of an established 
organisational practice or procedure due to organisational challenges as well as the 
inability of organisations to continue to follow previously established norms or behaviour 
(Oliver 1992).  
 
To what extent are these happening in the institutionalised Nigerian corporate governance 
environment? Is there any challenge to the institutionally conceived corporate governance 
status quo in Nigeria? Will the institutionally contingent corporate governance practices 
in Nigeria endure for long? Certainly the potential for deinstitutionalisation challenges 
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the stability and longevity of institutional practices, and suggests that they may become 
challenged, re-examined or abolished (Oliver 1992). 
 
Earlier discussed historical perspectives on the development of corporate governance and 
subsequent discussions on the state of corporate governance in Nigeria, suggest that 
Nigeria is renowned for poor governance. Thus, pressures stemming from globalisation 
have placed the adoption of global corporate governance best practices at the forefront of 
academic as well as policy/regulatory debates in Nigeria. Given that the author’s 
intention, in this thesis, is not to anthropomorphize Nigeria, the author further gather, 
from the research data, that Nigeria is beginning to recognize that the weaknesses of her 
corporate governance system are institutionally embedded. As a result, there is increasing 
awareness that all corporate stakeholders need to discharge their duties responsibly and 
honestly for the long term success of firms.  Increasingly, robust regulatory measures, 
facilitated by commendable governmental commitment, have also contributed to traces of 
deinstitutionalisation. Another major factor is the “changing” political culture of 
corruption.  Office holders in public and private enterprises as well as regulators are 
constantly being reminded to give maximum respect to the rule of law. Nigeria’s 
President Yar'Adua seems to have embarked upon a zero tolerance on corruption. There 
is also an increasing demand for good corporate governance by shareholders (institutional 
and individuals) and other stakeholders which is gradually erasing some of the very crude 
and unwholesome fraud, traditionally perpetrated by managers and directors. 
Furthermore, stability in governmental policies with regards to corporate affairs is also 
contributing to positive deinstitutionalisation.  According to a top government official 
and politician;  
 
“The political instability in Nigeria is reducing unlike the military era where 
governmental policies change drastically. The business atmosphere has become more 
sanitized since the advent of the democratic dispensation. The situation is very calm now 
and matters such as corporate governance are very high on our agenda”. 
 
However, this is a very slow process and the evidence for deinstitutionalisation are still 
minimal with few indications in the banking industry. At the micro firm/industry level, 
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the implementation of “good corporate governance” in the Nigerian banking industry (for 
example, through the 2006 Central Bank of Nigeria’s Code of Corporate Governance for 
Nigeria Banks, Post Consolidation) represents an attempt to re-shape the institutional 
landscape. The banking industry can thus be conceived as a potential fertile ground for 
“institutional entrepreneurship” (Di Maggio 1988; Fligstein 2001). This industry-level 
institutional rearrangement may have positive effects on the general Nigerian negative 
institutionalisms. For example, as earlier noted, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) under 
its new leadership has recently (on the 14th of August 2009) dismissed the Chief 
Executive Officers and executive directors of five major Nigerian Banks, for bad 
corporate governance and fraud. Following a preceding CBN audit of banks, they were 
found to have serious liquidity problems due to several billions of naira of unpaid and 
unserviced loans by debtors including top business moguls and politicians.  Weeks after, 
the CBN completed its audit process and with the further sack of the chief executives of 
three other banks, for issues bothering on liquidity, capital adequacy, corporate 
governance and corruption. As noted earlier noted, whilst practices such as this have 
littered the Nigerian banking industry and led to its near collapse in the 1990s, as 
subsequent discussions on the Nigerian banking industry will indicate, one can suggest 
that the banking industry could be set to place corporate Nigeria on the path of 
deinstitutionalisation from the negative “apron strings” of the institutional environments 
which have plagued corporate conduct in the country.  
 
However, despite recent regulatory initiatives and stakeholder advocacy at implementing 
good corporate governance in Nigeria, as a means to re-shape the negative institutional 
configurations, only peripheral changes are being achieved. Notably these industry level 
potential re-configurations seem to conflict with the previously discussed macro-
institutional settings, particularly the polity and the socio-cultural environment, and the 
entrenched corrupt practices at the firm level. Therefore, regulatory attempts at 
promoting good corporate governance become corrupt and deep rooted structural and 
systemic configurations remain predominantly unchanged. This is why regulations fail to 
achieve their desired objectives. Only “window dressing” of laws on paper without actual 
correction of institutionalised corrupt behaviour seems to cut across the Nigerian 
145 
 
corporate governance scenery. The author conceives this as a case of institutional 
maintenance, where regulatory reforms at the industry level are unable to change the 
self-reinforcing institutional landscape. Here, the prospects of true and lasting 
institutional change are highly limited, as it requires deep rooted systemic changes across 
different elements of the previously described institutional environment. Institutional 
maintenance thus becomes a corollary of efforts (particularly at the regulatory level) 
geared towards achieving institutional change. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
To what extent do firm and national level institutions matter in corporate governance? 
This study has shown how much they do in today’s world of corporate, economic and 
political globalisation. The author has specifically shown how certain underlying national 
conditions, which are external to the firm and in particular, the political, economic, legal 
and social environments, shape corporate governance. The author also shows how firm-
level environmental traditions, which are reflected in firm/industry values, culture, ethics 
and history, play a determining role in corporate governance. The author posits that 
corporate governance and the behaviours of firms as well as their stakeholders are deeply 
entrenched in these institutions. Whilst the study did not expressly consider all the 
institutional determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria, such as national 
cultural effects, the effects of culture have been discussed alongside other national and 
firm-level institutional environments. Findings from this survey show that the belief 
systems and cultural norms of the country influence the direction, practice and quality of 
her corporate governance. Therefore, irrespective of the legal/statutory framework and/or 
the international best practice approach, the history, culture and norms of Nigerian 
society have collectively, but negatively, programmed the conduct of key players in the 
corporate governance framework, especially board directors, managers and regulators, 
(Yakasai 2001) to produce a weak corporate governance system. 
 
At the firm level, agency theory concerns itself with the inevitable variance of self 
interests between the principals and agents, the welfare losses they create, and the means 
to foster the alignment of these interests to reduce those losses (Scott 1998). However,  
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macro and micro level institutional analysis of the firm, aimed at conceptualizing national 
systems of corporate governance, focus on the influence and effects of institutional 
frameworks upon managerial discretion (Pochet 2002) and the administration of 
corporate governance. In this chapter, the author has provided a Nigerian perspective on 
the institutional determinants of corporate governance. The study therefore advocates the 
use of institutional theory (as a complement to the agency theory) to conceptualize and 
explain the construction of corporate governance, particularly in developing countries. In 
this regard, the data-generated model can be used in viewing corporate governance and 
its internal and external environmental interactions. These interactions significantly 
dictate the legitimate expectations of stakeholders with regards to corporate governance, 
the administration of corporate governance and the practices developed or adopted, the 
corporate governance problems experienced, and the success of the regulatory measures 
designed to solve them. A profound scholarly appreciation of institutional theory retains a 
strong potential with regards to solving the mystery of national corporate governance 
diversity. Organisational structure is adaptively shaped internally by the characteristics 
and commitments of participants and externally by the influences and constraints from 
outside environments (Selznick 1957).  
 
Institutions shape corporate governance in Nigeria. However, this is not to undermine the 
relevance of the agency theory in the understanding of corporate governance in the 
country. It must be noted that discussions (Chapters 2 and 4 inclusive) have progressed 
from this basis. Clearly, both agency and institutional theoretical standpoints are 
important to the future of corporate governance research. Nevertheless, it is imperative to 
understand and conceptualize how corporate governance structures and practices evolve, 
the shapes and forms they take, and the strengths and weaknesses that become inherent in 
them. This chapter has been a response to these needs. The discussions in this chapter are 
thus a pointer to the fact that institutional perspectives can explain the peculiar 
translations, expressions and dimensions of agency costs and relationships in corporate 
governance, especially in developing countries.  As previously noted, the data-generated 
framework presented in this chapter does not replace, modify or nullify agency theory, 
which embodies a practical view of the firms’ internal governance dynamics, but 
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provides a much needed illumination on the institutional effects on corporate governance, 
encapsulating its complex dynamics and realities and thus constitutes a useful outlook 
through which we can understand the multidimensional nature of corporate governance, 
especially in the context of developing countries. 
 
Thus, beyond fascinating intellectual constructions, corporate governance models, 
especially in developing countries, would have limited applicability if they were not 
institutionally based and explained. This chapter’s main thesis is such that institutions are 
very powerful forces that shape corporate governance. The specific additions to the 
literature are the evidence and in-depth analysis gathered from a developing country. The 
author therefore argues that the application of “an institutionally-based theory” of 
corporate governance is more appropriate for developing countries, such as Nigeria. 
Foreign systems of corporate governance reflect their history, assumptions and value 
systems (Charkham 1994) which should not be transplanted, but rather, countries should 
identify the various ways in which the universal principles of good corporate governance 
can be applied in such a way that it pinpoints and corrects the weaknesses in each 
country’s particular system and practices (Okike 2007).  
 
The author also presents a case of the institutional maintenance of norms, practices and 
behavioural structures as against the institutional change that developing countries deeply 
needs. This adds to the literature on institutional theory. As Lockett, Wright and Leca 
(2009) noted, the issue of how agents maintain institutions remains an understudied 
phenomenon even though institutional maintenance is distinct from simple stability or an 
absence of change, but involving considerable efforts as a response to organisational or 
environmental change (Scott, 2001; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). For Nigeria to 
become a well desired investment location, it must minimize the effects of her negative 
institutional environments and allow corporate governance to truly decouple from such 
forces, as well as those resulting corollary forces of institutional maintenance. 
While the institutional environments, analyzed above, do not sufficiently complement 
good corporate governance practices, they are deeply entrenched and, therefore, perhaps 
unchangeable in the short-term. Nonetheless, to minimize their effects, it is imperative, as 
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the discussions on deinstitutionalisation indicate that stakeholders in corporate Nigeria 
begin to emphatically reconstruct certain areas of these institutionalisms. Given the 
astounding lacuna of literature on corporate governance in Africa, this chapter adds to our 
understanding of corporate governance and, in particular, the application of institutional 
theory, in the context of a developing economy. As the discussions in chapters 2 and 4 
also suggest, any attempt to lay out the principles of corporate governance in Nigeria 
must address the challenges of agreeing on a general concept of corporate governance. 
This is related to the institutional defects that the development of the subject has 
prevalently suffered. Indeed regulatory measures aimed at addressing some of Nigeria’s 
corporate governance issues must, at first, be institutionally based whilst reflecting 
global, regional and local principles of good corporate governance. This will facilitate a 
more effective and easily implementable administrative and regulatory governance 
structure. In line with the foregoing, corporate governance regulation and the role of 
government are discussed in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 – REGULATORY AND GOVERNMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF 
GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 
 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter conducts an in-depth examination of corporate governance regulation in 
Nigeria. Regulating corporate governance has no doubt benefited from considerable 
attention, in the wake of the corporate scandals of the early 2000s.This has ensured an 
active debate with discussants ranging from scholars across different disciplines; self-
regulatory organisations and stock exchange authorities; policy makers; and professional 
accounting and auditing associations. At one end of the debate, the central argument is 
the need to increase regulation and punish corporate offenders more heavily. Closely 
linked to this is the expected role of government in corporate governance. Given present 
global economic conditions, more governmental intervention is increasingly being 
favoured as key to restoring public confidence in corporations. The crucial question 
remains how governments across the world intend to repair the damaged corporate 
integrity without undermining the principles upon which the success of the modern 
capitalist economy is based. To this extent, the role of government in corporate 
governance is very important as well as highly delicate. 
 
Proimos (2005) argues that in order to ensure the effectiveness of good corporate 
governance principles, they must become requirements that are prudently monitored by 
law. He further argues that there must be stringent penalties associated with these 
requirements when breached. He concluded that mere guidelines for publicly listed 
corporations are ineffective, and as a result, only a statutory corporate governance 
regulatory framework will prevent future corporate scandals and collapses. The United 
States is a common example of a country with a rule-based corporate governance system. 
At the other end of the debate is the preference and need to encourage more soft-law 
alternatives. This form of regulation is dominantly principle-based and allows firms to 
voluntarily adhere to corporate governance codes of conduct and practice. This has 
traditionally been the UK’s preference for fostering sustainable good corporate 
behaviour. 
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In many countries, both postulates of corporate governance regulation do not function 
mutually exclusively of each other. Usually, there is a synergy between the legal 
requirements of corporations contained in the Companies law and the self-regulatory 
instruments. Indeed self-regulation is only able to function on an existing legal platform 
for corporate regulation. Wymeersch (2005) argues that the enforcement techniques and 
efficiency of self-regulation are directly dependent on the legal nature of the codes. He 
also noted that whilst a sufficient synergy must be achieved between self-regulation and 
the legal system, this is often a complex matter which differs considerably from country 
to country. He further attributed the difference to the variance in the legal status of the 
codes and the differences in the environing legal system. However, ranking different 
countries on a continuum, which has self-regulation at one end and strict legal 
requirements at the other, would suggest that corporate governance regulation is country 
dependent. The potential rank of the United Kingdom, with her principle-based form of 
regulation which functions on a “comply or explain” principle, and the United States, 
with her hastily passed Sarbanes Oxley Act, has been earlier suggested.   
 
One can deduce from chapters 2, 4 and 5 that in formulating corporate governance 
regulatory strategies, countries must account for their specific circumstances. These 
include relevant historical perspectives; corporate ownership structures and 
characteristics; cultural norms and values; socio-political and economic climates; and the 
ethical environment of business conduct. Countries should, therefore, position their 
regulatory systems to tackle the particular challenges they face. More importantly, it must 
be noted that corporate governance regulation in developing countries will differ in 
ideology, necessity, concerns, complexity and robustness in specific areas.  Given that 
developments on corporate governance regulation in developing countries are sparsely 
documented, this chapter facilitates an understanding of the regulatory framework of 
corporate governance in developing countries. In our Nigerian case, Okike (2007) 
recently made efforts to articulate the roles of some key players in the country’s corporate 
governance regulatory system. Ajogwu (2007) also attempted to analyse the legal, ethical 
and practical perspectives of corporate governance regulation with specific focus on 
related implementation and enforcement issues.   
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This chapter adds to this burgeoning literature by accounting for the regulatory 
determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria. This chapter particularly 
highlights the challenges of corporate governance regulation in Nigeria.  More 
importantly, it examines the extent to which the most appropriate and suitable corporate 
governance regulatory postulate and structure can be developed in Nigeria as well as in 
other developing countries. The state of corporate governance and the various 
impediments to good corporate behaviour have been analysed in chapter 4. The author 
further provided institutional explanations for these in chapter 5. Here, the author looks at 
the extent to which Nigeria has accounted for these in the configuration of her corporate 
governance regulatory system. Thus this chapter looks specifically at the appropriateness 
and effectiveness of various regulatory initiatives in promoting and ensuring good 
corporate governance in Nigeria.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section looks into the subject of corporate 
governance regulation in more detail, which serves as a background for subsequent 
discussions. Following on, discussions are divided into three parts. In the first part, the 
author scrutinises the regulatory infrastructure of corporate governance in Nigeria, 
including the roles of key players in the system. Part 2 further augments this multi-
stakeholder scrutiny through an in-depth analysis of corporate governance regulation in 
the Nigerian banking industry. Part 3 scrutinises the role of government in corporate 
governance.  Whilst this research field has generally not attracted substantial scholarly 
focus/attention, the author makes an attempt to create an understanding of government’s 
role in corporate governance in different institutional contexts. Lastly, in an attempt to 
conclude, the author converses out the need to foster a long lasting good corporate 
governance culture beyond the system of regulation.  
 
6.1 REGULATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance is strongly dependent on the larger environments within which 
firms operate; these consist of the legislative environment such as shareholder protection 
laws (LaPorta et al 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999); the efficiency 
and enforcement capabilities of the judiciary; as well as the general environmental 
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support for business (Klapper and Love 2002). Udayasankar and Das (2007) argue that 
these can cumulatively be regarded as corporate governance regulation. In common law 
jurisdictions, a corporation is usually subject to the statute under which it was 
incorporated as well as the case law of that jurisdiction (Gillen 2006). A corporation will 
be further subject to the securities law requirements in the jurisdictions in which it 
distributes securities to the public; the corporation will also be subject to the requirements 
of the stock exchange if it is listed (Gillen 2006).  At the basic, this tri-faceted 
infrastructure has traditionally regulated corporate governance.  
 
There is a general consensus that regulators, including stock exchange authorities, 
corporate affairs commissions, as well as securities and exchange commissions, all have 
important roles to play in promoting good corporate governance through regulation. 
However, the corporate scandals in the last decade have placed significant doubts on the 
abilities of these authorities to sufficiently regulate corporate behaviour. As indicated 
earlier, the rules-based and the principles-based corporate governance regulatory 
structures remain competing hypotheses in the corporate governance regulation literature.  
Nevertheless, the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US has attracted significant 
criticisms from many discussants. For example, Fisch (2004) argues that the US 
government has intruded into the traditional province of state law.  He further argued that 
the US government’s form of imposing excessive regulatory burden, upon the traditional 
structure and organisation of business relationships, negatively affects the essence of a 
traditional private contract. Thus, to what extent should corporate governance be 
regulated?  What are the maximum and minimum levels of regulation required in 
corporate matters? No doubt, corporations have become very powerful not just in 
economic terms but in almost all areas of human existence. Also, it has become ever 
more essential that they are properly monitored. Oversight and control measures, which 
are adequate, efficient and sustainable, must be in place to ensure corporate integrity.  
 
A considerable amount of research on corporate governance has focused on regulation 
essentially since the publication of the 1992 Cadbury Code in the UK.  The Cadbury 
Code also resulted in an increased interest on the corporate governance subject. It has 
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further constituted a popular reference point for many other countries, in the development 
of their own codes of conduct. No doubt, the Cadbury Code enriched the debate on 
regulation, particularly in the UK and indeed globally. Following years of corporate 
misconducts, incessant regulatory inquiries and increased shareholder activism, various 
codes of conduct and regulations are now in place in many countries such as the Preda 
Code in Italy; the Vienot Report in France; the German corporate governance code 
amongst others (Schmidt and Brauer 2006). Corporate governance codes have 
conventionally sought to promote good corporate governance through financial control 
requirements and reporting standards. Given that the stock exchange authorities in many 
countries require listed firms to adhere to the corporate governance codes in their 
jurisdictions, self-regulation becomes self-enforcing. However, what is the situation in 
developing countries? To what extent are the regulatory systems effective? To what 
extent can we achieve a global coherence with regards to national corporate governance 
regulatory requirements?  
 
6.2 - PART 1 - REGULATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA  
6.2.1 Overview  
In Africa, as preceding discussions have indicated, corporate governance matters are 
often discussed in relation to corruption which has been a hindrance to social, economic 
and political developments. Good corporate governance and accountability is gradually 
been seen by African corporate and capital markets regulators as one of the most 
effective tools to minimise corporate corruption (Mensah et al. 2003). In the wake of the 
financial crises of the late 1990s, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) emphasized the major role that the observance of international standards and codes 
of best practices can play in strengthening national and international financial systems. 
They therefore called for the preparation of Reports on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSC), which constitutes an assessment of the degree to which an economy 
observes internationally recognized standards and codes. The ROSC (2004) country 
report for Nigeria highlighted the following challenges; differential financial reporting 
requirements for large and small companies; institutional weaknesses in regulation, 
compliance, and enforcement; lack of adequate compliance with International 
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Accounting Standards (IAS) and International Standards on Auditing (ISA); absence of 
robust local standards, amongst others. The report went further to make several policy 
recommendations. For example, it highlighted the need for an independent body (such as 
the Financial Reporting Council, in the UK) to oversee, adopt, monitor and enforce 
international standards (ISA and IAS). 
 
Corporate governance regulatory practices borrowed by Nigeria from other jurisdictions, 
or those covertly forced on her by organisations such as the World Bank and IMF, may 
fail to tackle the specific regulatory challenges in the country. These issues, which relate 
to the extent of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance prescription (and/or imposition) on 
developing countries, are further discussed in the following chapter. However, in putting 
in place efficient regulatory mechanisms to promote good corporate governance in 
Nigeria, the central aim must be to ensure that the fundamental values (such as 
transparency, rule of law, fairness, responsibility and property rights) of a market 
economy in a democratic society (Mensah et al. 2003) are promoted. Thus, what is the 
state of corporate governance regulation in Nigeria? What are the regulatory mechanisms 
necessary to ensure good corporate governance? By providing an up-to-date and 
comprehensive assessment of the roles of key players in the Nigerian corporate 
governance regulatory framework, the author is able to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of present regulations. The implications of these for corporate governance 
discourse and practice facilitate very useful conclusions.  
 
The discussions here are in the following order. First the author examines the surrounding 
legal environment of corporate governance in Nigeria. This relates to the 
laws/legislations governing corporations and corporate conduct in the country. 
Discussions concentrated on those aspects, which are most relevant to corporate 
governance. Specifically, the corporate governance provisions of the Companies and 
Allied Matters Act of 1990 (hereinafter referred to as CAMA) are analysed. Following 
on, the author conducts a sequential assessment of the roles and responsibilities of key 
players in the Nigerian corporate governance regulatory framework. These include the 
Corporate Affairs Commission (hereinafter referred to as CAC), the Securities and 
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Exchange Commission (hereinafter referred to as SEC), and the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(hereinafter referred to as the NSE). Discussions focus essentially on the disciplining 
mechanisms which these organisations have put in place to tackle corporate corruption 
and promote good governance. In this vein, the author further evaluates the provisions of 
the 2003 Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as the SEC 
Code). Here the author examines the rationale behind the code; its strengths and caveats; 
as well as its ability to promote good corporate governance. The recent Code of Conduct 
for Shareholders’ Associations in Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as the SEC Code for 
Shareholders) is also examined, particularly in relation to afore-mentioned political 
capture of shareholder activism. The roles and efficiencies of some corporate governance 
professional monitors/watch dogs are also examined. These include the National 
Accounting Standard Boards (NASB), the Institute of Chattered Accountants of Nigeria 
(ICAN), the Association of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN), amongst others. 
Evolving local initiatives at corporate governance development and monitoring are also 
examined. 
 
6.2.2 The Legal Climate of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
The legal system is an important determinant of corporate structure and behaviour 
(Morrison 2004). Whilst some aspects of the company law and legal system have been 
discussed in the preceding chapter, it must be reinstated that the Nigerian law is based on 
a British defined common law, precedents and local statute. The laws in England further 
operate as a persuasive authority to complement the Nigerian law where there is a lacuna 
in the latter (Insol 2008). The main legal framework for corporate governance in Nigeria 
is the CAMA. CAMA became law on the 2nd of January 1990. The following extracts are 
CAMA provisions which specifically relate to corporate governance.  They include the 
laws which pertain to the following; directors’ duties, disclosure requirements, insider 
dealings, minority investor protection and executive compensation. This helps to 
understand the legal underpinning of corporate governance in Nigeria. Useful extracts 
from the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990 are provided in appendix 2. 
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The provisions highlighted in appendix 2 show that the Nigerian company law has 
historically been strongly influenced by the United Kingdom. Shareholders have, albeit in 
principle, enjoyed many of the same legal rights as shareholders in the dominant Anglo-
Saxon economies (Ahunwan 2002). What is lacking in Nigeria, however, is an effective 
judicial system to enforce these rights, which has traditionally increased the costs of 
contracting as well as making business activities much more risky ventures (La Porta 
1998; Ahunwan 2002). It is even more important to note that CAMA has not undergone 
any extensive review since 1990, almost two decades after. There are increasing concerns 
with regards to the ability of the Act to tackle specific corporate governance issues that 
have risen since it became law.  One of the caveats of CAMA is its deterrent capacity. 
The penalties for offenders/law breakers do not serve as a deterrent. These generally 
range from ₦25 (10 British pence) to about ₦500 (£2). Apparently these are no penalties; 
CAMA is long due for review. However, specific regulatory initiatives have been 
deployed in recent times to confront some of the statutory impediments to good corporate 
governance in Nigeria. How effective have they been? Following this basic analysis of 
the legal framework of corporate governance, the author proceeds to assess the roles of 
the key players that regulate the governance of Nigerian corporations. 
 
6.2.3 Assessing the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC)  
The CAC is a government monitoring body which regulates the formation, management 
and winding up of companies in Nigeria. The CAC is the body which administers 
CAMA. The CAC’s vision is to be a world class companies’ registry. It was established 
as an autonomous body to replace the erstwhile Company Registry, when the latter was 
found to be inefficient. The formation of the CAC, nevertheless, retained significant 
British influence. According to director of the CAC, 
 
“The establishment of the CAC as an autonomous body to administer CAMA is an 
improvement on the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
(DBEER- formerly Department of Trade and Industry DTI), in the UK” 
 
According to Section 7 of the CAMA, the purpose of the Commission is as follows:   
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(a) To administer the Act, including the regulation and supervision of the formation, 
incorporation, management and winding up of companies; 
(b) To establish and maintain companies registry and offices in all the states of the 
Federation suitably and adequately equipped to discharge its functions under the 
Act or any law in respect of which it is charged with responsibility;  
(c) Arrange and conduct an investigation into the affairs of any company where the 
interests of the shareholders and the public so demand;  
(d) To undertake such other activities as are necessary or expedient for giving full 
effect to the provisions of the Act. 
 
To what extent has the CAC being effective in its statutory obligations? According to the 
ROSC (2004), the CAC has neither an effective mechanism nor capacity to monitor and 
enforce requirements for accounting and financial reporting. The report further highlights 
the following shortcomings: 
(1) There is no rigorous enforcement of timely filing of the audited financial 
statements and directors’ report with the CAC.  
(2) Financial statements of non-listed public and private companies are not readily 
available.  
(3) Most companies do not comply with the filing requirements, and sanctions are not 
applied.  
(4) There are significant weaknesses in the enforcement mechanism, worsened by 
endemic corruption and poor record-keeping by the CAC. 
(5) Whilst CAMA requires that the audit committee review audited financial 
statements and report to the shareholders, however, authorities and others have 
not assessed the effectiveness of audit committees, making their capacity to 
monitor unknown.          
   ROSC (2004: 8) 
 
The ROSC country report concludes that there is no capacity at the CAC to effectively 
fulfil its functions. However findings from this survey were inconclusive. The comments 
of respondents at the CAC differ with regards to the extent to which the commission has 
been effective in its role. For example, a senior official of the CAC stated that; 
“The commission has been effective in satisfying its mandate and can comparatively 
compete with the company’s registry of other jurisdictions. I will rate the performance of 
the commission 70 percent in the last ten years” 
 
Other respondents at the CAC, however, stressed that the CAC’s capacity is constrained 
by myriad internal and environmental problems. Internal problems include corruption and 
the lack of human expertise. One of the environmental problems which confront the CAC 
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is the lack of independence from the polity and politicians, which results in the 
commission pursuing interest which could conflict with the essence of its formation. 
Okike (2007) argues that if the CAC is to fulfil its role of adequately promoting good 
corporate governance, its monitoring capacity will have to be strengthened with more 
realistic sanctions being applied to erring companies. She further noted that this will 
undoubtedly necessitate a review of existing legislation. In furthering the effectiveness of 
the regulatory powers of the CAC, the commission will also have to strengthen its human 
capital in terms of the knowledge, expertise and multi-disciplinary resourcefulness of its 
work force. Findings from this survey suggest that the majority of the CAC professional 
work force have legal backgrounds. Employees also need to be constantly educated and 
enlightened with regards to the importance of their roles and responsibilities, as well as 
the need to discharge their duties without favouritism, corruption, fear nor prejudice. 
Manpower development is imperative to the realisation of the commission’s objectives. 
 
6.2.4 Assessing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
The SEC is the apex regulator of the Nigerian capital market. It has the objective of 
developing and regulating a dynamic, fair, transparent and efficient capital market, in 
order to contribute to the nation’s economic development.  The evolution of the SEC 
dates back to many decades ago. It has evolved from the 1962 Capital Issues Committee, 
through to the 1973 Capital Issues Commission, to the SEC. SEC was formed following a 
comprehensive review of the financial system which led to the SEC Decree of 1979. The 
SEC decree has further undergone several reviews. The most recent of the reviews, as at 
the time of writing this thesis, is the 1999 review which led to the Investments and 
Securities Act (hereinafter referred to as ISA) of 1999. The ISA gave the SEC more 
powers and required it to: 
 
1) Regulate the capital market with a view to protecting the interest of all investors in the 
market.  
2) Develop the capital market in order to enhance its efficiency. 
 
The SEC aims to be Africa's leading capital market regulator. The ISA also empowered 
the SEC with a board of eight members including the chairman, the director general, 
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three executive commissioners and representatives from the Federal Ministry of Finance 
and Central Bank of Nigeria. The SEC regulates the issuance of securities. It further 
regulates capital market institutions, as well as the activities of capital market operators. 
These objectives are achieved through pre-registration requirements, rule making, 
inspection, surveillance, investigation and enforcement. As a result, the SEC acts as the 
guardian of the ordinary shareholder. The ROSC, (2004) report highlighted the following 
challenges which the SEC faces; 
 
(1) SEC is not yet effective in monitoring compliance with financial reporting 
requirements and enforcing actions against violators. 
(2) Its capacity to effectively monitor compliance with accounting standards is 
inadequate, but it is currently under re-organisation. 
(3) Its enforcement is weak, and administrative sanctions and civil penalties are not 
adequate to deter non-compliance. 
 
However, respondents highlighted the achievements of SEC, despite the institutional 
weaknesses outlined above. The following are the comments of Abigael Obheiolo, the 
Head of Department, Financial Services and Corporate Governance, at the SEC,  
 
“The commission has demonstrated sufficient capabilities to ensure good corporate 
governance.  Taking the current case of Cadbury Nigeria Plc for example, anyone would 
agree that the SEC has shown commitment to promoting good corporate conduct. The 
Cadbury scandal represents a case of significant managerial abuse which massively 
eroded shareholders’ fortunes. I investigated the matter, as the principal prosecuting 
officer, and the individuals found guilty were severely punished.”  
 
Furthermore the SEC, as a key member of the International Organisation of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO) is able to align with certain global best practices, where 
applicable. It is also worth noting that SEC’s managing director has been recently re-
elected as the chairman for the East African division of the IOSCO. In order to further 
facilitate good corporate governance and reduce corporate corruption, SEC is considering 
certain pre-emptive measures. For example, SEC may soon require the executives of 
companies, who apply to raise funds on the capital market, to attend an interview with the 
regulatory body. During the interviews, the SEC would scrutinise companies with regards 
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to their business goals as well as proposed use of raised funds. More importantly, 
companies will have to show that they have efficient corporate governance structures.  
 
Survey respondents at the SEC also noted that good corporate governance can only be 
achieved through the collective efforts of all relevant stakeholders especially regulators 
and professional bodies. As a result, several workshops and conferences are constantly 
held to ensure adequate collaboration. The SEC aims not to work in isolation and 
constantly commits resources to orientate other regulatory parties to covet their 
collaboration. In commenting on the need for collaboration, Abigael Obheiolo further 
noted that: 
 
“Until recently, other corporate watch dogs such as the accounting and auditing 
professional associations have operated disjointedly. However, the SEC as the apex 
regulator of the capital market continues to strive to aggregate these bodies to form 
sufficient synergy in order to achieve the common objective of ensuring good corporate 
governance” 
 
SEC proactively aims to achieve a credible and well regulated capital market. As a result 
it constantly deploys resources to educate all stakeholders with regards to their rights and 
responsibilities. In line with the foregoing the 2003 Code of Corporate Governance in 
Nigeria was developed with adequate input from relevant stakeholders. These include 
members of professional organisations, organised private sector and relevant regulatory 
agencies. The following section analyses certain provisions of the code and their impact 
on firm level corporate governance practices in Nigeria.  
 
6.2.4.1 The Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance in Nigeria (SEC Code) 
“The Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance in Nigeria is a code to make 
provisions for the best practices to be followed by public quoted companies and for all 
other companies with multiple stakeholders registered in Nigeria in the exercise at power 
over the direction of the enterprise, the supervision of executive actions, the transparency 
and accountability in governance of these companies within the regulatory framework 
and market; and for other purposes connected therewith” 
 
“Realizing the need to align with the International Best Practices, the SEC in 
collaboration with the CAC inaugurated a seventeen (17) member Committee on June 15, 
2000 in Nigeria. The Committee ……. was mandated to identify weaknesses in the 
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current corporate governance practice in Nigeria and fashion out necessary changes that 
will improve our corporate governance practices”  
        (SEC Code, Pp i) 
 
The SEC Code came to being in October 2003. It is the first code of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Findings from this survey suggest that the development of the 
SEC Code is connected to global inclinations towards corporate governance regulation. 
According to Fabian Ajogwu, a lead consultant to the committee which drafted the code; 
 
“It has become accepted that only with good corporate governance practices can any 
company attract investments especially FDI. Prior to developing the code, we conducted 
a survey which revealed several problems with the status quo. These include lack of 
awareness of best practices in corporate governance; the norm of Chairman/CEO role 
duality; directors’ habit of not attending board meetings; and infrequent board meetings. 
There was no guidance, no template/no signpost to work with. Again in the midst of this 
was the Unilever scandal which all together made industry watch dogs and regulators to 
realise that the time has come to write the rules” 
 
Apart from the global inclination with regards to the need to codify corporate governance 
principles and requirements, the need to prevent corporate scandals further facilitated the 
development of the SEC Code.  The SEC code12 further confirms this as follows: 
 
“The importance of effective corporate governance to corporate and economic 
performance cannot be over-emphasised in today's global market place. Companies 
perceived as adopting international best corporate governance practices are more likely 
to attract international investors than those whose practices are perceived to be below 
international standards”  
        (SEC code, Pp 2) 
Since the SEC Code came into being in 2003, it has not been reviewed. Given that 
emerging markets are characteristic of very rapid and dynamic economic development, 
their corporate governance codes must frequently be reviewed to reflect new economic 
conditions. Respondents generally agree that the SEC code is due for review. Fabian 
Ajogwu, whilst commenting on this noted that; 
 
                                                   
12 Relevant extracts from the SEC code are provided in appendix 3. 
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“When we were drafting the code, I recommended that a review must take place every 
two years. This has not been possible due to lack of institutional commitment.  However, 
the process of initiating a review is underway.”  
 
But what must a review strive to achieve? Okike (2007) argues that whilst the SEC Code 
represents a commendable development, its effectiveness is still in doubt. She further 
argues that the Code does not specifically reflect the country’s peculiar socio-political 
and economic environments. Indeed the Code has only been fairly effective in terms of 
compliance. However, it is important to note that the SEC Code was intentionally 
designed to be less rigid, as there was the need to encourage companies to comply with 
the Code in the first instance, given that it is the first of its kind. It is also important to 
note that the SEC Code was drafted with numerous inputs from the codes of conduct of 
other jurisdictions. Whilst it is perfectly in order to learn from other countries, adopting 
corporate governance guidelines which are best suited to more advanced and less 
“corrupt” economies will constitute significant misfits (Okike 2007).  Thus, Nigeria 
needs to revisit the SEC Code and identify corruption as an issue that must be sufficiently 
tackled (Okike 2007) both in principle and forcefully through enforceable regulatory 
initiatives.   
 
6.2.5 The Code of Conduct for Shareholders’ Associations in Nigeria (SEC Code for 
Shareholders)13 
While the rise of shareholders’ association has promoted shareholder activism in Nigeria, 
the discussions in Chapter 5 have revealed specific problems arising from the political 
reconstruction of the corporate governance mechanism in Nigeria. The SEC Code for 
shareholders was initiated as an attempt to address observed negative practices of 
shareholder associations in the Nigerian capital market. Giving background to the new 
development at the launching of the Code, the ex-Director-General of the commission, 
Musa al Faki said the Code: 
 
“Reaffirms SEC’s commitment towards strengthening good corporate governance 
through the instrumentality of shareholders associations…………It will be recalled that 
the commission embarked on the journey to fashion out the code on April 27,2006 when 
                                                   
13 Relevant extracts from the Code are provided in appendix 4 
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an inter-agency committee was set up in response to the observed inadequacies on 
shareholder associations’ activities. Some of the identified key problems areas that 
constrained the effectiveness of shareholder associations include: Proliferation of 
shareholder associations, concerns over behaviour of some members at Annual General 
Meetings (AGM), intense competition towards getting on companies’ audit committees, 
governance problems and unclear succession arrangements and the inadequate members 
enlightenment on shareholders rights, privileges and responsibilities. The rest were lack 
of regulatory oversight and funding constraints.” (Sun News 2007) 
 
An important recommendation of the Code is that the statutory audit committee of 
companies must elect members that are not executive members of shareholder’s 
associations to further reduce the answerability of the latter to the executive management. 
While the SEC Code for Shareholders is indeed a very timely initiative, there is limited 
evidence to suggest that it has produced significant positive results. However it must be 
noted that many countries do not have comprehensive and separate codes of conduct for 
shareholders’ associations.  This further brings to fore the need for each country to 
fashion out its corporate governance regulatory strategy in order to deal with its own 
specific challenges, albeit within an umbrella of accepted principles of responsible 
corporate behaviour. 
 
6.2.6 Assessing the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE)  
The NSE established in 1960 as the Lagos Stock Exchange has 301 listed companies with 
a total market capitalisation of about ₦9.56 trillion (£43.5 billion) at year end 2008 (NSE 
2009). In order to compete for FDI, the Nigerian government abolished laws preventing 
the flow of foreign capital into the country. The government has also allowed foreign 
brokers to enlist as dealers on the NSE.  There are two markets for the ordinary shares of 
the Exchange which are the First-Tier and Second-Tier markets. Nmehielle and Nwauche 
(2004) argue that the listing and post listing requirements for both tiers are rigorous 
enough to ensure corporate and financial discipline. They further noted that part of the 
listing requirements of the NSE makes sure that public companies on the First Tier 
Market have at least 300 members and those on the Second Tier have  at least 150 
shareholders. They also suggest some diffusion in the Nigerian shareholding structure. 
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The NSE “2008 review and outlook for 2009” stated that African economies, especially 
the Nigerian economy, are not insulated from the global financial crisis, as previously 
considered. For example, the All-Share index of the South African Stock Exchange and 
the NSE dropped by 27 percent and 45.8 percent respectively (NSE 2008). More 
importantly, the equity market capitalisation of the NSE dropped from a high of ₦12.64 
trillion (£57.5 billion) on May 3, 2008 to a low of ₦6.21 trillion (£28.3 billion) on 
December 16 2008 (NSE 2008). The report, however, noted that despite the declines in 
key market indicators, the fundamentals of the NSE remained strong. Nevertheless, it 
argued that whilst there have been strong corporate earnings and increased growth 
potentials in 2008, the predominantly local investors are still being ruled by cautious 
optimism which are based on the potential effects of the global financial crisis on the 
domestic market. 
 
Findings from this survey suggest that good corporate governance will no doubt facilitate 
the recovery of the NSE. The NSE and the SEC work jointly to regulate financial 
reporting and disclosures by listed companies. The NSE is self- regulatory and supports 
the SEC in the supervision of the securities market operations by exercising a certain 
degree of control through its rules which apply to listed companies. Given that the roles 
of NSE and the SEC are intertwined, the ROSC (2004) findings indicate that there are 
occasional conflicts of powers with respect to disciplining erring companies. Okike 
(2007), whilst commenting on this problem, stated that although the NSE monitors 
compliance with the financial reporting requirements of listed companies on behalf of the 
SEC, the occasional conflicts between the SEC and the NSE requires a revision of 
legislation. She argued that this is necessary to ensure clarity with regards to the roles and 
powers of these two institutions. Furthermore, the ROSC report stated that although the 
audited financial statements of a listed company are only published after approval by the 
NSE, the punishment for non-compliance is ineffective. It must be noted that de-listing 
has conventionally been the only sanction meted out to companies that do not comply 
with financial reporting requirements. Whilst commenting on the issue of the 
effectiveness of this mechanism as a form of deterrence, a senior official of the NSE 
stated as follows; 
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“Although the Exchange suspended Unilever in 1998 for falsifying annual returns and 
responded vehemently to the recent scandal at Cadbury, cases of de-listing are not very 
common”  
 
Furthermore, the Nigerian capital market remains relatively small and illiquid. It falls 
short of the developments in other developing countries such as South Africa; the NSE 
suffers predominantly from problems of poor and non-functioning infrastructure, which 
are indeed problems confronting the country in general (Alile 1997; Akamiokor 1995; 
Ahunwan 2002). Apart from infrastructural problems that plague the Exchange, the 
present capacity of the NSE to ensure good corporate governance seems to be in 
idealism. Indeed, the institutional commitment and capacity to promote good governance 
in Nigerian corporations is further undermined by problems which relate to “conflict of 
interests”. For example, the present Director General of the NSE, Ndi Okereke-Onyiuke, 
is also the Chairman of Transnational Corporation of Nigeria Plc (TransCorp), a foremost 
“mega corporation” in Nigeria. A former chairman of a listed Nigerian corporation, 
whilst commenting on this situation, noted the following concerns14;   
 
“How on earth can the DG of the NSE who regulates listed companies be a chairman of 
a company listed on the exchange she manages? This relates to a naked conflict of 
interest. How have other regulators and other members of the business community, 
including the government and the profession, allowed that to happen? Nigerian 
regulators are clearly not using their influences positively in the pursuit of good 
corporate governance”  
 
Following the indigenisation exercise of 1972, Nigerians have proved that they have a lot 
of investible funds and have demonstrated less courteousness in recent times, with 
aggressive investments in shares, in anticipation of future and promising returns (Soyode 
1977; Sunday 2005; Okike 2007). No doubt, the NSE is gradually becoming the hub of 
the capital market in sub-Saharan Africa. It is playing increasing roles in the mobilisation 
of capital. For example, the last five years have witnessed a high level of investor activity 
on the NSE.  The country’s banking sector reform largely facilitated this development. 
Investors and stock brokers are increasingly demanding adequate knowledge of the 
                                                   
14 These concerns have recently been justified by the CBN’s ongoing investigation of Transcorp for 
contributing to distress in the country’s financial sector, through unserviced bank loans and other possible 
corrupt dealings. At the time of submitting this thesis, these matters are still unfolding. 
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corporate governance of the companies in which lie their present or prospective interests. 
Current developments in the market, particularly the sharp decline in the share values of 
many listed companies, have further brought to fore the ability and integrity of the NSE 
to properly and correctly value firms listed on it. In this regard, doubts have been raised 
as to whether the companies were actually overvalued in the first place.  
 
6.2.7 Role of the Professions 
Okike (1998) gathered evidence from the audit reports of 45 large listed companies, 
during the periods of 1978 and 1989, which suggests that they contained other 
information besides those mandated by local statute. She therefore argues that this 
indicates that Nigeria’s accountancy and audit reporting professions have conventionally 
been influenced tremendously from the outside. The discussions in the following chapter 
will indicate that external influences remain vibrant in the Nigerian corporate governance 
system.  
 
The CAMA 1990 prohibits officers or their partners, as well as servants or providers of 
consultancy services to the company from being auditors; the aim of this is to ensure the 
independence of auditors in making honest accounting/auditing reporting (Oyejide and 
Soyibo 2001). However, findings from this survey do not suggest a significant level of 
independent audit reporting in Nigeria. Okike (2007) expressed the dissatisfaction of the 
Nigerian investing public with the performance of auditors. She subsequently argued that 
Nigerian shareholders no longer have confidence in the ability of auditors to protect their 
interests. Thus what roles do the professional affiliations of auditors, accountants, 
lawyers and other professions central to corporate monitoring play in ensuring that there 
is a professional, diligent and honest discharge of duties, in order to promote good 
corporate governance?  
 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) is a member body of the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) which is responsible for issuing 
International Standards on Auditing (ISAs); Nigeria thus has an undertaken to conform to 
ISAs (Okike 1998). ICAN also issues both international and local standards which 
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govern the Nigerian accounting practice. The international standards comprise of the 
International Accounting Standards (IASs) and the Standing Interpretations Committee 
(SIC) while the local standards include the Statement of Accounting Standards (SAS) and 
Auditing Guidelines (AG). As a result, ICAN members are required to conform to 
relevant guidelines in the discharge of their duties. However, findings from this survey 
suggest limited compliance. Indeed, ICAN and other related bodies including the 
National Accounting Standards Board (NASB) as well as the Nigerian chapter of the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) have traditionally played limited roles in ensuring that 
their members promote good corporate governance (see Okike 1994; 1998; 2004).  
 
Furthermore, there is limited cooperation between the professional bodies and the 
regulators, with regards to promoting good corporate governance. Abigael Obheiolo, 
whilst commenting on this stated as follows; 
 
“In order to enable these professional associations to participate more in promoting 
good corporate behaviour, the SEC is currently setting up a committee, which will be 
made up of members of ICAN, ANAN, Association of Issuing Houses, NASB, amongst 
other bodies, to review the financial reporting requirements for listed corporations”  
 
Given that regulators themselves are commonly members of these professional 
associations, sufficient positive synergy must be derived with a common goal of 
achieving good governance in Nigerian corporations. 
 
6.2.8 Indigenous Initiatives at Corporate Governance Development and Regulation 
In addition to codes of conduct and statutory requirements, institutional initiatives are 
being developed across the world, to foster good corporate governance. In Nigeria, the 
newly formed Society for Corporate Governance is a not-for-profit organisation which is 
committed to the promotion of good corporate governance through research and studies; 
advocacy and training; and standards monitoring. The organisation is being run in 
conjunction with Lagos Business School (LBS), Pan African University. LBS is a highly 
rated business school in Africa. The author is a member of the Society for Corporate 
Governance in Nigeria (SCGN), whose members include well respected figures in the 
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Nigerian corporate scenery. The goal of SCGN is to promote good corporate behaviour in 
Nigeria and in Africa. The society’s objectives include the following; promotion and 
enhancement of quality in board composition; promotion of ethical standards in corporate 
governance; and encouraging compliance with the SEC Code (SCGN 2009). SCGN 
achieves its aims by conducting workshops for chairmen of boards, CEOs and board 
directors (Ajogwu 2007). The Convention on Business Integrity (CBI) is another 
Nigerian initiative against corruption in the private sector. 
 
6.3 - PART 2 - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE NIGERIAN BANKING 
INDUSTRY  
6.3.1 Overview 
Preceding discussions have concentrated on the general nature of corporate governance 
regulation in Nigeria. In this regard, several corporate governance factors and their 
specific peculiarities in the Nigerian context have been examined. In this part, the author 
analyses the peculiar dimensions of the corporate governance regulatory model of the 
Nigerian banking sector. Specifically, the author investigates the corporate governance 
uniqueness and associated regulatory challenges of the nation’s banking sector. 
Commensurate with the situations in many countries, the Nigerian banking industry is the 
most regulated sector on the capital market. As a result, Nigerian banks can arguably be 
described as having the most robust corporate governance structure in the country. Thus, 
a deep scrutiny of the corporate governance regulatory framework of the Nigerian 
banking industry, undoubtedly, ensures deeper insights into the complexity and 
effectiveness of the corporate governance regime in Nigeria.  A case study of corporate 
governance in the banking industry will also give a pictorial representation of the extent 
of corporate governance development and innovation in Nigeria. It must also be noted 
that unlike the SEC Code which is principles based, corporate governance in the Nigerian 
banking industry is rules based. As a result, discussions give illuminations with regards to 
the extent to which both regulatory positions can efficiently co-exist.  
 
Here, discussions are structured as follows. First, the role, nature and particular 
importance of corporate governance in the banking sector are first examined. This is 
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followed by an exposition on the legal climate of regulation in the Nigerian banking 
sector. Given the catalytic importance of the banking sector to the Nigerian economy, the 
roles and effectiveness of the Central Bank of Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as the 
CBN) in ensuring good corporate governance are probed. The author further assesses the 
2006 Central Bank of Nigeria’s Code of Corporate Governance for Nigerian Banks, Post 
Consolidation (hereinafter referred to as the CBN Code), with regards to its ability to 
enforce good corporate governance.   
 
6.3.2 The Role, Nature and Particular Importance of Corporate Governance in the 
Banking Industry  
The central thesis here is that whilst firms, in all sectors, should ensure good corporate 
governance, the system of corporate governance in the banking sector is unique and has 
particular challenges. However, there is limited evidence in the literature with regards to 
theoretical and empirical investigations into the peculiarity of corporate governance in 
the banking sector, although the papers of Macey and O’Hara (2001) and Arun and 
Turner (2004) are notable developments. Indeed, most discussions in this area have been 
championed by regulatory agencies, including the World Bank, IMF and the central 
banks of different countries. To what extent should corporate governance regulation in 
the banking sector benefit from specific scholarly attentions? With the overall objective 
of assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance regulation in the Nigerian banking 
industry, the author further provides a framing of the particular relevance and importance 
of corporate governance in the banking sector. 
 
Taking a leap from the Shareholder and Stakeholder theoretical standpoints of corporate 
governance, the author submits that corporate governance in the banking sector cannot be 
properly administered solely by the assumptions of these theories. It is important to note 
that there are certain corporate governance needs and challenges which are sector 
contingent. As a result, attempts to theorise corporate governance in the banking sector 
will require a broader perspective. This will have to encapsulate the peculiar nature and 
dynamics of the banking sector. It must also take into account, not only the shareholders 
but other risk-bearers of banks, especially the depositors. Furthermore, this view will 
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accommodate the peculiar contractual form of banking as well as the governmental 
intervention which provides restrain for the behaviour and excesses of banks’ 
management (Macey and O’Hara 2003; Arun and Turner 2004). To this extent, bank 
governance is different. Thus, the ideal corporate governance model for banks may differ 
from the ones in other sectors, given that it must encapsulate the welfare of diverse and 
important stakeholders. 
 
6.3.3 The Statutory Framework of Corporate Governance in the Nigerian Banking 
Industry 
The most important statutory requirements which specifically govern Nigeria’s financial 
institutions include the following; the Central Bank of Nigeria Act (CBN Act); the Banks 
and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA); and the Nigeria Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC) Act. The recent CBN Act of 2007, which repealed the CBN Act of 
1991 and all its amendments, is the current legal framework within which the CBN 
operates. The CBN Act of 2007 provides that the CBN shall be a fully autonomous body 
in the discharge of its functions under the Act and the BOFIA (CBN 2008). These 
functions should concentrate on upholding stability and continuity in economic 
management.  BOFIA further confers on the CBN, the power to regulate banking and 
other non-banking financial institutions. It also empowers the CBN to act during matters 
which are connected, but not limited, to the following: licensing, examination (on-site 
and off-site), supervision, take over and management control, setting of capital 
requirements, revocation of licences, as well as total control over banks and other 
financial institutions operating in Nigeria (CBN 2008). The NDIC Act established the 
Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) for the purpose of insuring all deposit 
liabilities of licensed banks and other financial institutions operating in Nigeria (CBN 
2008). The NDIC is also mandated to give assistance in the interests of depositors, for 
example, by guaranteeing their payments in cases of imminent or actual financial 
difficulties in the banking industry (CBN 2008). The NDIC also assists monetary 
authorities in the formulation and implementation of banking policies (CBN 2008). 
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According to Nmehielle and Nwauche (2004), a major advantage of statutory standards 
of corporate governance is that they are both enforceable and subject to judicial review. 
They however noted that the problem in Nigeria is that the existence of these standards 
does not guarantee that they would be enforced. Furthermore, findings from this survey 
suggest that limited judicial review has also been at the fore of corporate governance 
problems in Nigeria. 
 
6.3.4 Corporate Governance Challenges in Nigerian Banks: The Role of the CBN 
The CBN, established by the 1958 CBN Act is the principal statutory regulator of banks 
and other financial institutions in Nigeria. Amongst other provisions, Nigerian banks are 
required to have their audited financial statements approved by the CBN. This must be 
done prior to publication in a national daily newspaper within four months of year-end. 
Auditors are also legally obliged to report matters related to breaches of legislation and 
irregularities, to the CBN. According to the ROSC (2004) report, outdated sanctions and 
reduced capacity undermines the effectiveness of the CBN in the enforcement of 
financial reporting requirements. The report further indicated that there are occasional 
conflict of views between the CBN and the NSE with regards to the approval of financial 
statements of listed banks. The CBN has also been ineffective in its regulation of non-
banking financial institutions, due to a lack of sufficient capacity. 
 
Before the banking sector reform which led to the reduction in the number of banks in the 
industry to 2515, the complexity and problem with most banks in Nigeria have centred on 
board directors.  According to Yakasai (2001: 240-241); 
 
“The complexity and trouble with most companies in Nigeria is that the directors work to 
the answer, mark their own examination scripts, score themselves distinctions and initiate 
the applause. But to the stakeholders (especially the equity owners), the excellent report 
sheets are openly fudged or at best engineered and indeed, the activities of boards are so 
varied and deceptively intractable that the more critically you look, the less you see.” 
 
                                                   
15 However Stanbic Bank and IBTC Bank, which were separate in the wake of the banking reform, merged 
on the 31st of March 2008 with the launching of Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc. This makes the current number to 
be 24.  
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Numerous banks littered the Nigerian business environment prior to the banking reform 
process. This has traditionally impacted on the monitoring capacity of the CBN. Post 
banking reform, the CBN has continued to demonstrate commitment in eradicating 
traditional board and managerial corruption. As previously noted, the ₦25 billion (£100 
million) minimum capital base for banks in Nigeria constitutes a major part of the 
banking reform programme. However, the CBN has noted that this is not enough for 
banks’ survival. It has therefore put in place rules which state the roles and 
responsibilities of the chairmen, CEOs, executive and independent directors, audit 
committees amongst other players in the firm level corporate governance framework. 
These have been codified in the CBN Code. The banking reform programme also resulted 
in some unusual corporate governance problems. For example, the CBN code noted that 
the size of the banking industry is bound to task the skills and competencies of board 
directors and managements. This is in relation to the duty of maximising shareholders’ 
wealth as well as the need to attend to other stakeholder interests. The mandatory CBN 
Code was thus formulated to help organisations overcome these difficulties in ways 
which make them remain competitive. This development stems from the realisation that 
the existing SEC Code will not be capable of achieving this.  
 
The banking reform programme led to several mergers and acquisitions. These resulted in 
some peculiar corporate governance challenges. According to the CBN, they include the 
following: the politically influenced power-conflicts between management and boards of 
merged banks, the lack of experience and adequate proficiency among managements and 
boards, the pre-eminence of internal politicking to reap private benefits over essential 
corporate goals, and corruption. These problems were addressed in the CBN code. 
Furthermore, in the drafting of the code, the CBN envisaged additional corporate 
governance challenges which could arise from the inability of merged companies to 
integrate personnel and systems. Also, the CBN sought to address potential irreconcilable 
differences in corporate culture which could result in board and management 
misunderstandings.  
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According to the CBN, other corporate governance related challenges resulting from the 
post-consolidation process include the following;  
 the technical incompetence of board and management to effectively redefine, re-
strategize, and restructure to take advantage of the consolidation;  
 boardroom squabbles as a result of different business cultures and high ownership 
concentration especially in banks that were formerly family owned or “one-man” 
entities; 
  squabbles arising from knowledge gaps, harmonisation of roles and salary 
structure among staff and management; inadequate management capacity in terms 
of running a much larger organisation; 
  resurgence of high level malpractices in order to boost income as a result of 
intense competition and lack of enough viable projects; 
  insider-related lending facilitated by lack of transparency in bank ownership and 
the pervasive influence of family and related party affiliations; 
  ineffective board/statutory audit committees; inadequate operational and financial 
controls; 
  and lack of proper transparency and adequate disclosure of information.   
 
Whilst the CBN code has been structured in ways which should tackle these issues, 
concerns remain on the degree of its enforcement and effectiveness. Appendix 5 provides 
relevant extracts from the CBN Code. Despite CBN's claim that the Code has made the 
apex bank to be on top of the situation, the secrecy which continues to surround the 
operations of banks in Nigeria is unhealthy (FS 2008). The CBN has been criticised for 
encouraging operational secrecy which relates to losses incurred, for example, through 
robbery attacks; the CBN allows banks to state losses such as these in general (non-
quantitative) terms (FS 2008).  
 
6.4 - PART 3 - THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIA 
6.4.1 Overview 
Preceding discussions have examined the extent to which the regulatory infrastructure of 
corporate governance in Nigeria promotes good behaviour, with insights from the 
banking industry. Here, the author proceeds to account for the role of government in 
corporate governance, given the aforementioned challenges which confront the Nigerian 
corporate governance regulatory system. In setting the tone of this section, it must be 
recalled that the government has traditionally constituted a non-positive influence on 
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corporate governance. As a result, discussions here reflect the extent to which the 
government can effectively engage with the governance of corporations in ways which 
promote rewards for performance, dynamism, flexibility and entrepreneurship, and 
minimise corporate corruption and fraud. Indeed, this would primarily require the 
Nigerian government to aggressively address public corruption. In this section, the 
author, first, examines the benefits and limitations of self-regulation in corporate conduct. 
Thereafter, the author investigates the rationale behind government’s intervention in 
corporate governance. This is followed by an international perspective of government’s 
role in corporate governance. Following on, the author examines the extent to which 
government’s increasing intervention in corporate governance will promote good 
behaviour beyond what the principle based form of regulation can possibly achieve. 
Indeed what can government possibly achieve in corporate governance? What is 
government’s agenda in corporate governance? The author further draws out specific 
deductions with regards to the ways in which the Nigerian government can usefully 
engage with corporate governance. Discussions in this part attempt to provoke a 
revolutionary thinking among corporate governance scholars with regards to the role of 
government in corporate governance across different institutional contexts. Discussions 
are also of significant practice and policy relevance. 
 
6.4.2 Self Regulation: Benefits and Limitations 
The economic literature has been at the fore-front of discussions on self-regulation. Self 
regulation models self-reporting of legal violations as a means to optimize enforcement 
regimes (Short and Toffel 2007). Whilst self-regulatory schemes extend beyond the 
concept of corporate governance it helps put corporations in check with no intervention 
from the government. It further reduces the costs of monitoring and compliance (Short 
and Toffel 2007). Innes (2001) argues that self-regulation optimizes the allocation of 
enforcement resources by lowering avoidance costs for the regulators and those being 
regulated. It also increases the chances of remediation and also lowers its costs (Innes 
2001). Turnbull (1997b) argues that self-regulation simplifies corporate law by reducing 
the need for government to maintain the already immensely prescriptive laws and 
regulations. He further argues that self-regulation protects the interests of all relevant 
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stakeholders, and that the most efficient regulation can be achieved by incorporating as 
much self-regulation as possible into firms. Indeed following Melville’s (1999) research 
into the potential of control self assessment in evaluating non-financial control systems, 
he made a case for the adoption of a “soft” control mechanism in a corporate governance 
framework.  
 
Coglianese et al. (2004) argue that self-regulation gives room for proximity being that 
self regulatory institutions are closer to the industry being regulated, which gives them 
access to more detailed and current information about the industry. They noted that this 
increases the chances of compliance, given that the more the involvement of the industry 
in setting their own rules, the more those rules appear reasonable to abide by. 
Furthermore, Maaseen (2003) examined the applicability of self-regulation in Indonesia 
and argues that self regulation even works better when incentives are in place and when 
the nature, opportunities and costs of problems are understood. Self-regulation tends to 
allow management hierarchies to be transformed into network organisations which are 
governed by the competing interests of strategic stakeholders (Turnbull 2002).  
On the other hand Short and Toffel (2007) argue that “self-policing” programmes in the 
context of self-regulation only shift the task of monitoring regulatory compliance from 
the government to the private sector. In this context firms are active participants in their 
own governance which begs the question of whether companies are actually regulating 
themselves or trying to avoid regulation altogether? (Short and Toffel 2007). A self-
regulated corporate governance system puts objectivity in doubt and gives room for bias. 
Also the proximity and flexibility in self-regulation could lead to conflict of interests 
which may result in insufficient monitoring and under-enforcement (Coglianese et al. 
2004). Underlying conflicts of interest could also leave self-regulatory bodies with 
insufficient funding (Coglianese et al. 2004). 
 
Greater flexibility could mean inadequate sanctions, where only modest sanctions are 
meted out against severe violations (Coglianese et al 2004). Also, in situations where 
foreign markets are not equally laden with regulations, aggressive self-regulation could 
put local firms at a serious competitive disadvantage (Coglianese et al 2004). Self 
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regulation further allows a great deal of “window dressing”, with no clear recognition of 
the problems (Maassen 2003).  Thus it may not be able to provide real solutions 
(Maassen 2003). Self regulation may also results into poor enforcement and makes 
shareholders passive (Maassen 2003). Lastly, self-regulation continues to suffer from the 
following problems; corruption of power; suppression of human nature; and information 
overload, biases, and errors (Turnbull 2002). 
 
6.4.3 Rationale behind the Role of Government in Corporate Governance  
It is worth emphasizing, once again, that the scandals of the past two decades transformed 
the global corporate governance landscape. Specifically, it led to increased demands for 
regulation in order to guide corporate behaviour and limit the reoccurrence of scandals. 
Consequently, countries across the world have developed their own codes of conduct or 
initiated legal reforms, or both, principally as reactions. For example, the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act in the US and the revised Combined Code in the UK came along as responses to the 
Enron scandal in the US. Historically, corporate self-regulatory bodies have prominently 
regulated corporate conduct. The role of government has traditionally been that of an 
overseer and not a major player in corporate governance regulation. The public uproar 
over the recent scandals has, however, made it clear that the status quo is no longer 
acceptable; government’s role should thus be to restore corporate integrity and market 
confidence without undermining the dynamism that underlies a strong economy 
(Coglianese et al 2004). On the other hand, law and regulation intervene and become 
effective only ex-post, when damages have already been done (Betta and Amenta 2004) 
whereas self-regulation is quicker and more flexible to respond to changing market 
conditions (IOSCO 2002). Self-regulation also strengthens the relationship between firms 
and their environment (Golinelli and Gatti 2001) and serves as an incentive-based tool for 
firms to assess themselves (Betta and Amenta 2004). 
 
No doubt, corporate misdemeanours seem to have awakened governments, across 
different countries, from their slumber. Regulation of corporate governance has become a 
major priority for policy makers in the bid to prevent corporate fraud. However, are 
governments across the world simply over-reacting? What is driving governments to 
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intervene more in corporate governance? Have self-regulatory institutions failed? Should 
few, perhaps unrepresentative, corporate misconducts change the paradigm upon which 
firms have successfully dwelled? On the other hand, are the recent corporate scandals 
indicative of the massive decadence and fraudulent behaviour which have plagued the 
modern corporation under the watchful eyes of self-regulation? Indeed, in the case of 
Nigeria, Okike (1994) has drawn attention to some curious governmental regulations 
within a socio-cultural and political context. The following discussions highlights 
corporate governance challenges which are experienced in other countries. Given that 
some of these challenges are similar to those already discussed in the case of Nigeria, the 
author specifically examines governmental response to them. 
 
6.4.4 An International Perspective of Government’s Role in Corporate Governance  
In China, several problems characterize the State-owned commercial banks which 
include the pursuit of multiple state objectives that compromises their commercial goals; 
lack of transparency in their reporting practices; and several other internal and external 
organisational problems (AFDC 2007). In this regard, the Chinese government recently 
clarified banks’ objectives and ensured shareholder diversification. The aim of these is to 
ensure a good corporate governance model which fosters Chinese companies’ 
competitiveness in their domestic and international markets (AFDC 2007). Furthermore, 
in order to enhance the soundness of corporate structures (many of which are family-run 
with non-transparent financial disclosure) and prevent the likes of Enron from happening 
in Taiwan, the Taiwanese government has established a task force committee which sees 
to corporate-governance reforms (Li 2003). In Australia, poor corporate governance 
practices and a number of high profile corporate collapses in the 1980s has led to the 
government’s continued fine tuning of disclosure requirements in corporations laws and 
accounting standards (Hockey 2001). The aim is to achieve best corporate governance 
practices through transparency and disclosure and by ensuring the substantive rights of 
numerous stakeholders (Hockey 2001). 
 
Without doubt, we are witnessing the evolution of government’s intervention in the 
corporate governance of many countries. In some, it is increased participation. For 
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example, the governments of East Asian countries have traditionally maintained a close 
relationship with business enterprises via formal or informal means (Qian 2000). In some 
other countries, such as the UK, there are already codes of conducts and best practices 
which companies have generally complied with.  In many other developing countries, 
either these codes are lacking or are just a matter of “paper work”. Nevertheless, the 
global rationale behind governments’ intervention in corporate governance is related to 
the realisation, or rather perception, of laxity in self- regulation.  Governmental actions 
have been hastened in a bid to prevent similar occurrences in the US as well as to restore 
investors’ confidence in corporations. Findings from this survey, further, suggest that it 
has become “fashionable” for government officials, especially in developing countries, to 
show commitment with regards to governance reforms. 
 
6.4.5 What is Government’s Agenda in Corporate Governance? 
Corporate crisis and reforms have been essentially cyclical, given that series of corporate 
governance regulations have followed a sequence of corporate recessions and subsequent 
scrutiny of the regulatory framework (Clarke 1998). Government’s increasing 
intervention is due to the need to regain the lost confidence of investors in the capital 
markets.  However, good corporate governance regulatory policy must ensure that there 
exists a proper, efficient and a workable structure through which companies can be run 
by an effective but honest management in pursuit of the interests of the company and its 
stakeholders. Given the limited studies on the role of government in corporate 
governance, an evaluation of scholarly “reasoning” with regards to governmental motive 
in corporate governance, is imperative. Will the differing levels of development across 
countries affect the agenda pursued by government in corporate governance? More 
importantly, a theorisation of the role of the State in corporate governance, in different 
institutional systems, is needed to further the debate in this area. 
 
6.4.6 The Nigerian Government and Corporate Governance: A Recommendation 
The ROSC (2004) recommends that the Nigerian government should improve the 
statutory framework of corporate governance in Nigeria. It also advised that the 
government should enhance the following: enforcement mechanisms, the capacity of 
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regulatory institutions, and the training requirements of professionals. The role of the 
Nigerian government in the regulation of corporate conduct is daunting.  It has to first 
address corruption which has been a great impediment to the enforcement of existing 
legislations and the effectiveness of self-regulation (see Okike 1994). Essentially, 
government’s responses should be well measured. Excessive regulatory burden as a result 
of regulatory convergence pressures from foreign investors and international regulatory 
agencies could seriously undermine the competitive advantage of indigenous firms. 
Regulation should therefore aim to improve investors’ confidence but must not limit the 
productivity and flexibility of companies. This is based on the premise that resources 
“wasted” in complying with “over intrusive and too demanding” regulations could better 
be used to benefit the company’s success. Does this suggests a principle based regulatory 
framework is better considering the country’s endemic corruption? Are there lessons to 
be learnt from the “comply or explain” principle in the UK? To what extent will this 
principle work in Nigeria? To what degree will Nigerian companies require heavy 
regulations with accompanying heavy sanctions to behave responsibly? 
 
Let us consider the UK’s experience; where the government has recently been more 
involved in corporate governance regulation especially through amendments to the 
Company law contained in the Companies Act 2006.  It has been suggested that the 
rationale behind the UK government’s role in corporate governance is to ensure an 
attractive regulatory structure for investments. Margaret Hodge MBE MP, the 
DBERR Minister of State for Industry and the Regions, whilst commenting on the 
Companies Act 2006, stated that the government’s role is to “increase the 
competitiveness of the UK”. She further argued that the UK government is committed to 
ensuring that a simple, accessible, flexible yet robust legal/regulatory framework exists 
within which businesses can operate to promote enterprise and growth. She also noted 
that this framework will provide the right conditions for investment and employment, 
which will produce a successful and competitive economy. Indeed, there is evidence that 
the UK is perceived as a good location for business. Studies by the FTSE, the National 
Association of Pension Funds in 2005 and Oxera (on behalf of the LSE) in 2006 all 
confirmed that the UK corporate governance model has a dual advantage of high 
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standards of corporate governance and relatively low associated costs; this has been seen 
by some companies as one of the main factors influencing the preference of a UK listing 
to a US listing (FRC 2006).  
 
Indeed some corporate governance scholars and practitioners alike have attributed the 
“demise” of the US as the world financial hub, to the burdensome and investment-
unfriendly form of regulation entrenched in the Sarbanes Oxley Act. There is increasing 
evidence that the UK is becoming the 21st century prime location for businesses. This is 
because the UK’s principle based corporate governance regulatory framework reduces 
the costs of regulation, allows the effective operation of a free market, creates wealth, 
eradicates poverty and facilitate innovative business practice (FRC, 2006). One can 
therefore conclude that the Companies Act, 2006 was engineered to make the UK, a more 
attractive place for investment and doing business, for both small business owners and 
large multinationals. And as the tussle between London and New York continues, one 
can further expect continuing UK governmental intervention in the domain of corporate 
governance so as to ensure that the UK remains a pace-setter in the today’s competitive 
world of trade and finance. 
 
So what can be learnt from the UK experience? There are two main lessons from the UK 
case study. First good corporate governance brings competitive advantage with respect to 
attracting investments which is good for Nigeria. Second the UK government has adopted 
a clear strategy to systematically interact with corporate governance, having taken into 
consideration the peculiarities of UK corporations, regulatory agencies and the general 
self-regulatory nature of the City of London. This suggests that government’s role in 
corporate governance should be locally conceived as well as internationally responsive. 
In the same vein, government’s response to corporate failures should be well considered 
as regulatory reforms that over-react or those that address symptoms whilst ignoring 
underlying causes can be expensive and counterproductive (Coglianese et al. 2004).  
 
Considering the legal powers and supremacy of the government, it is better suited to 
ensure that listed corporations follow specific standards and regulations. Thus, the 
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government can arguably ensure stricter enforcement. Undoubtedly, policy makers will 
have to rely on the expertise of self-regulatory bodies and credible corporate leaders to 
assist in regulating corporate behaviour. This leads to a joint effort by governments and 
self-regulatory bodies to put up standards that can be enforced. Nigeria will have to 
design this synergic relationship in ways which fit with her peculiar institutional 
configurations. As earlier mentioned, in order to achieve this, the Nigerian government 
needs to aggressively address public corruption and thereafter engage more strategically 
with the governance of corporations in ways which promote rewards for performance, 
dynamism, flexibility and entrepreneurship, and minimise private corruption. 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION: BEYOND REGULATION  
This chapter has attempted to look exhaustively into the subject of corporate governance 
regulation in Nigeria. This review has enabled a multi-stakeholder scrutiny of corporate 
governance regulation from a developing country perspective. The author has also 
accounted for the country-specific institutional embeddedness of corporate governance 
regulatory systems, through a comparative analysis of the systems in some other 
countries. However, to what extent can regulation alone actually achieve a long lasting 
culture of good corporate governance? Since the start of this thesis, discussions have 
clearly indicated that corporate governance and indeed corporate governance regulation 
are influenced by the wider institutional arrangements of a particular country. These 
institutional arrangements may be regarded as integral and inseparable constituents of 
any particular nation. Furthermore, they can either aggregate to facilitate the success of 
regulatory initiatives and promote good corporate governance or constitute barriers to the 
implementation of good governance principles. As a result, corporate governance 
regulatory initiatives must take into consideration, peculiar institutionalised arrangements 
which influence corporate behaviour.  These would consequently determine the extent to 
which principles or rules based forms of regulation are adopted. However, to what extent 
can regulation alone actually achieve a long lasting culture of good corporate governance, 
particularly in developing countries? 
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Given the corruption-riddled corporate governance system in Nigeria, majority of survey 
respondents favoured more governmental participation and a rule-defined corporate 
governance regulatory system in the short term. Furthermore, there was a general 
agreement amongst respondents that principle-based approaches to regulation should be 
imbibed in the long term, when the situation improves. Furthermore, companies should 
be scrutinised not only on the factors that determine how well they perform on the stock 
market; indeed, corporate governance regulation should encourage good conduct in 
corporations even in areas such as safety and employment policies. In Nigeria, corporate 
governance discussions also need to extend beyond the board and top management alone. 
Addressing corruption, including corporate corruption, certainly requires the promotion 
of certain values at all levels. A principle/culture of discipline, accountability and honesty 
should thus be encouraged throughout the corporation by any corporate governance 
regulation. Lastly, excessive regulation, notwithstanding countries’ peculiarities, could 
amount to box-ticking without any correction in behaviour. Nigeria must especially take 
note, particularly as mimicking regulatory initiatives best suited for other jurisdictions, 
may fail to address the country’s peculiar challenges. In relation to external influences on 
the development of national systems of corporate governance, the next chapter looks into 
the implications of external influences on the Nigerian corporate governance system. 
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CHAPTER 7 - EXTERNAL PRESCRIPTIONS OF GOOD CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A NIGERIAN PERSPECTIVE 
ON ANGLO-SAXON PRESCRIPTION (AND/OR IMPOSITION) 
 
7.0 INTRODUCTION  
Contemporary research on comparative corporate governance has been preoccupied with 
the study of differences in national systems of corporate governance as well as the 
identification of the strengths and weaknesses in different systems (O’Sullivan 2003). 
However while comparative studies of countries are common, there is limited evidence of 
a comprehensive study of the particular influence of a country’s governance structures 
and mechanisms on those of another country. Whilst, the comparative corporate 
governance literature has been preoccupied with research on the UK and the US at one 
end of the scale (Rubach and Sebora 1998; O’Sullivan 2003; Liu 2005; Braendle and 
Noll 2006) and continental Europe and Japan at the other end (Wojcik 2001; Patrick 
2004; Goergen, Martynova, and Renneboog 2005) developing countries have almost been 
unattended to. In a similar vein, although the potential for expanding the literature on 
corporate governance in developing economies is promising, the external factors shaping 
the corporate governance landscape are being somewhat neglected in the increasing 
debate. The author notes that attempting to conceptualize corporate governance in 
developing countries without considerable accounts of past and current external 
determining factors would be highly misleading and incomplete.  
 
Since less industrialised nations, particularly some African countries, such as Nigeria, 
were former colonies of Britain, from whence the foundations of their company law and 
regulation were derived, the author investigates the extent to which the influence of the 
UK corporate governance system extends beyond the developed world. Again, viewing 
the UK as a global standard setter in corporate governance, any UK regulation, code of 
conduct and/or listing standards could become a “model of best practice” particularly for 
the countries of origin of the companies listed on the LSE (Aguilera 2005). Furthermore, 
given that Nigerian banks may gain a strong presence on the LSE in few years to come; it 
has become further imperative to account for the UK’s influence on the shaping of 
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corporate governance in Nigeria. Will the UK’s “comply or explain” principle work in 
Nigeria? Should corporate governance structures and practices be copied? On the other 
hand, while Nigeria is ideologically and culturally stakeholder oriented, traditionally 
stakeholder oriented countries such as Japan, China and India have recently focussed on 
investing aggressively in Nigeria, especially in the oil sector (Bala 2003; Hanson 2008; 
Ajayi 2009). To what extent could these developments possibly amount to the 
prescription (and/or imposition) of their own governance practices on Nigeria to secure 
their investments and to cater for their oil dependent economic future? Indeed, can 
Nigeria emulate the corporate governance practices in these countries? 
 
Furthermore, the debate on the convergence or divergence of national systems of 
corporate governance has stemmed from research on comparative corporate governance. 
At the heart of the convergence debate is the assertion that the ever increasing forces of 
globalisation will compel convergence to the best practice model. On the other hand, the 
proponents of divergence have based their arguments on the country specific institutional 
embeddedness of corporate governance systems. While the debate on 
convergence/divergence may never be resolved, a modest attempt to move the debate 
forward would be to understand the intense pressures of economic and political 
globalisation, and appreciating that the translations of these pressures are contingent on 
institutional peculiarities such as the economic, political, social, legal and cultural 
environments. Indeed, are we talking about convergence or conforming to the Anglo-
Saxon model? Is a hybrid corporate governance structure developing? What are 
international best practices, and why should countries be encouraged to adopt them? 
What impact does the push for global standards have on Nigeria? What are the projected 
and actual roles of the OECD, IMF and the World Bank in promoting effective corporate 
governance? In what ways can corporate governance principles be prescribed (or 
imposed)? How effective are local institutional initiatives in ensuring good corporate 
governance in Nigeria? However, given the multi-country analysis that is offered in this 
chapter, discussions therein have significant relevance and general applicability to the 
corporate governance literature of developed, transitional and developing countries. 
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The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts. Part 1 examines the past and present 
influences of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system on Nigeria. Part 2 discusses 
the Stakeholder model’s influence on Nigeria with particular references to Japan, China 
and India. Part 3 examines the subject of the convergence debate and the push for global 
standards. It specifically investigates the extent of corporate governance prescription 
(and/or imposition) on developing countries. Upon showing these three classes of 
external influences on Nigeria, in an attempt to conclude, the author explores the 
possibility of having a corporate governance system, that is locally of value, and 
considerably externally/internationally acceptable.   
 
7.1- PART 1 - THE INFLUENCE OF ANGLO-BRITISH CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM ON NIGERIA  
7.1.1 Corporate Governance in the UK: An Overview 
The Cadbury, Greenbury, Hampel and Higgs led committees and subsequent Codes of 
Conduct have addressed various issues which have all together enriched the corporate 
governance debate specifically in the UK and indeed globally. In all of these 
developments, the UK’s emphasis on “principles”, rather than “rules”, based regulation 
has been reflected in her corporate governance regulatory framework for listed 
companies, namely the “comply or explain” principle. Historically, the UK corporate 
governance system has focused mainly on the financial aspects of corporate governance 
so as to enhance competitiveness. Corporate governance in the UK thus centres on the 
need to ensure that an effective framework exists to fortify the relationship between an 
organisation and those who hold future financial claims against that organisation such as 
shareholders, commercial lenders and other stakeholders with a view to avoiding 
corporate scandals as well as providing a platform for aggrieved stakeholders to be able 
to seek redress in court (Filatotchev et. al. 2006). The UK corporate governance aims to 
provide the structures and processes which ensure that companies are managed in the 
interests of their equity owners (Higgs 2003). 
 
However, in recent times, there have been active debates between the adherents of the 
Shareholder and Stakeholder models of corporate governance in the UK context. While 
186 
 
advocates of the latter view (Hutton 1995; Kay and Silberston 1995) have attempted to 
ensure the appreciation of other stakeholders, still the former remains dominant in the 
literature. Gamble and Kelly (2001) queried this long-held assumption that shareholders 
(both current and future) among all the numerous parties with interests in a company 
should be so privileged to be the ruling conception of the UK corporate governance 
system. Here are a couple of explanations. First shareholders bear the residual risks of the 
enterprise; thus they remain the definitive owners of the enterprise (Easterbrook and 
Fischel 1991). Second, maximizing shareholder value serves two purposes: 
accountability - on the part of managers to shareholders for their stewardship of the assets 
of the enterprise; and efficiency - absolute focus on a single clear objective leads to the 
most efficient outcomes (Gamble and Kelly 2001).  
 
While a number of law scholars (Hansmann and Kraakman 2001) have argued that the 
shareholder model has defeated the stakeholder model as far as the fundamental issues of 
corporate ownership and control are concerned, Armour, Deakin and Konzelmann (2003) 
argue that the UK corporate governance has not come to the “end of history”, as the 
shareholder model is less deeply entrenched than is generally suggested. Armour et al. 
(2003) further argued that the intensity of shareholder pre-eminence was only achieved in 
the 1980s and 1990s, and is actually far from being the norm. Davies (2002a) argues that 
it is indeed an anomaly. The recent collapses of major Anglo-Saxon corporations have 
further suggested the limitations of the shareholder model to tackle corporate fraud and 
have highlighted the benefits of the Stakeholder model.  
 
According to the UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC), corporate governance in the 
UK originated from a series of corporate misconducts in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
such as the collapse of the BCCI bank and the scandal at Robert Maxwell pension funds, 
both in 1991 (FRC 2006). Thus it had identified the following as the essential features of 
corporate governance in the UK: 
 Effective rights for shareholders. 
 Emphasis on objectivity of directors in the interests of the company. 
 Transparency on appointments and remuneration. 
 A single board collectively responsible for the success of the company. 
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 A Code of good practice based on extensive consultation with practitioners, and 
operating on the basis of the “comply or explain” principle. 
 Also a system that has checks and balances which encourages 
                 • Separate Chief Executive and Chairman. 
                 • A balance of executive and independent non-executive directors. 
                 • Strong, independent audit and remuneration committees. 
                 • Annual evaluation by the board of its performance. 
 
The framework of corporate governance in the UK essentially features dispersed 
ownership (mainly by institutional investors), strong legal protection for shareholders, 
“indifference” to other stakeholders, and easy transfer of shares facilitated by the highly 
developed stock market. Shareholders exercise their control over firms through the board 
of directors (comprising of both executive and non-executive directors) who theoretically 
stand to protect shareholders’ interests. The board decides the employment conditions 
and remuneration of top management and also appoints the chief executive officer 
(CEO), who runs the company. Lastly while UK firms do not have to consider too many 
complex and often conflicting interests of numerous stakeholders, which is advantageous 
in times of restructuring, there are concerns about the lack of encouragement to promote 
relationship, commitment and trust between employees and the management. 
Furthermore, this model renders labour unions ineffective.  
 
7.1.2 Colonial Influence of the UK on the Corporate Governance System of Nigeria  
In line with previous discussions, Britain has traditionally structured the 
platform/backdrop upon which corporate governance mechanisms and practices have 
developed in Nigeria. Notably, Britons (individual, institutional investors and the British 
government) were the principal owners of most large corporations operating in Nigeria 
during the colonial era. These corporations were mostly subsidiaries of UK parent 
companies subject to British laws. Consequently, only a limited number of Nigerians had 
interests in how the companies were formed, structured, and governed. The major 
concerns at that time were centred upon employment and equality related issues as well 
as the desperation for political independence. 
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While corporate governance in Nigeria during the colonial era remained largely British; 
following independence, discussions began to develop on the need to put in place a 
"Nigerian" corporate governance system (Ahunwan 2002). Indeed, several factors 
affected the direction of the Anglo-Saxon framed corporate governance of post-
independence Nigeria, such as the dominant zeal to attain economic independence 
together with political independence, which led to the abolition of many laws left behind 
by the colonial government (Ahunwan 2002; Okike 2007). However a deeper 
investigation into the governance practices of today’s Nigerian corporations suggests that 
the Anglo-Saxon ideology remain vibrant. The principles, upon which regulatory 
initiatives and policy formulations in the area of corporate governance in Nigeria are 
based, are British in origin and still resemble those of the UK. The laws that govern the 
conduct of listed corporations are also Anglo-Saxon formatted.  
 
7.1.3 UK Corporate Governance: A Global Champion or Local Success? Any 
relevance for Nigeria? 
The Cadbury Report laid the foundations for a set of corporate governance codes, not 
only in the UK but as far as in Russia and India, which have integrated its key principles 
into their own corporate governance codes (Mallin, Mullineux and Wihlborg 2005). No 
doubt the UK corporate governance system has a number of competitive advantages. It is 
a market based model which enjoys adequate support from companies, investors and 
regulators alike; it further allows board’s flexibility and accountability, and ensures the 
independence of non-executive directors (FRC 2006). According to the FRC (2006), this 
market-based model has been adopted in other financial markets as it enables the board to 
retain flexibility in the way in which it organises itself and discharges its responsibilities, 
and in a way that it remains properly accountable to its shareholders. The Department for 
Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (DBERR), the FRC, and the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) are major players in the UK corporate governance regulatory 
framework which operates at a number of levels: through legislation, in particular the 
Companies Act; through regulation especially the listing rules, which the FSA oversees; 
and through the Combined Code, a responsibility of the FRC (DBEER 2007). Since 
October 1997, the FSA has absorbed the self-regulatory organisations and the Bank of 
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England’s supervisory responsibilities, thus becoming a single regulator for financial 
services (Nakajima and Sheffield 2002).  
 
Traditionally self-regulatory institutions have been at the forefront of regulating corporate 
governance in the UK through the various codes of conduct and best practice. Before the 
Cadbury Code, the term “corporate governance” was already a known concept in the UK. 
The Cadbury Code features the belief that compliance of companies with a voluntary 
code coupled with disclosure is more effective than a statutory code (Cadbury 1992). 
About two years after the Cadbury Code, a survey among the FT100 companies showed 
that it has been implemented and that its compliance was virtually absolute in large firms 
(Bostock 1995 and Cadbury 1995). The Greenbury report sought to address the issue of 
directors’ remuneration which was not sufficiently tackled in the Cadbury report. The 
report concluded that if the issue of excessive executive pay were not to dominate the 
headlines in the future, as it did during 1994/95, then its recommendations would need to 
be taken seriously (Hughes 1996). The Greenbury report thus tied executive 
compensation with “how skilled and talented an executive is”, and required more 
comprehensive disclosure on directors’ compensation in the annual report of listed firms. 
 
The Hampel Committee (see the Hampel Report) sought to review the Cadbury Code and 
its implementation to see if it was achieving its aims and to tackle issues that resulted 
from the Greenbury report. In addition to this, the committee looked afresh at the roles of 
directors, shareholders and auditors in the light of minimizing regulatory burden on 
companies, and to substitute principles for details wherever possible. There is an 
important point to be noted here. Unlike the Cadbury and Greenbury Committees, the 
Hampel Committee was set up, not as a response to things which were perceived to have 
gone wrong such as corporate failures in the case of Cadbury and unjustified 
compensation packages in the privatised utilities in that of Greenbury; and thus it was 
expected to provide the non-cynical and positive contribution which good corporate 
governance can make. Following several consultations and changes, the Combined Code 
was created and published in June 1998 and it essentially continued the “comply or 
explain” principle. 
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In 2003, the UK government initiated the review of the Combined Code with the aim of 
re-examining the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors, and the Higgs 
Committee was set up. At that time, the review of company 1aw was also in progress. 
Both reviews represent the first scrutiny of the effectiveness of UK laws since the 
collapse of an American company, Enron (Davies 2002b). Nevertheless the report by the 
Higgs Committee re-emphasized the “comply or explain” principle as opposed to 
legislation which leads to “box-ticking” and supported a counsel of best practices capable 
of being intelligently implemented with discretion (Combined Code 2003; Davies 
2002b).  
 
Having reviewed the development of self-regulation in the UK corporate governance 
system, it is important to investigate if this is applicable to Nigeria. First, has the “comply 
or explain” principle worked in the UK? To a large extent it has. Although the UK has 
had her share of corporate scandals, UK corporations have generally functioned and 
triumphed in an environment of flexible and principles-based corporate governance 
regulatory environment. There is evidence that the UK is globally perceived as a good 
location for business. As suggested in the preceding chapter, studies by the FTSE, the 
National Association of Pension Funds in 2005 and Oxera (on behalf of the LSE) in 2006 
all confirmed that the UK corporate governance model has a dual advantage of ensuring 
high standards of corporate governance and relatively low associated costs. Indeed, in the 
tussle with the US to become the world’s foremost financial centre, the “comply or 
explain principle” has been a major advantage for the UK in attracting and retaining 
significant foreign investments. 
 
While the legal underpinnings are a reflection of the UK framework, it would be unwise 
to assume that Nigeria mirrors the UK in terms of application (Okike 2007). What has 
gone wrong? Widespread corruption, following several political turbulences coupled with 
massive institutional shortcomings, has impacted negatively upon the Nigerian corporate 
governance system. Nevertheless, the UK colonial legacy of corporate governance 
development and administration in Nigeria remains vibrant.  Findings from this survey 
show that the UK philosophy of corporate governance regulation is reflected in the 2003 
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corporate governance code of Nigeria. Indeed key players in the Nigerian corporate 
governance system regard the UK model of corporate governance as highly competitive 
and innovative as well as influential in shaping corporate governance in Nigeria. A key 
player in the drafting of the 2003 Code of corporate governance comments as follows: 
 
Following from our colonial past, we regard the UK model of corporate governance as 
highly competitive and innovative.  The UK system and Codes, from the Cadbury Code to 
the Combined Code, were consulted when we were drafting the Code. I would say the UK 
is very influential in shaping corporate governance in Nigeria.  
 
Findings from this survey suggest that it is generally assumed that Nigeria’s adoption of 
the UK’s dominant preference for self-regulation, as codified in the 2003 SEC Code, will 
strengthen the relationship between Nigerian firms and their environment (Golinelli and 
Gatti 2001), and serves as an incentive-based tool for firms to assess themselves (Betta 
and Amenta 2004). The more recent 2006 Code of Corporate Governance for Banks is, 
however, more tilted in favour of the rules-based US corporate governance system. Given 
the deep rooted corruption that has trailed the banking system, certain mandatory forms 
of regulation would have to be in place at least in the short term to curb the board and 
managerial corruption that have flourished over time. A principles-based regulatory 
system can be strategically employed as the situation improves. As a senior official of the 
Nigerian CBN puts it; 
 
“I think we need rules’ based regulations now and once things get better, we can revert 
to principles”  
 
Lastly, corporate governance regulation has developed in the UK and the US, principally 
as responses and reactions to corporate misconducts or their likelihood. However, 
corporate governance principles and regulatory initiatives must not be perceived merely 
as reactive mechanisms but must be proactively formulated with adequate sensitivity to 
the peculiar corporate environment. In the advent of corporate scandals, especially when 
the impact is enormous, regulatory measures developed often overreact and fail to tackle 
the specific underlying challenges.  
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7.2 - PART 2 - THE INFLUENCES OF JAPANESE, CHINESE AND INDIAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS ON NIGERIA  
7.2.1 An Overview of Corporate Governance in Japan 
Japanese firms are facing a fundamental challenge and transformation of their post-war 
corporate governance institutions. Following the revised Corporate Governance Code in 
2001, the Chairperson of the Japanese Corporate Governance Committee stated that 
“companies exist in order to create value in undertaking projects using their management 
resources, such as labour and capital, and represent a system that is made up of the 
cooperative efforts of many stakeholders. A good company thus maximizes the profits of 
its shareholders by efficiently creating value, and in the process contributes to the 
creation of a more prosperous society by enriching the lives of its employees and 
improving the welfare of its other stakeholders” (JCGC 2001: 2). Traditionally, Japanese 
firms were characterized by cross-shareholdings, lifetime employment, and a central 
governance role being played by banks (Nakajima 1999). Jackson (2004) argues that all 
these seem to be eroding away owing to considerable legal reforms and innovations in 
corporate governance, but they have not disappeared. Indeed Japan's post-war model of 
corporate governance can be described as stakeholder oriented akin to that of Germany. 
However, the Japanese feeling of obligation to family, a company, or country, the strong 
feeling of being part of a family or a company and finally the emphasis on consensus 
rather than antagonism (Mallin 2006) substantially influence the Japanese corporate 
governance system and makes it subtly different from other stakeholder oriented 
countries such as Germany. 
 
Before World War II, the Zaibatsu (family owned conglomerates) developed as a major 
feature of Japanese business ownership and corporate governance. However, as part of 
the US occupation reforms, the Zaibatsu families later lost their shares, which were 
widely redistributed to individuals. This transferred the control of firms from owners to 
managers. In other words, ownership and control became separated, and financing from 
banks became very important (Patrick 2004). Japan can be referred to as one of the most 
extreme cases of separation of ownership and control of listed companies. Though there 
are still a number of young companies that are principally family controlled and some 
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that are foreign controlled, ownership and control is separated in the majority with most 
Japanese firms owned through a cross-holding of shares held by lenders (principally 
banks) and business partners as a symbol of altruism and commitment.  
 
Patrick (2004) argued that the Japanese system is close to that of entrenched managerial 
autonomy and corporate governance guided by strong norms of managerial self-restraint. 
It is guarded by four major stakeholders, who are, in order of importance, its customers, 
as is true everywhere; its employees, especially those on the managerial track; its 
creditors, mainly its banks; and its shareholders. The role of the managers is to ensure 
adequate performance to keep every stakeholder reasonably satisfied. The management 
aims to ensure that a controlling interest is held by stakeholders, especially financial 
institutions that would not intervene in management and otherwise be passive unless 
called upon to block a take-over (Patrick 2004). The high stability of ownership allows a 
steady and continuous business relationship.  
 
7.2.2 An Overview of Corporate Governance in China 
The author takes an important caution here by not identifying China simply as a 
stakeholder oriented country. The Chinese corporate governance system has been 
influenced by both shareholder and stakeholder orientations, albeit within certain 
institutionalised traditional business arrangements. Therefore, it is not so clear as to 
which corporate governance theoretical model China can be best categorised under. 
However, there are important characteristics of the Chinese corporate governance system. 
For example, despite the opening of the Chinese market and subsequent privatisation of 
many state-owned companies, the government continues to hold controlling stakes in 
many large companies (Braendle, Gasser and Noll 2005). However, unlike most former 
centrally planned economies, China has in reality tried to avoid privatisation but has 
sought to reform state-owned enterprises by gradually introducing certain private 
enterprise measures such as managers' decision-making autonomy and financial 
incentives for executives (Naughton, 1995; Shirley and Xu, 2001; Chen 2004). 
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Peng (2000) argued that whilst the English term "corporate governance" seldom has an 
equivalent expression in many other languages and jurisdictions, the term has 
encountered even more difficulty in China, where the concepts of corporation and 
governance are ambiguous enough. Nevertheless, the development of corporate 
governance in China particularly sets out to investigate the role of corporate governance 
in China's development and to transform the large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into 
properly governed corporations. A key agenda item for China's SOE reform was thus the 
clarification of property laws, rights and responsibilities, as well as the creation of 
separate government and enterprise functions (Peng 2000). Frye and Shleifer (1997) 
commended the Chinese state-guided economic reform describing it as an ideal way of 
governmental intervention in firms’ ownership and governance. Nee, Opper and Wong 
(2007), however, argue that while China’s market transition from an agrarian state 
socialist economy to a dynamic capitalist driver of global economic performance and 
growth has been remarkable, direct state intervention in the governance of firms is likely 
to yield more negative than positive economic effects. 
 
The newest system of corporate governance in China dates from 2002 and is applicable to 
all listed companies on Chinese stock exchanges. There is evidence to suggest that China 
is establishing its corporate governance structures by emulating the Anglo-Saxon system, 
albeit within an environment where the necessary formal and informal institutions and 
infrastructure to make these structures work effectively are significantly lacking (Tam 
2002). Tam (2002) further argued that corruption, fraud, stock market manipulation, tax 
evasion, amongst other forms of siphoning of state/company assets in an environment of 
non-robust protection of shareholders' rights, are some of the obvious manifestations of 
the Anglo-fashioned Chinese corporate governance system. 
 
7.2.3 An Overview of Corporate Governance in India 
The Indian corporate governance system is plagued by several infirmities. For example, 
Rajagopalan and Zhang (2008) argued that the lack of incentives, power of dominant 
shareholder, non-robust external monitoring systems, and the shortage of qualified 
independent directors are factors confronting the corporate governance system of India. 
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Indeed these problems have restrained India's potential to become part of the world’s top 
economies (Chakrabarti, Megginson and Yadav 2008). India’s pursuit of significant 
corporate governance reforms in 1999 and 2000, contained in “Clause 49”, set a new 
precedence for corporate governance developments in the country. Essentially Clause 49, 
based on a voluntary 1998 Code of Corporate Governance, requires public companies to 
have functional audit committees and a minimum amount of independent directors, and 
also requires the CEO and the CFO to both certify financial statements and internal 
controls (Khanna and Black 2007). 
 
The corporate scandals at the start of the 21st century no doubt changed the corporate 
governance landscape globally. Following the Enron scandal, new codes have evolved in 
India, the latest being the Revised Clause 49, which is generally perceived as an off-shoot 
of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and does not reflect the country’s history and corporate 
culture which are those characteristic of its socialistic society (Kanchan 2007). However, 
formal institutions of corporate governance in India have been present for long, even 
though corporate governance discussions only came to receive adequate attention after 
the structural adjustment and globalisation programmes commenced upon in 1991 
(Sarkar and Sarkar 2000). These exposed the Indian economy to a new era where the 
existing norms of governance became obsolete owing to intense competition, removal of 
economic borders and massive foreign direct investment; globally accepted standards of 
corporate governance thus became imperative (Kanchan 2007). However, India’s move 
towards the Anglo-Saxon model has been contested by certain sectors of the business 
community and important concessions have been made which may, in the future, function 
to enable owners of the large conglomerates of India's post-colonial corporate economy 
to maintain control of their empires in as much as they remain internationally competitive 
(Reed 2002).  
 
7.2.4 Implications for Nigeria 
Following an overview of the state of corporate governance in Japan, China and India, 
the author proceeds to examine their influences on the corporate governance practices of 
Nigeria. It must be noted that these countries have begun what seems to be a lasting 
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investment culture in the Nigerian business environment, especially in the oil sector, 
which accounts for some 95 percent of the country’s total export revenues. While the oil 
industry is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, the significant investments from Japan, 
China and India into the country’s oil sector indicates the importance of the sector to the 
long term economic sustainability of these investing countries (see Bala 2003; Hanson 
2008; Ajayi 2009). Indeed, the rate of economic growths and expansions in Japan, China 
and India suggest that they will continue to demand oil in large quantities to fuel their 
escalating economies. These countries seem to have thus taken a long-term strategic view 
by investing in the oil sector of the 12th largest oil producer in the world. For example, 
Chinese state-owned CNPC invested £1.4 billion in a Nigerian oil refinery in 2008 
(Hanson 2008). Will the acquisition of large stakes in major Nigerian oil companies 
result in the prescription (and/or imposition) of their corporate governance practices on 
Nigeria, in order to ensure that their investments are within an environment they can 
identify with, trust and be confident of? 
 
The overview of corporate governance structures and practices in Japan, China and India 
suggest that if imbibed considerably, they would have more negative than positive impact 
on Nigeria. The Japanese, Chinese and Indian corporate governance systems themselves 
are suffering from significant misfits, corruption and institutional weaknesses. They are 
somewhat in a flux, fluctuating between a traditional stakeholder model and a 
globalisation fuelled push towards the Anglo-Shareholder model. Indeed, one must ask if 
these countries have any agenda such as influencing the Nigerian corporate governance 
system. Considering recent developments in the global energy markets, could it be that 
all they desire is having some control/influence with regards to the Nigerian oil sector? 
According to a former CEO and Chairman of a large listed Nigerian corporation,   
 
“I doubt if Japan, India and China as well as other countries investing in the Nigerian oil 
sector will drive any good corporate governance in the country. They are here because 
they have seen investment opportunities, they did not set out with corporate governance 
in mind, and they know they can even pay their way through the system to achieve what 
they want even if that constitutes large scale corruption. They are not here because they 
want to do clean business but profitable business” 
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However, there are few corporate governance related values in these countries that 
Nigeria can learn from. They include the role and efficiency of banks as corporate 
partners, the high importance/value placed on trust in business relationships, the long-
term view of business efficiency and performance as against short-term profit seeking. 
Furthermore Japanese corporate owners are typically stable. High stability of ownership 
leads to steady and continuous business relationships. Furthermore, a hostile take-over is 
very unlikely in an environment of stable and concentrated ownership. For example, in 
Japan, a company, under a main bank system would form a long-term business 
relationship by reciprocal cross-holdings of shares, and loans, usually within the 
Keiretsus, closely-knit industrial/corporate groups, akin to the pre-World War 2 Zaibatsus 
albeit no longer family controlled (Nakajima 1999). The main bank thus has a special 
responsibility to monitor, rescue and restructure the company, if it falls into financial 
distress. The bank is an important shareholder of the firm and carries out a variety of 
banking and other transactions with the firm, for example, foreign exchange businesses 
and trustee functions of corporate bonds (Okabe 2004).  
 
The close relationship between the main banks and the firms has further given Japanese 
firms the avenue to borrow for a long period of time, thus operating with a long-term 
perspective which helps stabilize operations. This indirect financing has dominated the 
financial system of Japan since the 1950s (Nakajima 1999) and Okabe, (2004) observed 
that even when direct financing was gradually biting into the field dominated by indirect 
financing in 1993, more than 90 percent of large listed corporations still had a “main 
bank” or two playing very prominent roles. This indirect financing and the close 
relationship between the banks and the firms had been long regarded as one of the factors 
behind the success of the Japanese style of management. However, there has been 
evidence of companies shifting from bank financing to market-oriented financing thus 
weakening ties with banks compared to the past. This is partly because the main bank-
oriented system of corporate governance had been criticized both locally and 
internationally for the lack of transparency. Nevertheless, it has always been an efficient 
provider of funds and insurance to the client firm. It has enabled corporations to 
efficiently obtain low cost financing and assisted corporations to invest in more risky 
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projects. However, while these mechanisms seem to have worked in Japan, Nigeria must 
be aware that they are contingent on Japan’s peculiar history, culture and polity. 
 
7.3 - PART 3 - NIGERIA AND GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
STANDARDS: WHO BENEFITS  
7.3.1 Introduction 
From an economic standpoint, globalisation calls for global corporate governance 
standards. No doubt standardisation of global corporate governance practices will benefit 
cross-border institutional investors. Indeed, as the competition for investments is growing 
in both developed and developing economies, the debate on the need to achieve a 
standardisation of corporate governance practices has gained more impetus. At the fore of 
this debate are globally and regionally powerful institutional initiatives aimed at 
corporate governance development and enforcement/compliance monitoring. It has, 
therefore, become even more imperative to account for the roles and influences of these 
global forces in shaping the perception and construction of corporate governance, 
especially in developing economies. The author, therefore, attempts to provide a scrutiny 
of global and regional moves towards the standardization of corporate governance 
principles and practices, in the case of Nigeria (see Adegbite and Nakajima 2010). In this 
regard, the roles of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation 
for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD), the Commonwealth Association 
for Corporate Governance (CACG) and corporate governance rating agencies are 
examined. The roles of these organisations in influencing the corporate governance 
regulatory framework of Nigeria are specifically considered.  
 
Findings from this survey show that the World Bank, IMF, OECD, amongst others, wield 
tremendous powers not singularly because of the “good” principles they promote through 
research papers, conferences and training activities, but through the over-bearing 
influence they are able to derive from providing financial help, especially to developing 
countries. For example, the World Bank is able to police the implementation of “good” 
corporate governance practices especially in debtor countries on a regular basis by 
essentially making these practices an integral part of its anti-poverty and growth 
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strategies, and punishes them for non-compliance by withholding funds (Soederberg 
2003) or not cancelling their debts. Therefore, global and regional forces covertly 
influence the corporate governance direction of countries especially in the developing 
world. To what extent is this form of prescribing (and/or possibly imposing) corporate 
governance to developing economies invariably to move them towards the Anglo-Saxon 
model, often posited as “international best practise”?  In the following sections, the 
author investigates who benefits from the convergence of corporate governance 
principles. Is it the country that conforms or the westernised global organisations and 
their notable sponsors?  
 
7.3.2 The World Bank, IMF and OECD: The Form of Prescribing (and/or 
Imposing) “good” Corporate Governance 
 
“The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were endorsed by OECD Ministers in 
1999 and have since become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, 
corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate 
governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory 
initiatives in both the OECD and non OECD countries…The Principles also provide the 
basis for an extensive programme of cooperation between the OECD and non-OECD 
countries and underpin the corporate governance component of the World Bank/IMF 
Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC)” (OECD 2004: 3). 
 
According to the ROSC, the World Bank conducts corporate governance country 
assessments, employing a diagnostic template to gather pertinent information in order to 
come up with recommendations that can lead to a country action plan. Furthermore, the 
ROSC states that its initiative represents an institutional commitment to carry out 
assessments of national corporate governance systems by measuring the legal and 
regulatory framework, as well as practices and compliance of listed firms against the 
OECD principles of corporate governance (ROSC 2004). ROSC ensures that these 
assessments: 
 use a consistent methodology for assessing national corporate governance 
practices;  
 provide benchmark indices by which countries can evaluate themselves and gauge 
progress in corporate governance reforms;  
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 strengthen the ownership of reform in the assessed countries by promoting 
productive interaction among issuers, investors, regulators and public decision 
makers;  
 provide the basis for a policy dialogue which will result in policy 
recommendations.  
Soederberg (2003) argues that while good corporate governance embodies “universal 
principles”, the definition advanced by the ROSC draws on the Anglo-American variant. 
She stressed that this imposed standardisation of corporate governance to stabilize the 
international financial system ensures that developing economies adapt to the exigencies 
of the neoliberal open market economy by placing greater emphasis on “shareholder 
value”, as against other variants of corporate governance, in order to protect the interests 
of foreign capitals. She further argued that the ROSC initiative is an establishment of 
comprehensive webs of surveillance to police the behaviour of economies and states in 
developing countries, on the one hand, and to legitimize the subjective meaning of these 
codes on the other. When countries conform to the OECD principles, which the ROSC 
advocates, automatically what would result is less diversity in national corporate 
governance systems and practices but a global Anglo-Saxon style of corporate 
governance. This is worrisome. For example, what happens to the important traditional 
roles played by Japanese banks, the strengths of the keiretsu and the stable cross 
shareholding structures which are generally regarded to be strong points of the Japanese 
style of management and corporate governance?  
 
By insisting that the ROSC represents “common values” across nations despite the fact 
that they appear to be serving the interests of Western institutional investors who are 
closely linked with the world’s powerful financial centres, Soederberg (2003) argues that 
this strategy serves to construct a reality in which no other alternative but the Anglo-
Saxon postulate of corporate governance is permitted to exist. Worst still, countries, 
especially debtors to the World Bank, get blacklisted and punished with restricted 
financial aid, when they fail to zealously demonstrate the commitment to ensure World 
Bank’s prescriptions of good corporate governance. 
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The implications of this must be clearly understood. Given that Anglo-Saxon countries 
have already “perfected” their shareholder model of corporate governance, requiring 
other countries to conform to this model means that the US and UK will for a long time 
(and possibly forever) have comparatively better and more competitive corporate 
governance systems and practices. Furthermore, as conformity will imply that the 
efficiency of governance mechanisms, such as investor protection, are judged by Anglo-
Saxon standards, it becomes automatic that the West would undoubtedly rank higher on a 
national comparative scale and therefore remain more competitive in attracting 
investments.  
 
In the long term, conforming strictly to the OECD principles might not be in the best 
interest of emerging markets. If, indeed, globalisation would drive convergence of 
national systems of corporate governance, perhaps it should be allowed to do so without 
any significant push by the World Bank, IMF and the OECD. Furthermore, if 
globalisation and the ever increasing global competition for investments mean that only 
the countries with the best system of corporate governance and practices would attract the 
most investment, perhaps there should have been convincing evidence for this, or maybe 
we also should allow that to happen. OECD’s prescription of “good corporate 
governance” to some developing countries who are not members of OECD, calls for a 
second look. Indeed, is the Anglo-American/OECD idea of “corporate governance” good 
itself? Considering the ongoing collapses of major US corporations, such as Enron, 
Xerox, K-Mart, Tyco and World Com, it has become even more imperative to explore the 
construction of the so-called “international standard of corporate governance” 
(Soederberg 2003). 
 
Indeed, why do we need international standards on corporate governance? To what extent 
are there international standards on public governance? When the World Bank and 
OECD introduced the Global Corporate Governance Forum in 1999, Ira Millstein, 
chairman of the forum’s Private Sector Advisory Group said the job of the forum was to 
“put together a demand pull for governance … and motivate private sectors around the 
world to want corporate governance … by persuading private enterprises that good 
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governance has merit… The attitude should be, if they do it, money will flow. If they 
don’t do it, money will not flow…Follow the money.” (CGA 1999) Almost ten years on, 
is there empirical evidence to convince one that money has flowed into countries with 
systems of good corporate governance? What is the agenda? Is it for countries, especially 
developing ones, to accept that the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance is the 
best and therefore good for them, without any scrutiny whatsoever? Is it a “make believe 
agenda”? In the words of a senior official of a Nigerian corporate governance regulatory 
agency; 
 
“There are significant doubts about the agenda of the World Bank, IMF, OECD and 
others. They are always around dashing money out, through organising symposiums and 
seminars, under the pretence that they want to improve our corporate governance. Most 
of us believe that these things are not free, as we would later pay for them; it is an 
extension of our colonisation” 
 
As another senior official further comments; 
“Must we follow the OECD standards? Can’t we initiate and come up with our own 
standards that best suit our environment and society? These people (World Bank, IMF, 
OECD) are always interfering. They are impostors. For example, during local 
conferences organised by the World Bank as well as other bodies, these guys won’t even 
give you room to ask questions, they would just tell you these are the best practices and 
that we must adopt them, in order to attract investments. Imagine! Who determines the 
best practice? America! Why must this be so? You find them at every of our meeting? 
They are everywhere. What do they want?”  
 
7.3.3 The Role of the Commonwealth Association of Corporate Governance (CACG) 
Nigeria is a member country of the Commonwealth as well as a Commonwealth 
Foundation member. However the role, influence and especially the underlying motive of 
the CACG also requires adequate scrutiny particularly in the context of developing 
countries. According to the CACG, the body was established in 1998 to promote “the 
best international standards germane to a country on corporate governance through 
education, consultation and information throughout the Commonwealth as a means to 
achieve global standards of business efficiency, commercial probity, effective economic 
and social development, and to facilitate the development of institutional capacity. The 
CACG published the CACG Guidelines/Principles for Corporate Governance in the 
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Commonwealth in November 1999 which was developed in collaboration with the 
Global Corporate Governance Forum and the World Bank with the aim of achieving 
global competitiveness and economic accountability. 
While there is sufficient synergy between the World Bank and the CACG, the approach 
of the CACG is relatively different and somewhat commendable. Consider this 
paraphrased extracts from the 1999 CACG Guidelines:  
The Purpose of the CACG Guidelines: The CACG Guidelines are intended to be 
precisely that – guidelines to facilitate best business practice and behaviour, whether of a 
private sector or state-owned enterprise. These guidelines are neither mandatory nor 
prescriptive and have been designed as evolutionary in concept. In other words, the 
CACG Guidelines are seen as a “continuum”, remaining flexible and responsive to 
further developments in corporate governance in the global economy…The challenge is 
now to move away from philosophical debates on corporate governance to dealing with 
the “hard” issues of practical implementation and the application of good corporate 
governance practices throughout the world. Naturally, each country and/or region must 
define for itself what its special circumstances and priorities are within this context 
 
The CACG approach is rather more appealing. It recognises the specific institutional 
emebeddedness of the corporate governance structures of Commonwealth countries. It 
therefore stresses that the guidelines are not in any way prescriptive. However, findings 
from this survey suggest some doubts which relate to the actual agenda of the CACG, as 
against its projected objectives. 
 
7.3.4 The Role of Corporate Governance Rating Agencies 
The external determinants of corporate governance in developing economies cannot be 
sufficiently analysed without reference to the increasing role played by corporate 
governance rating agencies. Whilst most of these rating agencies have not done much 
work in African jurisdictions, one must expect their influence to be significant when they 
eventually do. But there are causes to worry! These rating agencies are essentially Anglo-
American in nature and ideology such that their standards are typically fashioned in this 
respect. Let us start with a very influential corporate governance rating agency – 
Governance Metrics International (GMI), which is the world's first global corporate 
governance rating agency. According to GMI (2008) , its research and rating system are 
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aimed at helping institutional investors assess the governance characteristics of individual 
companies…… 
 
“By evaluating the quality of a company’s corporate governance and the impact that 
governance practices plus certain  environmental and social risk factors, may have on 
fund returns……... GMI ratings are calculated on the basis of six core extra-financial 
categories including board of directors, financial disclosure, shareholder rights, anti-
takeover provisions, executive and director compensation and corporate social 
behaviour, including regulatory, environmental, labour and sourcing issues.” 
 
Furthermore Standard and Poor’s Corporate Governance Scores, which have two levels 
of analysis- the country and company levels, are becoming highly influential. While 
Standard and Poor’s accepts that there is no “one size fits all” model of corporate 
governance due to the peculiarities of companies and countries, a deeper reflection on 
their origin and predominant ideology indicates they are essentially another Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance agency. For example, the methodologies they employ to do their 
ratings are formulated in line with the OECD principles. According to Standard and Poor:  
 
A company Corporate Governance Score (‘CGS’) reflects Standard and Poor's 
assessment of a company’s corporate governance practices and policies and the extent to 
which these serve the interests of the company’s financial stakeholders, with an emphasis 
on shareholders’ interests. For purposes of the CGS, corporate governance encompasses 
the interactions between a company’s management, its board of directors, shareholders 
and other financial stakeholders. – 2002 Standard and Poor's Corporate Governance 
Score. 
 
Although Standard and Poor argues that financial stakeholders include both a company’s 
shareholders and creditors such that by addressing the interests of these two groups, the 
CGS recognizes the importance of stakeholders’ rights and can therefore be applied 
globally since it operates with differing approaches to corporate governance. It must be 
noted that this may be an attempt aimed at acceptability as the Standard & Poor’s CGS 
further states that they have been designed specifically with a shareholder primacy focus. 
Standards and Poor’s CGS are essentially based on Anglo-Saxon perspectives of good 
corporate governance and it may be fundamentally inapplicable to rate the corporate 
governance practices of African countries solely based on such parameters. 
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7.3.5 More Confident Initiatives should come from Africa 
From the preceding discussions, it is clear that corporate governance developmental 
initiatives formulated in other jurisdictions are unlikely to meet the challenges that are 
peculiar to Africa and especially in the case of Nigeria. Corporate governance 
innovations whose origins are African are more strategically posed to tackle the corporate 
governance issues which the continent faces. Having examined the roles played by the 
World Bank, IMF and OECD, it becomes imperative to ask what the efforts of the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) are in prescribing and promoting good corporate 
governance in the continent. Nigeria as well as other African nations may be less 
sceptical of the AfDB agenda as against those of the World Bank, IMF and the OECD. 
As a result, what is the AfDB doing? The African apex bank published a document in 
2007 which sets out the Bank’s strategy in promoting corporate governance reforms in 
Africa, highlighting the respective roles of key stakeholders while calling for full 
partnership with actors operating in the field (AfDB 2007). Let us examine the following 
extracts from the document: 
 
“The research undertaken in the preparation of this document reveals a complex spectrum 
of corporate governance practices, institutional, legal and regulatory arrangements across 
the continent. One major finding to emerge is that many corporate governance problems 
stem from poor political and economic governance generally. Notwithstanding ongoing 
sustained efforts, a significant number of regional member countries (RMCs) continue to 
face endemic problems such as corruption, institutional instability, lack of transparency 
and accountability, and a weak rule of law. Within this context, corporate governance 
mirrors the wider environment; progress in both arenas is intrinsically linked and needs to 
be tackled in parallel…The overall goal of the Bank’s strategy is to contribute to 
economic development by promoting good corporate governance in public and private 
sector corporations and ensuring that they create value for shareholders, not only from a 
financial standpoint but also in a socially and environmentally responsible way.”  
 
Unsurprisingly, the AfDB understands the corporate governance phenomenon in the 
African context. Indigenous initiatives would no doubt promote good corporate 
governance in Africa. In this light, the document further states that the Bank’s corporate 
governance strategy will complement existing efforts and strategic partnerships with 
other key regional players and where feasible the Bank will promote initiatives that are 
regionally oriented and designed. Indigenous initiatives should also be developed in the 
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area of corporate governance assessments and ratings. The seminal 2007 Mo Ibrahim 
Index of African Governance by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation is no doubt a good 
development. Mo Ibrahim while commenting on the development said  
 
“We are shining a light on governance in Africa, and in so doing we are making a unique 
contribution to improving the quality of governance. The Ibrahim Index is a tool to hold 
governments to account and frame the debate about how we are governed. Africans are 
setting benchmarks not only for their own continent, but for the world. ”  
 
What remains is for this innovation to be taken further to encapsulate the governance of 
African corporations. 
  
7.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter makes contributions to comparative corporate governance research by 
providing a cross-examination of the impact and influences of external governance 
systems and forces on Nigeria. A review of the influences of the shareholder and 
stakeholder corporate governance models on the ideology, structure and practices of 
corporate governance in Nigeria, has given insights into the evolution and present state of 
corporate governance in the country. It has also augmented our knowledge of corporate 
governance in jurisdictions such as the UK, Japan, China and India, and more 
importantly, it has enabled a more comparative analysis. One can therefore make a 
number of important conclusions. First, corporate governance in Nigeria, as well as in 
most other developing countries, are subject to external influences and interferences. 
Three classes of these external effects have been discussed in our Nigerian case. One can 
observe from the first part of this chapter that the UK has traditionally influenced the 
construction of corporate governance in Nigeria. However, the UK’s influence has 
become less active in determining the actual governance practices of corporations even 
though the UK model and principles remain vibrant in shaping the legal framework of 
corporate governance in Nigeria. In this regard, there is evidence to support the UK’s 
status as a global corporate governance pace-setter. However, as preceding discussions 
have shown, a total adoption of the UK style of corporate governance would lead to 
significant misfits with the Nigerian peculiar business environment. Nevertheless, there 
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are ample positive lessons that can be learnt from the UK model which have also been 
discussed.  
 
The story is not exactly the same for Japan, China and India. Corporate governance in 
these countries is, somewhat, in a state of flux, mingling between conforming to the 
Anglo-American model or rather sticking to their traditional stakeholder orientations, 
especially in the cases of China and India. Nonetheless, certain mechanisms, such as the 
Japanese traditionally stable cross-shareholding structure and the role of banks and 
creditors, could improve the state of corporate governance in Nigeria. However, while 
there have been notable reforms, good corporate governance in these countries is 
generally impeded by similar constraints to those found in Nigeria, such as board and 
managerial corruption. It follows that if the recent large influx of investments and 
business interests from these countries to the Nigerian corporate environment especially 
in the oil sector (see Bala 2003; Hanson 2008; Ajayi 2009), would amount to stifling 
corporate governance in the country, one should expect more negative than positive 
impact. If this happens, the Anglo-Saxon construed corporate governance regulatory 
structure in Nigeria maybe unable to cope with the new corporate governance scenery.  
 
The author has also presented a survey of the prospects of corporate governance 
imposition in developing countries. This area of corporate governance research has been 
less studied, perhaps intentionally by Anglo-Saxon scholars. Discussions noted that 
prescriptions (and/or impositions) are largely not based on universally accepted principles 
but essentially on Anglo-Saxon constructions and preferences. The roles of the World 
Bank, IFC, IMF, OECD, CACG and other Westernised global bodies require scrutiny and 
a second look with regards to their corporate governance developmental activities and 
compliance monitoring in developing countries. This chapter makes an objective 
assessment. The activities of the World Bank and other Anglo-Saxon oriented 
organisations have attracted significant scepticism, especially in developing countries.  It 
is therefore recommended that their approaches should be less over-bearing and ensure 
that local initiatives are not mulishly subdued. Imposing corporate governance ideologies 
and covertly transplanting Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems in other 
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jurisdictions have significant implications. From a scholarly sense it limits our discourse. 
It gradually eliminates comparative corporate governance research as well as the 
strengths specific to different national systems of corporate governance. While countries 
can share some similarities with regards to basic attributes of good corporate governance, 
prescribing the scope, extent and parameters of good corporate governance could itself be 
limiting. The author, therefore, calls for more indigenous initiatives in order to tackle 
Africa’s specific challenges in such a way that the continent remains internationally 
competitive with regards to attracting and protecting capital. Rather than enforcing 
corporate governance ideologies and systems more suited to cope with the peculiar 
challenges specific to developed economies, African countries should adopt practices 
deemed fit to improve their respective corporate governance systems, irrespective of 
where those practices come from. To this extent, the next chapter investigates certain 
specific firm level practices which are capable of promoting good corporate governance 
in Nigeria.  
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CHAPTER 8 – SPECIFIC DRIVERS OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
IN NIGERIA 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
Having provided a comprehensive analysis of the institutional, regulatory and external 
determinants of good corporate governance in Nigeria; this chapter looks at the specific 
drivers of good corporate governance at the firm level. It must be noted that previous 
discussions have concentrated on the climate of corporate governance in the country and 
essentially the environmental factors which shape corporate behaviour.  Particularly, the 
interdependent (and interacting) institutional factors, discussed in Chapter 5, wield 
tremendous influence on firm-level corporate governance characteristics. This chapter, 
therefore, examines the extent to which good corporate governance can be promoted at 
the firm level in Nigeria, given her peculiar institutional, regulatory and external 
environments. This chapter specifically aims to offer insights into the ways through 
which good corporate governance can be promoted in developing countries, particularly 
at the firm level.  
 
Preceding discussions have shown diversity in national corporate governance practices, 
as well as the differing challenges in ensuring good corporate governance across different 
institutional arrangements. With evidence from Nigeria, this chapter argues that these 
differing perspectives must be accounted for in formulating the drivers of good corporate 
governance. Furthermore, the degree of relevance and applicability of certain “good 
corporate governance drivers” will differ across countries, regions and industries. In this 
chapter, the author discusses nine drivers of good corporate governance in Nigeria, as 
generated by the research data. These drivers represent the most important vehicles of 
good corporate governance in the Nigerian context. Respondents were generally 
unanimous with regards to the high importance of these drivers although there were 
subtle differing perspectives in relation to the means to promote some of them. Whilst the 
following discussions have significant implications for other developing countries in 
general, caution must especially be exercised in making confident generalisations about 
their applicability in other jurisdictions. Some key drivers of good corporate governance 
in Nigeria include; 
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1) Board independence  
2) Board heterogeneity 
3) Board reputation 
4) Board evaluation 
5) Vibrant institutional shareholders 
6) Effective shareholder activism 
7) Decent and explicitly defined Performance related executive compensation 
8) Full public information disclosure 
9) Competent and independent board audit committees 
 
In the following sections, the author explains each of these drivers and their abilities to 
promote good corporate governance in Nigeria. 
 
8.1 BOARD INDEPENDENCE 
Board independence is generally considered to be central to good corporate governance. 
It predicts the behaviour of firms in different ways. For example, Black and Kim (2007) 
argue that more independent boards are able to make better acquisition decisions, and are 
more likely to appoint an outsider as CEO. Furthermore, independent boards are more 
likely to fight takeover bids, and are more likely to fire a CEO following poor 
performance (Black and Kim 2007). Whilst there is limited and inconclusive empirical 
evidence to correlate board independence with better overall firm performance in the 
finance literature of developed countries (see Bhagat and Black 2002), positive 
associations have been documented in emerging markets (see Choi, Park, and Yoo 2007; 
and Zheka 2005). The proposition that directors should act independently of management 
by ensuring a thoughtful and diligent decision-making process (Macavoy and Millstein 
2003) has been a major preoccupation of the corporate governance literature for several 
years (HLR 2006). Board independence has become a conventional prescription of good 
corporate governance; it has now been prescribed by corporate law in most countries and 
has been encouraged by the voluntary codes of conduct in place in different countries. 
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What is board independence? It can be described as a subjective concept that connotes a 
willingness to bring a high degree of rigour and objectivity to the evaluation of a 
company’s management and a scrutiny of its plans and proposals (Langevoort 2001).  
Several parameters, which promote board independence, have been highlighted in the 
literature. Let us start with the separation of the role of the CEO from that of the 
Chairman. Conventional wisdom has it that consolidating the roles of the CEO and 
Chairman into one position amounts to concentration of too much power and influence 
into one individual, hence bad for corporate governance. In Nigeria, the SEC Code for 
listed corporations encourages the separation of the roles of the CEO and Chairman. 
Consequently, there has been an exponential reduction in companies with CEO-Chairman 
role duality. Survey respondents identified this as one of the major achievements of the 
SEC Code.  In the words of an independent director of a listed Nigerian firm;  
 
“The separation of the chairman from the CEO is a very important development and 
constitutes one of the major achievements of the code. Almost all of the public quoted 
companies have separated the role of the chairman from the CEO. However, most CEOs, 
upon retirement, simply become the chairman” 
 
Furthermore, as the saying goes “two heads are better than one”.  The separation of the 
roles of the CEO and chairman is not only important but wise for the corporate 
governance function. The responsibilities in each position are crucial to good corporate 
governance and firm survival. Therefore a board needs the benefits of “two wise men” to 
administer those responsibilities. According to the former CEO and chairman of a large 
listed Nigerian corporation; 
 
“I do not think anyone in Nigeria is disputing the necessity of the need for separation 
anymore. We all have agreed that this is compulsory. Indeed, in cases where some 
companies do not want to split the roles, there have been numerous cases where 
significant shareholder activism has ensued. Companies are increasingly being forced to 
separate the roles.” 
 
There was complete agreement amongst survey respondents that the separation of the 
CEO and Chairman is an important parameter of board independence and eventual good 
corporate governance. This is in agreement with the management and business strategy 
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literature which suggests that the absence of CEO/Chairman duality is associated with 
“critical” organisational decision making, including executive turnover, value-promoting 
business strategy, and limitations on anti-take-over defences, which are, in turn, related to 
efficiency and better firm performance (Filatotchev et al. 2006).  
 
The literature has further posited that a significant number of independent directors, in 
board composition, are important in order to further ensure board independence. In 
today’s increasingly turbulent corporate governance environment, board independence 
serves as the beacon for corporate governance reform; more independent boards will 
ensure more effective oversight of corporate management which should positively impact 
overall firm performance (Daily and Dalton 2003).  Previous discussions have 
highlighted the negative influences of culture, social ties, political and corporate 
mentorship, and tribalism on corporate governance practices in Nigeria. For example, 
there are already provisions contained in CAMA, the SEC Code and the SEC Code of 
Conduct for Shareholders which encourage all board committees (especially board audit 
committees) to be composed of independent directors and members of shareholders’ 
associations. However the political capture of this arrangement has undermined the 
efficiency of the intended board independence. Thus, achieving the highest degree of 
independence in board composition extends beyond the letters of the law and the 
prescriptions of corporate governance codes. Independence in board audit committees as 
well as other board committees would require express willingness and commitment at the 
firm level beyond what the law and voluntary codes can possibly prescribe. The 
challenge of board independence in Nigeria is more behavioural and legal. 
 
In Nigeria, board independence cannot be achieved without a dominant presence of 
“truly” independent board members. Findings from this survey further question the 
degree of actual independence of the supposedly independent board members. No doubt, 
this problem is not restricted to Nigeria and other developing countries. However, the 
traditional role and overbearing influence of family ownership on the appointment of 
senior management and board members limits the fiducial oversight function and 
independence of the supposed independent directors. However, in whose hands would the 
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corporation be best run? Is it the controlling shareholder or the truly independent 
director? There are mixed evidence in the literature with regards to this.  For example, 
Klein and Shapiro (2004) argued that discussants have generally suggested that the 
boards of closely held companies should have a dominance of directors who are 
independent from management and the controlling shareholder. They pointed out that this 
is based on the notion that independence from management and the controlling 
shareholder is synonymous with excellence. However, they argue that this “fallacy” 
implies that shareholders are better off if they entrust their wealth to individuals who may 
or may not share the controlling shareholder's interest and commitment.  
 
The benefits of executive directors and non-executive directors who are closely linked 
with the controlling shareholder must not be undermined, particularly in Nigeria, despite 
the traditional corrupt boards. The case of Oceanic Bank has earlier been highlighted 
where a board member and another member of the management team belong to the same 
family with the CEO. No doubt, this may connote some negative tendencies of undue 
power concentration and encourages more “rubber stamping” of CEO decisions. 
However, the strong commitment and drive such harmonious relationships can produce, 
with regards to the long term financial position and growth of the company could 
constitute important parameters for success. However, this is only possible when the 
directors involved uphold objectivity and integrity at all times, considering the endemic 
corruption in the business environment of Nigeria . As a result, the normative undertone 
which trails absolute board independence, as a force for good, needs to be scrutinised. 
 
Findings from this survey further suggest significant regulatory conflict with regards to 
board independence in Nigeria. For example, the CBN Code, in line with most rule-based 
governance codes, mandates that the number of non-executive directors should be more 
than that of executive directors. Ndi Okereke-Onyiuke, Director General of the (NSE) 
flayed the CBN on this demand stating that “It is important that those who have 
substantial shares in a bank be allowed to sit on the board of such banks. I see no need for 
any independent directors on the board of banks” (The Nigeria Business 2006). Whilst 
reliance on certain independence standards can lead to practicable structural reforms and 
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promote effective corporate governance (HLR 2006), the best course remains the middle 
course for Nigeria, which is a healthy combination of directors related and unrelated to 
the controlling shareholder and management (Klein and Shapiro 2004). This form of 
board independence will promote both objectivity (due to the presence of directors who 
are unrelated to the controlling shareholder and management) and long-term firm 
commitment (due to the presence of directors who are related to the controlling 
shareholder and management). Board independence, in this form, will promote good 
corporate governance in Nigeria.  
 
8.2 BOARD HETEROGENEITY 
Board heterogeneity can be defined as variation among board members. This variation 
may derive from multiple sources, including the following; expertise and managerial 
background; personalities; learning styles; education; age; as well as values (Coffey and 
Jia 1998). Indeed from the perspectives of the service, strategy and resource roles of 
boards, “good” corporate governance is linked with high degrees of board diversity 
including its human and social capital (Filatotchev et al. 2006). Board diversity, thus, 
benefits corporations for the following reasons: it allows a better understanding of the 
market, especially in a diverse market place; diversity is also linked with creativity and 
innovation; it further enables more effective problem-solving; it enhances the 
effectiveness of corporate leadership; and promotes more effective global networking and 
relationships (Cox and Blake 1991; Robinson and Dechant 1997). Indeed the starting 
point for building better governance structures is by encouraging greater board diversity 
(Odle 2007).  
 
Analysis of findings from this survey suggests that board heterogeneity, in terms of 
gender, age, disciplinary background, industry experience, and tribe are important in 
promoting board effectiveness and good corporate governance in Nigeria. Let us start 
with gender. Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) examined the relationship between 
gender diversity and firm value for Fortune 1000 firms. They presented empirical 
evidence which positively correlates gender diversity (more female representation) with 
improved financial value. It must be noted that board composition in Nigeria has 
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traditionally been male dominated. There are historical and cultural explanations for this. 
The female gender has traditionally been regarded as inequitable with the male, such that 
women have traditionally suffered societal discrimination16, especially in terms of 
education (advanced education in particular). This has resulted in a traditional 
education/professional gap between men and women, especially with regards to those 
who are capable of filling senior positions both in the public sector as well as in private 
organisations.  
 
In the light of this, one must recognise that the market for directors differs from country 
to country. By mandating the presence of a particular gender (in this case female) in 
board composition, we may run the risk of inhibiting the eventual effectiveness of the 
board. Thus, a wrong approach to gender diversity in board composition would be to 
suggest equal or near-equal representation of men and women. Board composition is 
crucial to organisational survival and must not be compromised by gender diversity, 
particularly in very traditional societies. No doubt, there are burgeoning empirical 
evidence which link board diversity to corporate philanthropy and corporate social 
performance (Coffey and Jia 1998). Board (gender) diversity is also considered to 
improve other corporate governance related matters such as ethical investments and 
ethical business conduct. However, the findings from this study suggest that board 
diversity must not be encouraged in Nigeria at the expense of overall board effectiveness. 
According to Fabian Ajogwu, the lead consultant to the SEC Code committee; 
 
“When we were drafting the SEC Code, we made no provision for gender diversity in 
board composition although some people raised the need to address the issue, but we 
decided that it was not going to be diversity in terms of gender, but in terms of human 
capital and quality experience. The idea is that a smart board should keep in mind that to 
operate in this environment, you will need to have a wealth of diverse knowledge, 
expertise and experiences for you to have an encompassing reach”  
 
However, it must be noted that the respondents surveyed were mostly male and their 
views must be treated with caution, as they may reflect the traditional gender bias. 
                                                   
16 The ideology behind this is that “no matter the level of education a woman achieves, her place in the 
society is in her husband’s kitchen”. Undoubtedly, this primitive mentality is loosing its relevance and 
gender equality is increasingly being promoted in modern Nigeria. 
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Results from this study, nevertheless, suggest that board heterogeneity, in terms of 
educational and industry backgrounds and expertise are more important parameters which 
ensure board effectiveness. In order to improve corporate governance in Nigeria, 
competent individuals with sufficient and diverse human capital and array of experiences 
must be brought unto boards. This will enrich the decision making process of the board 
and create better firm value. Nevertheless, the market for directors seems to be further 
limited by absence of sufficient human capital. Taking into consideration the 
requirements of the SEC and CBN in relation to independent directorship, it must be 
noted that the market for such top quality individuals is small in Nigeria. According to a 
survey respondent, who serves on the board of a number of large listed companies; 
 
“No doubt the board should be heterogeneous in terms of industry experience and 
disciplinary background. However there are constraints on the number of people you can 
have on the board; there are not that many highly experienced executives, such that you 
have to appoint the same people on different boards”  
 
Furthermore, there is a cultural variant to board diversity in Nigeria. Specifically, boards 
of Nigerian firms, especially those that operate nationally, will have to reflect the cultural 
character of the country in their composition. Whilst, there is no requirement for this, the 
rationale behind it extends back to the essence of the post-colonial Nigerian republic. 
Nigeria became independent in 1960 and a republic in 1963, comprising of a British-
defined democratic federal constitution which reflected three major geographical/ tribal 
character of the country (Northern Hausa, Western Yoruba and Eastern Igbo). As a result, 
organisations with a national scope of operation are generally expected to reflect the 
Nigerian cultural form in board composition. As a result, boards of Nigerian firms do not 
want to be seen as dominated exclusively by a particular tribe or region of the country. It 
must also be noted that a notable number of major corporations in Nigeria have risen with 
a tribal identity. As such there is a need to ensure some degree of tribal diversity in board 
composition. Boards with sufficient cultural diversity will thus have “a sense of 
belonging and identity” throughout the country. This may be crucial to customer 
allegiance and eventual firm performance. 
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Findings from this survey also show that age heterogeneity in board composition plays a 
role in the Nigerian corporate governance system. However there were variations with 
regards to respondents’ comments on this. These variations were connected to the 
capacities in which they responded. For example, regulators generally downplayed the 
importance of directors’ age. Accordingly, they argued that diversity in terms of 
disciplinary backgrounds, as well as expertise and experience supersede any 
consideration of age in terms of promoting effective corporate governance. This suggests 
that any individual with the sufficient human capital can be a good director. Notable 
directors of some high-profile boards, however, suggest that younger people are less risk 
averse and more exploratory. As such, they argue that age becomes crucial to board 
composition being that younger directors are prone to explore more business 
opportunities such as market expansions in ways which enable the company to become 
more competitive. According to an independent director on a number of high-profile 
boards; 
 
“Age is crucial. Younger directors bring new knowledge, are more competitive and are 
ready to grow the business unlike the cautious older ones” 
 
However experience spanning over many years of executive life must not be 
underestimated and compromised especially in the board composition of large 
companies. There are already regulatory provisions contained in Sections 252 and 256 of 
CAMA 1990 for mandatory disclosure of directors who are aged 70 or above; directors in 
this category are however  eligible for appointment in as much as they are of sound mind 
and clear intelligence. The premise here is that with age comes useful experience. 
According to a former CEO of a large listed corporation,   
 
“There is a lot of talent in the over 60s who have had, over time, the right experience and 
expertise in corporate governance and as such they should not be ruled out of 
participation on boards because they are simply over 60” 
 
Here also, the middle course remains the best path for Nigeria, which is a healthy 
combination of both young and older directors. Fox (2007) developed a diversity matrix 
for improving board diversity. This matrix aims to generate more diverse perspectives 
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when making decisions. As a result, this matrix can help Nigerian boards to identify areas 
in which they are well represented as well as those areas needing representation when 
recruiting and selecting new board members. 
 
8.3 BOARD REPUTATION 
To what extent is there a link between overall board reputation and good corporate 
governance? No doubt, this area of the corporate governance literature has been less 
researched. There are limited evidence in the literature with regards to the link between 
board/directors’ reputation, especially independent directors, and good corporate 
governance.  Chun-An and Chuan-Ying (2008), using Taiwan as a case study, have 
recently correlated directors’ reputation with improved firm performance. They further 
provide evidence which suggests that high-performing firms are more able to attract 
reputable directors to join them and exert their monitoring talent to improve their firms’ 
corporate governance quality and performance. On the other hand, Zajac and Westphal 
(1996) argue that powerful top managers seek to maintain their control of the board by 
selecting and retaining board members of low repute and excluding individuals of high 
reputable standards. They further stressed that powerful boards similarly seek to maintain 
their control by favoring directors with reputations of good performance (those who have 
actively monitored the management of other boards), whilst avoiding those directors with 
experience on passive boards. It must be noted that the reputation of independent 
directors normally account for overall board reputation.  
 
In Nigeria, not only is board reputation important for good corporate governance; it 
generates significant investor confidence which drives firms’ share performance. The 
findings from this study suggest that the reputation of directors is significant in 
promoting board effectiveness. Individuals with a good performance record on other 
boards, as well as a general reputable status in the Nigerian business society, are 
considered to bring credibility to the board. Given the legendary corruption in Nigeria, 
board members of high repute are constantly sought after. Commenting on this, a former 
CEO of a large listed corporation, who is constantly sought after to sit on a number of 
high profile boards said:  
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“Directors with high repute are more objective. From their perspective, they have lent 
their name to the company, and they are careful not to have them dragged into the mud. 
These individuals, not only contribute to board reputation but to the reputation of the 
company itself. However, there is a limited market for this group of highly experienced 
directors. Individuals of high corporate integrity are, however, in hot demand”   
 
Indeed when reputable directors resign from boards, it sends negative signals to the 
market with regards to the corporate governance of the firm they have left. Consequently, 
other boards in the industry will contest for them. The results from this investigation 
suggest that firms with a significant number of independent directors of good reputation 
will improve its corporate governance and overall firm performance. Furthermore, if we 
take multiple directorships as proxies for reputational capital; a better reputation means a 
better performing firm (Chun-An and Chuan-Ying 2008). However, it must be noted that 
reputation has to do with the estimation in which an individual is held. Thus, it may not 
necessarily indicate the individuals’ actual worth. Future studies must seek to determine 
the extent to which directors’ reputation contributes to actual corporate governance 
improvement.  
 
8.4 BOARD EVALUATION 
No doubt, boards are already being "evaluated" by activists, investors, the media, and 
politicians; however, the issue of board evaluation is getting back to the boardroom, 
where it belongs, since these groups are not as well equipped, nor sufficiently close to the 
situation, to provide fair evaluations (Carey 1993). Board evaluations have thus become 
high on the list of corporate governance guidelines due to the realisation that only by 
regular assessment can directors be expected to make their optimum contribution with 
regards to their oversight function of managerial conduct (Heidrick 1997; 1999). The aim 
of evaluation should be to increase the effectiveness of the whole board and not to target 
nor intimidate poor performers (Carey 1993). As a result, there are growing boardroom 
interests in directors’ evaluation, such that questions are being asked with regards to the 
right evaluation methodology for actual improvement in corporate governance (Bassett 
1998).  
 
220 
 
Board evaluation can be carried out in two major ways which are self-evaluation and 
external evaluation. Self-evaluation is when the board evaluates itself without any 
significant external help, while external evaluation is when outside consultants are called 
in to access the performance of the board. Heidrick (1997; 1999) argues that the first step 
in undertaking directors’ evaluation is to first evaluate the board as a whole which 
provides the context for developing tailored or company-specific assessment criteria. 
Bassett (1998) also argued the case for board self-regulation and recommended that self 
evaluation, in an objective, measurable, and meaningful manner, should be a regular part 
of every board's routine.  
 
Whilst there is limited evidence of board evaluation in Nigeria, respondents noted that it 
is a highly significant parameter for effective corporate governance in the country. 
Section 5.4 of the CBN Code already stipulates provisions for board performance 
appraisal and mandates that this must be carried out by an outside consultant. However 
results from this study are consistent with Carey (1993) and posit that self evaluation of 
directors is widely preferred over evaluation by external consultants. As a result, most 
boards are not properly evaluated despite the CBN’s statutory provisions. There is 
sufficient evidence which suggest that these provisions have only resulted in box-ticking, 
where the performance of all boards is rated optimum. A respondent who sits on the 
boards of several large listed corporations commented as follows;  
 
“I sit on a board where K17 has been called upon to evaluate us. Let me be frank with 
you, it was simply to conform with CBN rules and it only led to box ticking. Definitely, we 
would not call in consultants that would give us low scores, and if a particular consulting 
firm does, we would simply not call them again” 
 
The CBN rightly noted in the CBN Code that whilst adherence to corporate governance 
principles promotes the performance of boards, this is not a sufficient condition. It further 
highlighted the clear need for board performance reviews or appraisals which constitutes 
a new concept to ensure exceptional board performance. Regular board evaluation would 
undoubtedly improve the corporate governance situation in Nigeria but it must be 
                                                   
17 Pseudonym to ensure confidentiality of the company involved 
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approached systematically. Findings from this survey suggest that the concept is new and 
that it is important that the rationale behind it becomes clearly understood and accepted. 
With respect to this, relevant stakeholders must be educated on the benefits of effective 
board evaluation. Regulatory initiatives must be deployed in ways which suggest that 
honest board evaluation is both possible as well as desirable. Board evaluation is 
imperative to good corporate governance. In Nigeria, corporate governance effectiveness 
without board evaluation remains in idealism.   
 
Whilst self evaluation and external evaluation are options which have their benefits and 
limitations, one thing not to do because of the Nigerian cultural peculiarity is to conduct a 
“boss-employee” type appraisal. Findings from this survey show that bringing in a boss-
like evaluator to evaluate board performance in a way that management will appraise 
employees would be unacceptable in Nigeria and such proposition has indeed been earlier 
rejected. Board performance should be assessed in terms of individual members’ 
appraisal as well as the entire board.  
 
Furthermore, Nigeria is witnessing the emergence of advisory groups, nominated by 
shareholders, to monitor and encourage board effectiveness. Whilst this is still relatively 
uncommon, it is gradually becoming a recognised practice. Advisory groups normally 
comprise of retired chairmen and other individuals with proven records of useful 
experience, and reputable status. It must be noted that advisory groups are formed to 
provide board guidance and not evaluation. However, whilst the board is not subject to 
the recommendations of the advisory groups, the very persuasive nature of their functions 
and duties, as well as the calibre and reputation of its members create a vague sense of 
authority and indirect evaluation. Advisory groups assess the performance of boards with 
regards to organisational goals, and subsequently come up with guidance for the future. 
Thus boards are very unlikely to go against their advice and recommendations even 
though there is no legal provision which gives forceful authority to the advisory board. 
An advisory board can be regarded as a “council of elders” which is jointly nominated by 
shareholders and the board.  Diamond Bank, Nigeria Plc is an example of a company 
with such arrangement. 
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8.5 VIBRANT INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS 
Sherman (1990) argues that the growth of institutional shareholdings and the 
corresponding concentration of stock ownership in the hands of fewer individuals have 
changed the nature of the relationship between those shareholders and their corporations. 
Specifically, shareholders are able to use their enormous powers to influence how their 
portfolio companies are managed and governed (Sherman 1990). Institutional investors 
have become giant players in the affairs of today’s corporations, especially in the UK and 
US. However, Clyde (1997) noted that there remain considerable disagreements over the 
actual role they play in promoting good corporate governance. He argued that at one end 
of the debate, scholars have argued that concentrated ownership is imperative to efficient 
monitoring of management (Demsetz 1983; Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986), whilst the central thesis at the other end is that institutional shareholders 
are practically powerless (Jensen 1989).  
 
Institutional investors are expected to provide adequate policing of corporate 
management in ways which individual dispersed shareholders are incapacitated to do. 
Gaved (1998) noted that in countries where institutional investors play vibrant roles, they 
have also been generally instrumental and supportive with regards to many of the 
initiatives engineered towards achieving good corporate governance. He, however, also 
pointed out that their contributions are both pragmatically and structurally limited. 
Commenting on the UK corporate governance, he further argued that it is difficult for 
institutional investors to exercise the anticipated influence on the financial, operational or 
strategic management of a company. He noted that even when the largest institutional 
investors routinely meet privately with management, the information disclosed rarely gets 
down to smaller shareholders, who are thus further distanced from the management of the 
company.  
 
The behaviour of institutional investors with regards to their supervisory functions  are 
contingent on the following components; the legal framework detailing the limits of their 
involvement and influence in the company; the role of the financial intermediary; and 
more importantly the size of their holdings (Koladkiewicz 2002). In a 2007 OECD report 
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on the role of institutional investors in promoting good corporate governance, a case was 
made for a proper understanding of the roles of institutional investors in order to increase 
their relevance and vibrancy especially in developing economies. The report argues that 
large institutional shareholders must play an active role in the governance of companies 
because of their shareholdings which enables them to actively influence the actions of 
companies. In order to adopt a proactive monitoring role, the report further stated that it 
is necessary that institutional shareholders view themselves as owners of corporations, 
and not mere equity owners who are after short-term profits. Institutional investors are 
major shareholders who are expected to take a long-term view of their shareholdings, 
and, where necessary, incur costs in intervening to correct managerial excesses and 
promote good corporate governance (OECD 2007). 
 
In Nigeria, institutional investors are currently playing very limited roles in the corporate 
governance of listed firms. In the words of a senior manager of a Nigerian investment 
bank;  
 
“Institutional investors/stockholders do exist but their influence is very feeble, because 
they have not come to understand their roles and responsibilities in keeping corporations 
faithful to their mission and objectives. Like ordinary passive individual shareholders, 
they tend to be focused only on the returns they get on their investments- short terminism. 
They have not yet identified a role for themselves in corporate governance” 
 
However, findings from this survey indicate a great amount of optimism with regards to 
the ability of institutional investors to drive good corporate governance in Nigeria. The 
expected role of the few indigenous institutional shareholders has been constrained by the 
small equity they, most times, hold. Whilst it is unlikely for small institutional investors 
to make any impact in corporate governance in Nigeria, there is a great expectation that 
large institutional investors, especially foreign/international ones can contribute 
positively to the governance of Nigerian corporations.   The premise here is that their 
large shareholding would almost guarantee them a representation on the board, which 
places them in an informed position to positively influence managerial conduct. 
However, in order for the institutional investor to be more effective, their board member 
representative needs to be someone with the sufficient human capital and required 
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knowledge of the Nigerian terrain. These were the words of the chairman of a large listed 
firm in Nigeria;   
 
“In order for the institutional investor to be more effective, their board member 
representative needs to be someone that could almost be a CEO of the company itself. 
This person must be able to stand up to the CEO and executives, and be able to ask 
important and seasoned questions about the company’s operations and position. He/She 
must not just be someone who can spare the time but someone with a profound 
understanding and commitment to his/her roles and responsibilities.” 
 
The role of institutional investors in promoting good corporate governance must also bear 
need-driven attributes. It is clearly in the interest of institutional investors to ensure that 
the company in which lies their financial interests is governed with the highest degree of 
accountability, in order to secure their investments. Institutional investors playing 
increasingly active roles in the Nigeria corporate governance system include ACTIS, 
Renaissance Capitals and Capital Alliance. For example, these investors demand, as part 
of their terms of investing and retention of investments, that they get specific board 
member allotment (s). Institutional shareholders can further constitute a valuable source 
of information for directors as well as a rich resource for new ideas; they can provide the 
long-term/almost permanent financing that would lift corporate Nigeria to a long-term 
planning horizon (Sherman 1990). This would, however, require a conducive legal 
environment which limits the constraints on the processes of large stake acquisition by 
institutional shareholders, especially foreign ones. 
 
8.6 EFFECTIVE SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
In Chapter 5, the author discussed the peculiarities of shareholder activism in Nigeria. 
The author specifically analysed the political misuse of shareholder activism, including 
the dilemma of shareholders’ associations; the board/managerial capture of the intended 
activism; as well as the emergence of two classes of shareholder activists, as institutional 
response. More importantly, the impediments to effective activism were highlighted. 
Some of these include the ex-post nature of the activisms of shareholder associations, and 
the insufficient positive interactions between company’s management and shareholders’ 
associations. Following on from preceding discussions, findings from this survey suggest 
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that effective shareholder activism in the broadest sense, which involves both large and 
small individual and institutional shareholders, will promote good corporate governance 
in Nigeria.  
 
Indeed, effective shareholder activism will drive good corporate governance in 
developing countries such as Nigeria. Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) posited shareholder 
activism as a valued mechanism for corporate governance in India. They provided 
evidence on the role and importance of large shareholders in monitoring firm value. 
Amao and Amaeshi (2008) also galvanised for shareholder activism as a prerequisite for 
effective corporate governance and accountability in Nigeria. However, before 
galvanising for more activisms, we must be clear of what is at stake. More of the 
“shameful” practices of supposed shareholder activists only constitute pseudo activism 
and promotes bad corporate governance. As noted earlier, pseudo activism refers to a 
corruption motivated stage-managed conduct of shareholder activists, with no meaningful 
intention to promote effective stewardship and accountability of board directors and 
managers for corporate assets. On the other hand, genuine shareholder activism will drive 
good corporate governance in developing countries such as Nigeria, but findings from 
this survey suggest that this is highly contingent on a less corrupt corporate environment. 
Thus, while the emergence of shareholder activism in Nigeria is no longer in doubt, the 
undermined capacity to get useful information by genuine shareholder activists 
constitutes one of the executive management constructed barriers to impede activism. 
Commenting on the problem, a former CEO of a large listed corporation said:  
 
“When I was running XYZ18 Plc, we had a policy of calling in members of these 
shareholder associations and their executives, once a quarter during the year, to our 
factories. This enabled them to have a better understanding of how the business was 
being done, and the identification of the key success drivers/indicators for the company. 
By thus keeping them adequately and frequently informed, we found out that we could 
improve the quality of our AGMs through informed shareholder participation.” 
 
Shareholder activism can be promoted through a better informative interaction between 
shareholders’ associations and corporations. This will have to go beyond yearly AGMs. 
                                                   
18 Pseudonym to ensure confidentiality of the company involved 
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This will facilitate effective shareholder activism, given that enlightenment is crucial. 
Furthermore, upon being aware of their rights and responsibilities, Nigerian shareholders 
will also have to make a decision to be “active” and act on their rights and 
responsibilities. This would mean taking a step beyond the attendance of AGMs but 
asking specific questions to ensure sufficient clarity of corporate goals and strategies, as 
well as scrutinising managements’ and directors’ activities. Furthermore, the Nigerian 
media can promote shareholder activism by providing unbiased and fact-based 
information to the investing public. This will mean “taking the bull by the horn” and 
reporting all forms of corporate abuses and misdemeanours promptly without political 
interferences. Independent corporate watch-dogs and professional bodies should also rise 
up to assist in this much needed activism against corporate corruption. 
 
8.7 DECENT AND EXPLICITLY DEFINED PERFORMANCE RELATED 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
In the seminal article of Jensen and Meckling (1976), they examined potential conflicts 
between owners and managers, and addressed the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm value. Their paper summits that when managers' wealth is not tied 
directly to firm value through performance related executive compensation, managers 
may lack incentives to increase shareholder value and may resolve to self-serving 
behaviours, at the firm’s expense (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Havey and Shrieves 2001). 
Indeed agency theory takes a positive outlook towards executive compensation. Agency 
theory seeks to align the interests of predominantly absent and information deficient 
owners with those of powerful and probably opportunistic executives (Fama 1980; Fama 
and Jensen 1983). The agency theory literature thus suggests that the linkage of executive 
remuneration with company performance is an important remedy which should provide 
an important mechanism to drive good corporate governance and corporate success 
(Randøy and Nielsen 2002).   
 
Havey and Shrieves (2001) argued that the use and extent of incentive compensation are 
related to the following: (a) the presence of outside directors and blockholders, (b) the 
use of leverage, and (c) the nearness of retirement for the executives as well as the 
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percentage of the firm’s stock they already own. However, Cyert, Sok-Hyon and Kumar 
(2002) noted that the striking growth in executive compensation, especially in developed 
countries, mostly in terms of equity-based compensation, in the past decade has attracted 
extensive public scrutiny. This scrutiny largely relates to risky business ventures often 
pursued by managers in order to reap maximum monetary bonuses. Current economic 
crisis have further highlighted the caveats of a financial based compensation scheme for 
executives. 
 
In developing countries, especially Nigeria, the mechanism of linking executive 
compensation with executive performance in order to drive firms’ success and increase 
shareholder value, is still in its infancy. There is, however, increasing evidence of 
executive compensation schemes, especially in the country’s financial sector. Findings 
from this survey suggest that executive compensation in the Nigerian banking industry 
has only focussed on monetary bonus schemes. No doubt, diverse and robust 
performance linked compensation mechanisms will have to be developed to drive good 
corporate governance in Nigeria, beyond the financial services industry. At present, 
except in the financial services industry, executives do not appear to be well 
compensated. There are significant implications of the absence of a performance related 
executive compensation culture. In commenting on this, the vice-chairman of a large 
listed bank in Nigeria said: 
 
“The traditional absence of clear performance related compensation strategies has been 
a major factor behind some of the corporate governance related corrupt practices of 
executives. If executives are not well compensated, they create other avenues to accrue 
money to themselves, at the expense of shareholders” 
 
It must be noted that there is an informal/cultural disapproval of paying executives huge 
bonuses by the Nigerian public as well as the subtle uncomplimentary regulatory 
positions towards such. For example, the SEC Code states that “There should be full and 
clear disclosure of directors' total emoluments and those of the chairman and highest-paid 
director, including pension contributions and stock options where the earnings are in 
excess of ₦500,000 (£2000)” (Part A; Section 6A). No doubt, appropriately 
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compensating management would mean taking a far journey from the £2000 mark. 
Furthermore, when companies make such disclosures about their executive 
compensation, what normally follows is “an uncomfortable public high brow that the 
directors are milking the company dry”, which makes executives resolve to more corrupt 
means to accrue wealth to their pockets”. 
 
Whilst performance related executive compensation schemes will promote good 
corporate governance in Nigeria, adequate caution must be exercised.  Understanding the 
reality of industry specific business operations and relationships is important to the 
formulation of executive compensation schemes. Specifically, the profitability potentials 
of a particular company must inform its executive compensation. In the words of a 
former CEO of a large listed corporation,  
 
“The profit margins that companies in certain areas, in this environment, can achieve 
almost without trying/performing are significant. Indeed, like most developing countries, 
the profitability potential of companies operating in some industries, such as the 
financial services, insurance and manufacturing are so enormous; formulating 
compensation packages simply based on “end of year profits” and stock appreciation 
could amount to executives getting huge sums at the end of the year without any real 
performance on their part” 
A more analytical framework must be adopted to understand what an executive 
performance compensation scheme must entail. This will undoubtedly go beyond the 
financials and percentage increases in yearly profits, but allows a deeper investigation 
into the overall efficiency of business operations. This limits the tendency of 
managements to engage in accounting mal-practices and, as a result, misrepresent the 
position of the company. Indeed purely stock related compensation for executives could 
induce manipulation and pseudo share value appreciation. An example is the previously 
mentioned case of Cadbury Nigeria Plc. Executive compensation must, thus, extend 
beyond the financials but seek to account for facts behind the figures. A decent and 
explicitly defined reward system is needed to inform good corporate governance and 
promote corporate success in Nigeria. 
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8.8 FULL PUBLIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
The literature recognises that “information asymmetry” (Akerlof 1980) or “information 
impactedness” (Williamson 1985) is pervasive in firms and result in uncertainty, adverse 
selection, moral hazard, and opportunism which in turn leads to the following: higher 
transaction costs; incorrect pricing of assets; and lower liquidity (Filatotchev et al. 2006). 
In most countries, there are both mandatory and voluntary disclosure requirements; the 
discussions here are however limited to the latter. Clausen (1979) stresses the importance 
of voluntary disclosure practices in enhancing good corporate governance. He further 
argued that information disclosure must be embodied in a consistent policy that can be 
enunciated, implemented, and reviewed, in ways which are coherent with the corporate 
objectives, and not a matter of uncoordinated responses to external stimuli. Adequate 
information flows constitute a key driver of good corporate governance (Filatotchev et al. 
2006). Mallin (2002) argued that good corporate governance should ensure the full, 
timely and comprehensive disclosure of information on all important matters, ranging 
from the financial position of the firm to its performance and other governance related 
matters. She itemised the following fundamental information as important to ensuring 
that shareholders have the necessary knowledge of the business and as such must be 
transparently disclosed (Mallin 2002: 253):  
 financial/ operating results 
 ownership structure 
 members of board of directors and management 
 quantitative and qualitative matters relating to employees and other stakeholders 
in the corporation 
 governance structures and policies 
 corporate targets and prospects 
 execution of unusual and complex transactions, transactions on derivative 
products and their risk levels. 
 
Findings from this survey suggest that full public disclosure on most of these 
fundamental issues is critical to ensuring good corporate governance in Nigeria. 
Respondents agree that true, transparent, and consistent disclosures will improve the 
quality of corporate governance in the country. The challenge, however, remains the 
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possibility of such disclosures, in an environment of endemic corruption. Furthermore, 
the survey data indicate that there is a need for companies with employee share 
ownership schemes to make such disclosures. Bassett, Koh and Tutticci (2007) recently 
found evidence to suggest that disclosure on Employee Stock Options (ESO) affect 
corporate governance. It is essential that there is disclosure on the ownership structure of 
Nigerian companies with respect to the percentage of shares owned by employees. In 
Nigeria, the ESO potentially benefits two classes of individuals, whose agenda could be 
different. On one hand, it benefits the employees through the return they can potentially 
get on their investments as well as some degree of employment security given that they 
are somewhat employing themselves.  
 
On the other hand, it must be noted that share ownership means the “right to vote”. Since 
most employees/employee representatives focus less on this important power, 
managements are able to influence how they vote. This gives management more 
controlling power on the shareholders and the company. Some takeover bids have failed 
primarily as a result of managements’ reliance on ESO.  Union Bank Nigeria Plc and Afri 
Bank Nigeria Plc are good examples19. Given that ESO’s equity fund keeps increasing, 
the consequential increasing voting power continues to remain subject to management’s 
influence. This suggests that regulatory initiatives must ensure that companies deploy 
mechanisms which aid specific and relevant voluntary disclosure. However, Nigeria must 
take note that a voluntary disclosure programme should not substitute good corporate 
behaviour (Clausen 1979). 
 
8.9 COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT BOARD AUDIT COMMITTEES 
There has been a renewed emphasis on the importance of auditor competence and 
independence as key drivers for good corporate governance. Arthur Levitt asserted in his 
speech at New York University in 1998 that “management had become obsessed with 
making their numbers, that accounting practices had seriously slipped, and the bedrock 
                                                   
19 Both banks have the employees’ equity fund as one of their major shareholders. As a result, takeover bids 
have failed because the management of both banks have relied on employee shares. During periods of  
take-over bids, management of companies with such schemes normally echoes into employees’ ears that 
they will eventually get sacked in the hands of a new investor. As a result, votes are normally cast in favour 
of managements. 
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basis of capitalism — honest and transparent financial reporting — was being 
dangerously compromised” (Biggs 2000: 8). Following on from previous discussions, the 
literature also stresses “the importance of auditor independence in promoting the quality 
and integrity of information provision and disclosure” (Filatotchev et al 2006: 88). 
However Spira (1999) noted that research into audit committees has not extensively 
explored the subject of their independence. Independence is crucial to board audit 
committees in Nigeria. Whilst the SEC Code and the CBN Code both define the 
independence of auditors, findings from this survey suggest that regulations only cannot 
achieve the desired independence. Survey respondents highlighted moral uprightness and 
individual integrity as the major instruments of an independent audit function.  
 
In relation to the competence of board audit committees, DeZoort and Salterio (2001) 
found effects of financial-reporting and audit knowledge on audit committee’s corporate 
governance function. They further suggest that varying knowledge levels lead to 
systematic differences in audit committee members’ judgments especially in disputes 
involving auditors and management. Adequate proficiency is primary to the success of 
auditors’ corporate governance function, specifically in developing countries. Al-
Mudhaki and Joshi (2004) examined the composition, focus and functions of audit 
committees in India. They concluded that whilst the concept of an audit committee is no 
longer new in the country, their formation is slow and their composition lacks 
independence. More importantly, they argue that their functions remain concentrated in 
the traditional areas of accounting which makes it less responsive to changes in the 
corporate governance scenery. Independence in board audit committees, no doubt, has the 
potential of alleviating weaknesses in existing corporate governance structures (Turley 
and Zaman 2004), particularly in developing countries. However, the capability of 
members is primary and must first be ensured. In turn, this will enhance the independence 
of auditors from managements as well as protect auditors from allegations of inadequate 
and fraudulent auditing (Mautz and Neumann 1970). 
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8.10 SUMMARY  
This chapter has identified nine specific drivers of good corporate governance in Nigeria 
at the firm level. These factors are to a differing extent interdependent on one another. 
Particularly, the presence or effectiveness of one could significantly impact on the other. 
Other drivers which were found to be somewhat significant but not of prime importance 
in driving good corporate  governance in Nigeria include board size, and disclosure of 
private information to major shareholders and analysts. The drivers identified in this 
chapter are by no means absolute, further research is needed to identify more drivers and 
more importantly the complimentarity relationships amongst these drivers. Discussions 
have, however, given more insights into the drivers of good corporate governance in 
developing countries, having taken into consideration previous discussions on the 
institutional, regulatory and external climate of corporate governance. Indeed, this 
chapter further attests to the dependency and interaction of firm-level corporate 
governance practices with the broader institutional environment.  
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CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
9.0 THESIS SUMMARY  
In Chapter 1, the author gave a general overview of this thesis including the rationale 
behind this study, and introductions to the key themes that have been explored in this 
research. The author also highlighted the research questions and objectives of this study. 
In Chapter 2, the author made an attempt to delineate the conceptual and theoretical 
issues relating to the terms “corporate governance” and “good corporate governance”. As 
a result, the author conducted a comprehensive and cross-disciplinary review of relevant 
literature. Discussions here highlighted the fact that a normative approach to good 
corporate governance may limit our scope, in ways which consequently facilitate a 
common blunder of assuming cross-national and cross-institutional applicability, 
particularly with regards to the notion of “good corporate governance” in varieties of 
capitalism. Therefore in seeking to investigate the determinants of good corporate 
governance in one of Africa’s most important financial markets – Nigeria, the author 
adopted a mix of qualitative research methods, which are detailed in Chapter 3. 
Discussions in Chapter 4 show that one size does not fit all, and that developing countries 
face peculiar corporate governance challenges. In particular, Chapter 4 analyses the 
conceptual, theoretical and practical constructions of corporate governance in Nigeria. 
Here, the author examined several corporate governance related mechanisms and the 
particular forms and shapes in which they express themselves in Nigeria. In these 
discussions, the author analysed the influence of the country’s endemic corruption on the 
whole corporate governance system.  
 
In seeking to understand why the state of corporate governance in Nigeria as well as in 
most other countries of the sub Sahara is not very encouraging, the author analysed the 
evolution of corporate governance in Nigeria from the lens of institutional theory. Whilst 
the author did not expressly consider all the institutional determinants of good corporate 
governance in Nigeria, he represented the principal data generated determinants in a 
simple and flexible model which facilitates an understanding of how two classes of 
institutional forces shape corporate governance structures and practices in Nigeria. The 
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author also advocated the use of institutional theory to complement the agency theory in 
conceptualising and explaining the construction and practice of corporate governance, 
particularly in developing countries.  
 
The author subsequently argued, in Chapter 6, that regulatory measures aimed at 
addressing Nigeria’s corporate governance problems must be institutionally based. In this 
regard, corporate governance regulatory strategies in developing countries must 
systematically employ globally, regionally and locally accepted principles of good 
corporate governance in order to produce more efficient and easily implementable 
administrative and regulatory governance mechanisms. Indeed, Chapter 6 provided a 
detailed scrutiny of corporate governance regulation in Nigeria, whilst adopting a multi-
stakeholder approach for the review. Discussions challenged some of the “taken for 
granted assumptions” with regards to generalisations on corporate governance regulatory 
requirements for developing and developed countries. The author further documented the 
peculiar characteristics and importance of corporate governance regulation in the 
Nigerian banking industry. The author subsequently examined the role of government in 
corporate governance in an attempt to summit that countries must account for their 
specific circumstances, including relevant historical perspectives, ownership structures 
and characteristics, cultural norms and values, as well as the broader polity and ethical 
characteristics, in formulating regulatory initiatives. 
 
Given relevant historical dimensions and present day influences, comprehensive studies 
on corporate governance in developing countries can be considered limited, if the 
external factors shaping the landscape are neglected. In Chapter 7, the author focused on 
the impact and influences of external governance mechanisms and forces on Nigeria. 
Three classes of these were discussed. The author analysed the traditional and present 
influences of the UK’s corporate governance system on the construction of corporate 
governance in Nigeria. Similar studies were conducted in Japan, China and India. The 
author further provided some evidence of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
prescription (and/or imposition) on developing countries. On the basis of these 
determinants, the author identified, in the preceding chapter, nine specific drivers of good 
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corporate governance in Nigeria, particularly at the firm level.  In all, this research has 
made use of survey extracts (typed in italics and single spaced) from the raw interview 
and focus group data, in a way which facilitated useful deductions, and ensured a clearer 
link between existing literature, the research findings and analysis, in an attempt to make 
scholarly, practice and policy contributions. So what can we make of all these? 
 
9.1 PREREQUISITES OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NIGERIA 
The institutional, regulatory, external and firm level dimensions to corporate governance 
in Nigeria have been evaluated. Their determining influences on the shaping of corporate 
conduct have been expressly considered with in-depth insights, useful case studies, and 
extracts from raw survey data.  Overall, the analysis presented in this thesis has shown 
that the quality of corporate governance in Nigeria is somewhat middling. Whilst related 
studies in this area have made similar conclusions, it must be noted that this thesis has 
provided relevant explanations with regards to the evolution and present-day reality of 
the corporate governance phenomenon in developing countries, and particularly why the 
state of corporate governance in the country is what it is today. Apart from the already 
explained predominantly negative macro and micro institutional settings, this thesis 
further suggests that the unimpressive state of corporate governance in Nigeria is also 
related to inefficient enforcement of corporate governance laws as well as inadequate 
compliance with voluntary codes of conduct. Some of the problems which relates to the 
inability of corporate governance legal provisions to ensure good conduct have been 
highlighted, such as the non-stringent penalties for non-compliance. Indeed a major 
impediment to promoting and sustaining good corporate governance in Nigeria remains 
the regulatory capacity to ensure enforcement. For example, Okike (2007), whilst 
concluding her paper on the status quo of corporate governance in Nigeria, stressed that 
companies get away with violating company laws due to weak and ineffective 
enforcement. She therefore, recommended that rather than coming up with more forms of 
regulations such as the SEC 2003 Code, efforts should be geared towards enforcing 
compliance, especially as Nigeria is a country which is generally considered as highly 
corrupt both locally and internationally. 
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Adopting a less normative approach, some attributes of good corporate governance have 
also been highlighted in thesis. Here, this research argues that business integrity, 
investment security and good corporate governance are imperative to corporate and 
economic survivals in both developed and developing market economies. Indeed, the 
increasing globalisation of capital markets and the ever increasing numbers of cross-
national investment portfolios have brought to the fore the need for companies to adopt 
generally acceptable standards of good corporate governance. Conventional wisdom has 
it that good corporate governance allows firms to raise cheaper capital more efficiently 
and enhances shareholder value. This thesis has, however, argued that good corporate 
governance must be conceived more broadly in order to have meaningful impact on 
corporate performance.  
 
This will require a focus on fundamentals and people; Causey (2008) argued that in 
achieving good corporate governance, there must be open and frank lines of 
communication, transparent policies and practices, clarity with regards to domains of 
authority, board independence, as well as strong internal controls and audit functions. 
Patel (2006) argues that in developing countries, good corporate governance will mean a 
very effective system of checks and balances on board and managerial behaviour. He 
further noted that these will ensure effectiveness in the rules and practices that underpin 
and govern the relationship between the management and shareholders. It will further 
enable the company to engage constructively with its other stakeholders including 
employees and creditors who all make important contributions to the growth and stability 
of the company (Patel 2006).  
 
For this to happen, certain institutional arrangements must be clearly understood and 
accounted for. The discussions in this thesis have shown that institutional interactions 
seriously dictate the legitimate expectations of stakeholders from corporate governance. 
Institutional forces also guide the administration of corporate governance and the 
practices adopted. Consequently these determine the corporate governance problems 
experienced, and undoubtedly the efficiency of regulatory mechanisms deployed to 
address them. Judge, Douglas and Kutan (2008) studied panel data for corporate 
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governance ratings in 50 countries in order to investigate the country-level predictors of 
corporate governance legitimacy, exploring how the institutional environments of 
different countries influence their perceptions of corporate governance. They concluded 
that the greater the extent of law and order in a country and the more the culture 
emphasizes global competitiveness, the higher the corporate governance legitimacy. 
Institutions can therefore shape good or bad corporate governance. Discussions have 
shown that the belief system and culture of the Nigerian society have negatively 
influenced the direction, practice and quality of corporate governance despite the legal 
and statutory requirements in place. Whilst there is an increasing ideological and 
regulatory move towards a “best practice” corporate governance system, Nigeria must 
minimise the effects of her negative institutional environments and allow her corporate 
governance system to decouple from such forces.  
 
Institutional arrangements are very powerful forces which shape corporate governance. 
This can further explain the diversity of national systems of corporate governance despite 
globalisation fuelled pressures for convergence. Okike (2007) noted that whilst there is a 
case for global convergence of corporate governance standards owing to pressures due to 
the increasing globalisation of trade and finance, there is a clear need to appreciate the 
differences in the environments in which businesses across various countries operate. 
Africa must, therefore, not simply mimic the corporate governance systems and practices 
of other jurisdictions without accounting for her peculiar institutional environments.  In 
the same vein, corporate governance ideologies should not be imposed on developing 
countries. Discussions in this thesis have highlighted several problems with the 
transplantation of corporate governance structures which are best suited for particular 
jurisdictions. Especially, certain institutional uncomplimentary effects have been 
examined. As a result, Africa must not respond futilely to pressures amounting from the 
globalisation of national financial markets and, indeed, the push for convergence of 
national systems and practices of corporate governance. Alternatively, developing 
countries must imbibe universal principles of good corporate governance in ways which 
fit with their culture and history, as well as their social, political, economic and legal 
environments.  
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Rwegasira (2000) made a case for Africa's choice of corporate governance system to be 
in the direction of the institutionally-based model and emphasized that African 
economies must adapt the model to the peculiarities of their specific economies. He 
further stressed that inputs can be gathered from more than a single model in order to 
provide for globally competitive corporate governance systems. The discussion in 
Chapter 7 further advocates necessary caution with regards to a conventional push 
towards the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model, and summits that countries 
should imbibe structures and practices that are applicable and beneficial to their 
environment, irrespective of where these come from. A long term strategy such as this 
would effectively promote good behaviour in African corporations. This has the potential 
to correct the inherent negative practices and those sustained over time both at the 
national and firm-level dimensions of corporate governance in developing countries. 
Yakasai (2001; 250-252) while taking into account some of the problems associated with 
the climate of corporate governance in Nigeria proposed the following recommendations 
with a view to improving corporate governance in Nigeria, especially in the banking 
sector; 
 
• The government should concern itself with the business of providing the enabling 
environment for the private sector to perform. In spite of the attractiveness, the 
government should steer clear of the appointments to and not interfere with the boards of 
private companies in the so-called command or strategic sectors because the problem 
with such an unsustainable system is to ask these boards to serve God and Mammon i.e. 
the benevolent state and the bottom line (equityholders) at the same time. To my mind, 
the governance of private companies should be left in the hands of boards to pursue their 
bottom line and other objectives but still fulfilling the Holy Book's law (Matthew 22:21), 
``Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things 
that are God's''.  
 
• Another area of conflict to be avoided in the governance of a private company 
especially in any Nigerian banking institution is that between the chairman and the 
managing director/chief executive………The Managing director/chief executive should 
be a man of many parts who must provide the strategic leadership and act as the 
custodian of the corporate image and culture and nurture key relationships with the 
media, the regulatory institutions, employees, unions, government and shareholders. 
 
•Given the global nature of banking today, the nominating committee must put 
knowledge and competency above other factors such as ownership and affirmative 
actions in recommending appointments to BOD………a good clue when looking for 
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executive directors is to first of all search from within the organisation to recruit from 
serving managers unto the board due to their encyclopaedic knowledge of the company 
and their experience and professional competence, failing which the committee should 
look outwards with the provision that competence counts above other considerations.  
 
• On the issue of motivation and benefits, these are the driving forces making people to 
lobby extensively to be on board. In particular, if the benefits are no longer in the short-
term, prospective board members will only seek nomination and appointment for what 
they can contribute to the governance of the company. 
 
• Our legal system should be free to deal promptly and decisively with erring and 
fraudulent board members so as to act as a deterrent to others.  
 
• Lastly, rare is the company that does not periodically review the performance of its key 
contributors - individuals, work teams, business units and senior/top managers and 
advisers. One contributor, in Nigeria at least, usually escapes such a review, and that one 
is arguably the most important i.e. the board. And who will guard the guardians? Done 
properly, board appraisals can improve the relationship between the corporate board and 
its management. No one can evaluate a board better than the board itself, a self-
evaluation that need not be self-serving. 
On Yakasai’s first recommendation – that government should stay clear of corporate 
governance; this may not be totally desirable. Corporate scandals and their potential huge 
impact, as exemplified by current economic crisis has taught us that government has a 
role in corporate governance (see Okike 1994; 2004). During periods of corporate 
scandals and subsequent turmoil in the capital markets, governments have generally 
stepped in to “quench the fire” through reforms in company laws and enforcement 
mechanisms (see Okike 1994; 2004). No doubt this ex-post function of the government 
may lead to non strategic policy initiatives and misguided responses to corporate 
misdemeanours. There is limited evidence that the seemingly governmental over-
reactions in periods following large-scale corporate misdemeanours, have achieved true 
improvement in corporate governance, and correction in corporate behaviour. On the 
other hand, they potentially increase the compliance burden of corporations. In this 
thesis, the author has provided useful discussions on the legitimate and strategic role of 
government in corporate governance. It must be noted that governments are part of the 
larger stakeholder community of modern day corporations, and they clearly wield 
tremendous powers especially with regards to the provision of a conducive business 
environment which underpins the behaviour of management and board members, 
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especially in developing countries. I, therefore, note that government must delineate a 
clear and locally conceived strategy, with regards to the affairs of corporations. The 
author has also called for a systematic governmental interaction with corporate 
governance with the aim of creating a competitive environment for investments. This 
would necessitate a synergic relationship between policy makers and self-regulatory 
bodies, one which takes into account the country’s institutional environments and 
associated challenges.  
No doubt, Yakasai has provided certain useful recommendations. For example, he 
foretold the need to address CEO-Chairman role duality years before the issues were 
addressed in the SEC Code and the CBN Code. His paper clearly draws on decades of 
experience in the Nigerian banking sector and particularly on the experiences which he 
gathered from the various executive and non-executive directorships which he has 
occupied in the Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. However, given that the subject of corporate 
governance is still at its infancy in Nigeria, commentators must be exceptionally careful 
with regards to their recommendations. The subject is still comparatively fragile in 
developing economies and, as a result, rather than suggest practices best suited for 
developed countries, we must understand our environment first. This understanding has 
to do with our legendary and increasingly endemic lawlessness. A clearer account of this 
climatic factor on corporate governance systems will enable the development of locally 
conceived structures and mechanisms based on general notions of good corporate 
governance. These will facilitate Nigeria’s construction of an investment friendly 
corporate governance system.  
Furthermore, undermining the importance of equity ownership on the part of executive 
directors by Yakasai potentially impairs the necessary commitment desired of them in the 
pursuit of long term growth strategies for firms. The findings of this research indicates 
that there is a compelling personal business interest to run a business well if one has got 
equity in it. Integrity, knowledge and competency are no doubt important attributes 
necessary to make a good and resourceful board (as the discussions in Chapter 8 have 
indicated), but discouraging equity ownership by directors of Nigerian banks totally 
underestimates the nonchalant and lackadaisical attitudes they can potentially express in 
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the discharge of their very important duties of assets stewardship for the rather 
externalised shareholders, especially minority ones.  
Also, whilst this research has also found evidence in line with Yakasai, which suggest the 
need to foster a long term orientation towards performance related compensation, the 
author’s findings disagree with his suggestion to hastily prosecute and punish corporate 
offenders. This could lead to improper investigations which are based on more assertions 
than facts. For example, the Cadbury Nigeria Plc scandal led to a very hasty prosecution 
of “fraudulent board members” by the SEC. In this case, the Cadbury board sacked the 
CEO - Bunmi Oni, as well as the finance director - Ayo Akadiri for their roles in 
“falsifying the company’s financial statements”. Thereafter, SEC further banned them 
from operating in the Nigerian capital market, from taking up a job in the financial 
services sector, and from holding directorship positions in any listed company in Nigeria. 
Whilst rigorous enforcement and deterrent corporate governance mechanisms must be in 
place, findings from this survey suggest these must be carried out honestly and 
systematically within the confines of the law. Given the sensitivity of the issue and also 
given that the matter is still in court, respondents however expressed adequate caution in 
their comments, and those who commented requested for 100 percent anonymity.  
Nevertheless, two problems were generally associated with rapid and unthoughtful 
prosecutions of corporate offenders, particularly in Nigeria. First, they suggest political 
witch-hunting and connote undue political interferences. For example, the hasty 
prosecution of corporate offenders may be as a result of an influential politician who has 
basically decided to intimidate and settle personal grudges against a particular corporate 
leader. No doubt if there has not been an incidence of corporate misconduct, convictions 
are unlikely, but given that the motive might not be to correct bad behaviour and promote 
good corporate governance, the deterrent message that prosecutions should ideally pass 
are highly disrupted negatively. Secondly it connotes some degree of foreign 
interference. Cadbury Nigeria Plc, a subsidiary of Cadbury Schweppes, had Bunmi Oni 
as its CEO for 11 years. Given the traditional practice of MNC’s having expatriates as 
CEOs, his case was considered very uncommon in Nigeria. It is thus generally assumed 
that MNCs constantly look for means to sack local CEOs of high performing subsidiaries 
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in order to have control of firm’s management and more direct relationships with local 
customers and networks. For example, it must be noted that Bunmi Oni won the award of 
Nigeria's most respected CEO on September 14, 2006 for his corporate excellence and 
high integrity. This award was conferred on him by the Price Water House Coopers’ 
international audit consultants (PWC). Ironically, PWC was engaged by parent company 
Cadbury Schweppes, few months after, to conduct an audit of Cadbury Nigeria Plc. Has 
this been the case of “give a dog a bad name and hang him”? No doubt, prosecution and 
subsequent punishment of corporate offenders are imperative to instilling good behaviour 
in the governance of corporations in developing countries. However, this must be well 
investigated without political and foreign interferences, in order to truly have a deterrent 
effect. 
Furthermore, unlike Yakasai’s strict preference for self evaluation of the board, findings 
from this survey suggest this may lead to significant box ticking. In this regard, it is 
expected that no director is likely to be deemed underperforming, taking into 
consideration the general Nigerian business culture and role of ethnicity, religion and 
their impact on trust, faithfulness as well as division, as against considerations of 
effectiveness in board evaluation. As discussed in Chapter 8, board evaluation should aim 
to increase the effectiveness of the whole board and not to target and intimidate poor 
performers (Carey 1993) and as such potential options should not be limited to self-
evaluation, which undermines the abilities of external trained consultants which is a 
strong preference of the CBN. 
This thesis has also shown that the necessary legal infrastructure and regulatory 
instruments to successfully promote good corporate governance in Nigeria are reasonably 
present, but that enforcement and compliance related issues remain the major 
impediment. Indeed the fundamental problem of corporate governance in Nigeria centres 
on the gulf between the provisions of the law and its actual implementation (Nmehielle 
and Nwauche 2004). This gulf has been created by limited political will, endemic 
corruption as well as insufficient capacity and commitment of regulatory agencies to 
ensure adequate implementation of laws. The company is an artificial rather than a 
natural “person” in law; its formation, activities and demise, all occur within the confines 
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of the laws of the jurisdiction of its location (Morrison 2004). It is time to make the law 
work in Nigeria! At the firm level, the Enron case has taught us that it is not enough for a 
company to have a good corporate governance structure in place. What matters is if this 
structure eventually produces good behaviour. Corporations in developing countries 
(including foreign multinationals) must be wary of bribery (directly or indirectly) and 
corruption in business administration, especially in a situation where the institutional 
climate provides an enabling environment for these. Good corporate governance is thus 
achievable but it is important that local initiatives, with regards to corporate governance 
development and monitoring, must not only aim to tackle peculiar challenges, but should 
also strive to be internationally acceptable, whilst being weary of corporate governance 
impository tendencies. 
 
9.2 A REMINDER OF MAJOR RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
A quick literature search of scholarly, practice and policy papers on corporate governance 
in sub Saharan Africa would reveal a comparative astounding lacuna, in relation to the 
literature on developed countries. This has become thwarting to scholars from the region. 
In this thesis, the author has investigated the institutional, regulatory, external and 
specific determinants of good corporate governance in one of Africa’s most important 
financial markets - Nigeria. Employing a mix of the following qualitative research 
methods: in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, direct observations and case 
studies, the author has provided, in this thesis, a scrutiny of corporate governance in 
developing countries. Part of the richness of this thesis is the deep insights it has provided 
into the nature, practice and complexity of the corporate governance phenomenon in 
developing countries. It has also encouraged a deeper discourse of the subject, especially 
as it challenges specific Anglo-Saxon theoretical postulates and assumptions with regards 
to their applicabilities in the Nigerian environment. 
 
This thesis contributes, not only to the academy but, to the business sector and the polity 
of developing economies, particularly Nigeria. The author has provided in-depth 
discussions with regards to the definitive motive of corporate governance through a non 
normative multi-theoretical and multi-disciplinary scrutiny of the literature. No doubt this 
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is imperative to the survival and continued/future relevance of the already vast but 
somewhat deficient literature. Good corporate governance, despite disagreements in its 
meaning, remains imperative to corporate and economic survival and sustainability, and 
can be usefully discussed because of the basic principles of honesty, accountability, 
transparency and fairness that it promotes. 
 
This thesis has further shown that developing countries face peculiar corporate 
governance challenges.  The state of corporate governance in Nigeria has been depicted 
in order to serve as an outlook to understand the complex dynamics of corporate 
governance relations in developing countries. Discussions also suggest that whilst 
countries share some similar corporate governance challenges, the translations of these 
challenges and the means of tackling them, especially in developing countries, differ. 
This difference is contingent on the following; the ownership structure of corporations;  
the influence of the state in their governance; the presence and role of a viable market for 
corporate control; the extent to which shareholder and stakeholder activism is legally and 
informally encouraged; the ethical climate of business conduct; as well as orientations 
towards corporate social responsibility.  The author has argued that corporate governance 
is thus country specific based on explanations from the spectacles of institutional theory.   
 
In this respect, it is anticipated that discussions will add, not only to the corporate 
governance literature but also to the literature on institutional theory. There is also a 
secondary contribution to the broad literature on comparative institutionalism and 
comparative management, respectively. Noting that the financial economics’ favoured 
spectacles of the agency theory do not accommodate the relevance of key institutions in 
the workings of a corporate governance framework,  corporate governance discussions 
need a complementary institutionalist perspective in conceptualising the complex 
dynamics of the subject, particularly in the developing world.  The author concluded that 
corporate governance is multi-dimensionally influenced by institutional environments. 
Specifically, this study shows that the effectiveness of corporate governance structures 
and regulatory mechanisms depends on the complimentary relationships of certain 
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national and firm-specific institutional environments with good corporate governance 
principles and practices.  
 
Therefore in enriching scholarly discourse in the area of governance and opportunism in 
the modern corporation, the author brings insights from a Nigerian case to add to the 
increasing scholarly recognition (Boehmer 1999; Aoki 2001; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; 
Aguilera 2005; Leaptrott 2005; Liu 2005; Lubatkin et al 2005, 2007; Judge, Douglas and 
Kutan 2008) with regards to the institutional embeddedness of countries’ corporate 
governance systems and key players. This thesis has augmented the burgeoning corporate 
governance-institutional theory literature by examining how certain national and 
industry/firm specific institutions have shaped and are shaping the corporate governance 
structure and practices of Nigeria. Understanding these macro and micro institutional 
forces is of the essence with regards to our understanding of the underlying rationale and 
machinery upon which business conduct and governance systems are developed, nurtured 
and sustained over time. This brings to the fore the benefits of the institutional theory to 
encapsulate these relationships. Notably, the author also makes efforts to enrich 
institutional theory by exploring a case of institutional maintenance, where changes at 
micro (firm) level are unable to change the self-reinforcing institutional landscape. Thus, 
both institutional and agency theories can complementarily be employed to explain 
corporate governance. This institutionalist approach is particularly needed in explaining 
corporate governance in developing countries, which are characterised by lesser 
economic development, weak legal infrastructures, as well as public and private 
corruption. 
 
In line with this, corporate governance cannot be separated from corporate governance 
regulation. The thesis has attempted to look exhaustively into the subject of corporate 
governance regulation in Nigeria. Discussions highlighted that countries will have to 
position their regulatory systems to tackle the particular challenges they face. As such 
corporate governance regulation in developing countries will differ in ideology, 
necessity, concerns, complexity and robustness in specific areas. The implications of 
these for the role of government in corporate governance, which has generally not 
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attracted substantial scholarly focus, have also been clearly examined in this thesis. 
Particularly, the thesis has explored the potential for an effective governmental participation 
in corporate governance, whilst attempting to help Nigeria’s Federal Government to develop 
an engagement strategy in the governance of corporations. Primarily, this would require the 
government to address the endemic public corruption in the country. 
 
Furthermore, corporate governance in developing countries cannot be separated from past 
and present external influences and interferences. In this regard, the author has made 
further contributions to the literature on comparative corporate governance research by 
providing a cross-examination of the impact and influences of external governance 
mechanisms and forces on Nigeria. Here, the thesis’ comparative analyses further 
contribute to the literature on corporate governance developments in other countries 
especially the UK, Japan, China and India.  Particularly, the author draws scholarly 
attention to the fact that corporate governance in Nigeria, as in most developing 
countries, is subject to external influences and interferences. The implication of this is the 
probability of corporate governance imposition. Indeed, imposing corporate governance 
ideologies and covertly transplanting Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems in 
other jurisdictions potentially limits our scholarly discourse, especially in the area of 
comparative corporate governance research. Lastly, in order to improve the practice of 
corporate governance in Nigeria, the author has identified nine key drivers of good 
corporate governance. Whilst, these drivers are by no means absolute, they may indicate 
the path of improvement for corporate governance in the developing world.  
 
9.3 RELEVANCE, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
Nigeria is a regional power. In a 2005 Goldman Sachs report (see Wilson and Stupnytska 
2005), Nigeria (alongside  Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, and Vietnam) was recently listed among the "Next 
Eleven" economies as having a high potential to become one of the largest economies in 
the world. Goldman Sachs ratings centered predominantly on degrees of economic and 
political stability. This suggests Nigeria is gradually becoming a true pace setter in 
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economic development in Africa. Rigorous corporate governance research is important to 
the African continent given the enormous role of the private sector in economic 
development. Nigeria must thus put in place an effective corporate governance system, to 
set a good example to many African countries, who are looking up to the African 
economic giant. 
 
While South Africa seems to be leading the debate (Vaughn and Ryan 2006), Nigeria 
catches up a step further with this research.  Corporate governance developments in 
Nigeria are also becoming increasingly notable in the African corporate governance 
literature. However what is happening in other African countries? Apart from Mensah et 
al. (2003) who documented the prevalence of corruption in the Ghanaian corporate 
governance regime and Abdel and Shahira (2002) as well as Boutros-Ghali (2002) who 
examined the corporate governance structure and practice of Egypt, there are limited 
academic discourses on corporate governance developments in most countries in Africa. 
What is happening in Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Cape Verde, and Gambia? The author hopes that this 
thesis will encourage further research into corporate governance developments in other 
African jurisdictions where the subject is even at a more infantry state. However, future 
studies on corporate governance in Africa must be weary of Anglo-Saxon ideological 
transplantation. In promoting good corporate governance in Africa, future studies should 
aim to be profound and must account for the complex dynamics of local business 
relationships and culture and their interaction with governance and opportunism in the 
African business enterprise. Again, one size does not fit all! In relation, the author 
advocates for more indigenous initiatives in order to tackle Africa’s specific challenges. 
Particularly, African countries should adopt practices which they deem fit in order to 
improve their respective corporate governance systems. 
 
9.4 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY’S SCOPE  
This is a Nigerian case study. As such, whilst this research has important implications for 
developing countries in general, adequate caution must be exercised in making 
generalisations. Although, there may appear to be striking resemblances with regards to 
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the general state of African countries, there abound remarkable differences in their 
history, economic base, political systems, laws, and ethics, which dictate the conduct of 
business and the shaping of corporate governance. However, it is anticipated that this 
thesis adds to the increasing rich resource materials for future studies on corporate 
governance, especially in sub Saharan Africa.   
 
Nevertheless, whilst the findings of this study are not easily generalisable, given its 
contextual dimension, it nevertheless offers significant analytic generalisability (Yin 
2003). In this thesis, the author has also employed a qualitative mixed-method approach 
to data collection and analysis. Future studies may employ alternative methodologies to 
further validate or challenge its findings. Finally, as suggested by Steger and Hartz 
(2005), prescriptions of good corporate governance is not always enough, some further 
efforts should be made to find out and develop some economic and sociological theories 
which may add to our understanding of what is really going on. 
 
9.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS: FOOD FOR THOUGHT FOR CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE RESEARCH 
Pressures from globalisation on one hand and strong forces of institutionalism on the 
other continue to wrestle in comparative corporate governance research and in the debate 
on convergence. Despite global similarities in corporate governance codes of conduct and 
regulatory frameworks, the eventual translation into practice is contingent on the country-
specific structures and processes of enforcement; these lead to different governance 
outcomes. At the “First Global Academic Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate 
Governance” in 2008, Mahbub Zaman presented a paper titled “(F)utility of corporate 
governance reforms: institutional and power analysis of internal audit functions”. Zaman 
argued that corporate governance extends beyond changing structures and processes, but 
has to do with changing individuals – the mind of individuals. Personal ethics is thus 
central to good corporate governance and the efficiency of voluntary codes and 
regulations. Adopting an over-forceful regulatory strategy can be counterproductive as 
corporations may eventually find means of circumventing the legal provisions. Caution 
must thus be especially exercised, with regards to this, in developing countries. Corporate 
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governance reforms should begin to concentrate on affecting the minds. No doubt, this is 
difficult and will take time. However, developing resources to encourage and create an 
ethical environment for governance will be the way to effectively govern our 
corporations in the years to come. The need to take a long term view of regulation in 
corporate behaviour has already been highlighted.  
 
No doubt, corporate governance is a reality, but so may be corporate governance failures. 
Corporate scandals will likely continue to occur although well-considered reforms can 
reduce the likelihood of their occurrences. Subsequently, corporate governance research 
and reforms must have and reflect a long term agenda – not just coming up with findings 
and/or recommendations and wanting immediate results when implemented. 
Furthermore, most discussants would agree that modern corporate governance 
discussions have originated with a shareholder focus. However, the subject has 
encapsulated a variety of other issues that centres on the existence and day to day 
activities of today’s corporations. These have enriched discussions on the subject across 
the globe. However, the findings of this study further bring to the fore the benefits of 
studying the corporate governance systems of less reported economies in the literature, 
whilst employing multi-theoretical lenses, given their conceptual and practical 
implications for a global theory and discourse on corporate governance.  
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Appendix 1: A Summary of the 18 Drivers of Good Corporate Governance 
(Filatotchev et al. 2006: 83-95). 
 
Board independence: … has a significant effect on “critical” organisational decisions, 
such as executive turnover, value-enhancing business strategy, and limitations on anti-take-
over defences.  These “critical” decisions are, in turn, related to efficiency improvement 
and superior performance.  In terms of specific operationalisations of board independence, 
independent board committees and the absence of the CEO duality are essential. The 
presence of a senior (lead) independent director and the proportion of independent directors 
have median importance, whereas the large board size is also a relatively less important 
factor...…. high proportion of executive directors on board might be detrimental for “good” 
governance.  
 
The diversity, human and social capital within the board: … boards can extend their 
involvement beyond monitoring and controlling top management to the provision of 
ongoing advice and counsel to executive directors on strategic issues….  In terms of 
specific operationalisations of board diversity and its human and social capital 
independence, human capital of independent board members (experience, expertise, 
reputation), board directors’ heterogeneity in terms of human capital (education, 
expertise, etc.) are very important. International experience among independent directors 
is also advantageous. The number of network ties to other firms and external 
constituencies are quite important, whereas board directors’ heterogeneity in terms of 
gender and age are relatively less important factors.  
 
High engagement in board processes:  the extensive and timely provision of 
information to independent directors is widely considered as a “good” governance 
driver…… Also the “board’s focus on strategic controls (growth of market share, 
competitiveness)”and information-related drivers of “good” governance, such as regular 
communications among board members, vertical and horizontal information flows, etc., 
are generally important. Independent directors’ social ties with the CEO are a sign of bad 
governance. 
Presence of large-block shareholders: has a significant effect on “critical” 
organisational decisions, such as executive turnover, value-enhancing business strategy, 
and limitations on anti-take-over defences….various associations of institutional 
investors play strong governance roles, as do individual blockholders and family owners.  
Shareholder activism: shareholder activism, or direct involvement of shareholders in 
“critical” decisions, may be another important driver of “good” governance. Investors’ 
active involvement in revisions of executive compensation and board/management 
turnover are very important, as well as regular discussions with board members on strategy 
issues and “good” voting practices.  
 
Breadth and depth of public information disclosure: information disclosure is a 
significant driver of corporate governance….  More broadly, information on employment 
and environmental policies are important prerequisites for promoting corporate social 
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responsibility and socially responsible investment as governance mechanisms…….. 
Annual reports with general information, as well as particular sorts of information on 
corporate governance, operating and financial reviews, and related party transactions were 
important aspects of disclosure.  
  
Breadth and depth of private information sharing…the flow of private information to 
large investors, fund managers, and analysts is good governance practice.  In terms of 
private information, it is not the provision of information to fund managers and analysts 
that is highly important but the provision of internal information to boards 
themselves….both public and private information flows are key drivers of good corporate 
governance and that it complements various other mechanisms. 
 
Independence of the external auditors: auditors’ independence promotes the quality and 
integrity of information provision and disclosure.  Evidence stresses the prevention of 
conflicts of interest by restricting non-audit tasks.  Other devices such as rotation of 
auditors, shareholder involvement or unconstrained legal liability are moderately important.   
 
Competence of the audit committee: in tandem with auditor independence, oversight by a 
professionally qualified audit committee has positive effects on the intensity and quality of 
the audit process….nominal independence of audit committee members is insufficient to 
improve audit quality without sufficient qualification…..professional qualification, 
reporting of the committee to shareholders and board involvement in the appointment of 
auditors are highly important. 
 
Presence of internal control systems and support of whistleblowing: having adequate 
systems of financial controls and risk management are a driver of good corporate 
governance.  It might also be noted that the literature often lacks detailed codification of 
what constitutes good systems of internal control, as these are often very specific to the 
firm.  However, the literature also stresses that the integrity of such systems may be 
enhanced by support and protection of whistleblowers with inside information to form 
internal checks and balances, particularly where ethical misconduct or fraud is an issue.   
Long-term performance-related incentives: While there is still apparent dispute 
between academic literature as to whether pay and incentives provide stronger links with 
performance, long-term incentive plan and performance related bonus as against share 
option schemes help in promoting good corporate governance and long-term objectives 
Transparent and independent control of the remunerations committee: High levels 
of disclosure come top in good corporate governance drivers.  Shareholders should be 
able to see within the remuneration report details of pay for individuals and details of 
incentives schemes along with performance conditions.  This is not just confined to the 
performance conditions but also the company must provide an analysis of the methods 
used to assess whether the performance conditions have been met with an explanation of 
why those methods were chosen.   
 
An active market for corporate control: The role of the market for corporate control 
has been highly controversial within the corporate governance literature.  Empirical 
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research does not provide strong evidence for a positive effect on the long-term 
shareholder returns.  As such, the disciplinary role of takeovers must be considered a 
governance mechanism “of last resort.”  However, management and business strategy 
research suggests that M&A may play an important role in managing certain 
organisational transitions as the firm grows, matures and declines.  These “critical” 
decisions are, in turn, related to efficiency improvement and superior performance. 
 
Transparency and protection for shareholders and stakeholders during mergers and 
acquisitions: ….to function effectively, the market for corporate control must be 
characterized by high transparency and fair treatment of various shareholders, including 
protection of minority shareholders…..the protection of employee rights and firm-specific 
human capital are important in minimizing “breaches of trust” and undermining 
cooperation and commitments within companies…….Transparency and equal treatment of 
shareholders are highly important as well as One-share / one-vote principles.  
 
Board power regarding takeover bids, subject to shareholder veto: The literature on 
takeovers suggests that the board should play a substantial role in the takeover process.  
Empirical research showed that while some sorts of takeover defences may destroy firm 
value, the complete neutrality of the board is likely to be unrealistic and undesirable.  
Managers should be able to say “no,” but not say “never” regarding takeover bids….the 
board should play an active role in takeovers rather than being neutral, but board actions 
should also be subject to some oversight or final power by the shareholders.  Various anti-
takeover devices and defensive actions are inappropriate. 
Stakeholder involvement within corporate governance: the economics and corporate 
finance literature does not assign much role to stakeholders as drivers of corporate 
governance, with the exception of debtholders. Employees and debtholders are the two 
most important drivers of corporate governance among the various stakeholder parties.   
Voice mechanisms for debtholders: Debtholder voice is an important driver of “good” 
corporate governance.  The finance literature stresses the potential monitoring role of 
banks, particularly as a substitute for the market for corporate control.   In terms of specific 
operationalisations, direct voice based and formal contractual mechanisms are important.   
 
Employee participation in financial outcomes and collective voice in decision-
making: Employee participation is widely considered as an important driver of “good” 
corporate governance by supporting firm-specific investment of employees and 
alignment of incentives with those of shareholders or managers.  In terms of specific 
operationalisations of employee participation, share ownership, voice via pension funds 
and via consultative committees such as works councils, are very important.   
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Appendix 2: Useful Extracts from the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 
1990 
 
CAMA is an Act to establish the Corporate Affairs Commission, provide for the 
incorporation of companies and incidental matters, registration of business names and the 
incorporation of trustees of certain communities, bodies and associations. 
 
Part VIII 
Directors and Secretaries of the company  
Chapter 1 
Directors  
Appointment of Directors  
246.   (1) Every company registered on or after the commencement of this Decree shall 
have at least two directors and every company registered before that date shall before the  
expiration of 6 months from the commencement of this Decree have at least two 
directors.  
          (2) Any company whose number of directors falls below two shall within one 
month of its so falling appoint new directors and shall not carry on business after the 
expiration of one month, unless such new directors are appointed. 
    (3)  A director or member of a company who knows that a company carries on 
business after the number of directors has fallen below two for more than 60 day shall be 
liable for all liabilities and debts incurred by the company during that period when the 
company so carried on business. 
248.   (1) The members at the annual general meeting shall have power to re-elect or  
reject directors and appoint new ones.   
249.   (1) The board of directors shall have power to appoint new directors to fill any 
 casual vacancy arising out of death, resignation, retirement or removal. 
251.   (1) The shareholding qualification for directors may be fixed by the articles of  
association of the company and unless and until so fixed no shareholding qualification 
shall be required. 
252.   (1)  Any person who is appointed or to his knowledge proposed to be appointed  
director of a public company and who is 70 or more years old shall disclose this fact to 
the members at the general meeting. 
Removal of Directors 
262.   (1)  A company may by ordinary resolution remove a director before the expiration  
of his period of office, notwithstanding anything in its articles or in any agreement 
between it and him.  
    (2) A special notice shall be required for any resolution to remove a director under 
this section, or to appoint some other person instead of a director so removed, at the 
meeting at which he is removed, and on receipt of notice of an intended resolution to 
remove a director under this section, the company shall forthwith send a copy of it to the 
director concerned, and the director (whether or not he is a member of the company) shall 
be entitled to be heard on the resolution at the meeting.   
Remuneration and other payments 
267.   (1) The remuneration of the directors shall from time to time be determined by the 
 company in general meeting and such remuneration shall be deemed to accrue from day 
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 to day. 
(2) The directors may also be paid all travelling, hotel and other expenses properly 
 incurred by them in attending and returning from meetings of the directors or any 
committee of the directors or general meetings of the company or in connection with the 
business of the company. 
         (6)  A director who receives more money than he is entitled to, shall be guilty of 
misfeasance and shall be accountable to the company for such money.  
  (7)  The remunerations of directors shall be apportionable.    
Disclosure of directors' interests  
275.    (1) Every company shall keep a register showing as respects each director of the  
company (not being its holding shareholding company) the number, description and 
amount of any shares etc in or debentures of the company or any other body corporate, 
being the company's subsidiary or holding company, or a subsidiary of the company's 
holding company, which are had by or in trust for him or of which he has any right to 
become the holder (whether on payment or not): 
Duties of Directors 
279.   (1) A director of a company stands in a fiduciary directors relationship towards the  
company and shall observe the utmost good faith towards the company in any transaction 
with it or on its behalf. 
          (3) A director shall act at all times in what he believes to be the best interests of the 
company as a whole so as to preserve its assets, further its business, and promote the 
purposes for which it was formed, and in such manner as a faithful, diligent, careful and 
ordinarily skilful director would act in the circumstances.   
Part XI  
Financial Statement and Audit  
Chapter l 
Financial Statements  
Accounting records  
331.  (1) Every company shall cause accounting records to be kept in accordance with  
this section. 
         (2) The accounting records shall be sufficient to show and explain the transactions 
of the company  
332.  (1) The accounting records of a company shall be kept at its registered office or  
such other place in Nigeria as the directors think fit, and shall at all times be open to 
inspection by the officers of the company. 
333.   (1) If a company fails to comply with any provision of section 331 or 332(1) of this  
Act, every officer of the company who is in default shall be guilty of an offence unless he 
shows that he acted honestly and that in the circumstances in which the business of the 
company was carried on, the default was excusable. 
  (2) An officer of a company shall be guilty of an offence if he fails to take all  
reasonable steps, for securing compliance by the company with section 332 of this Act, or 
has intentionally caused any default by the company under it. 
  (3) A person guilty of an offence under this section, shall be liable to imprisonment  
for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine of ₦500. 
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Appendix 3: Relevant extracts from the SEC code 
Part A- THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
1. COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
As much as possible, the Board should be composed in such a way as to ensure diversity 
of experience without compromising compatibility, integrity, availability, and 
independence. 
(a) The Board should comprise of a mix of Executive and Non- Executive Directors 
headed by a Chairman of the Board, so however as not to exceed 15 persons or be less 
than 5 persons in total. 
(b) The members of the Board should be individuals with upright personal characteristics 
and relevant core competences, preferably with a record of tangible achievement, 
knowledge on board matters, a sense of accountability, integrity, commitment to the task 
of corporate governance and institution building, while also having an entrepreneurial 
bias. 
(c) Executive directors' remuneration should be set by a Remuneration Committee made 
up wholly or mainly of non-executive directors. 
 
2. CHAIRMAN & CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER POSITIONS 
(a) A Board should not be dominated by an individual. Responsibilities at the top of a 
company should be well defined. 
(b) The position of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer should ideally be separated 
and held by different persons. A combination of the two positions in an individual 
represents an undue concentration of power. 
(c) In exceptional circumstances where the positions of the Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer are combined in one individual, there should be a strong non-executive 
independent director as Vice Chairman of the Board. 
(d) The Chairman's primary responsibility is to ensure effective operation of the Board 
and should as far as possible maintain a distance from the day-to-day operations of the 
company, which should be the primary responsibility of the Chief Executive Officer and 
the management team. 
 
3. PROCEEDINGS & FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS 
(a) To maintain effective control over the company and monitor the executive and 
management, the board should meet regularly, and not less than once in a quarter with 
sufficient notices, and have a formal schedule of matters specifically reserved for its 
decision. 
(b) Company meetings should be conducted in such a manner as to allow free flowing 
discussions. There should be enough time allocated to shareholders to speak and to 
enable them contribute effectively at the Annual General Meeting. 
 
5. NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 
Non-executive directors should be of such calibre as to make constructive contributions 
and for their views to carry significant weight in the board's deliberations. 
(i) Non-executive directors should bring independent judgement to bear on issues of 
strategy, performance, resources, including key appointments, and standards of conduct. 
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(ii) Directors' service contracts should not exceed three years without shareholders' 
approval. 
(iii) Non-Executive directors should not be dependent on the company for their income 
other than their director's fees and allowances. The non-executive directors should ideally 
be independent and not be involved in business relationships with the company that could 
fetter or encumber their independent judgment. 
 
6. EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 
(a) There should be full and clear disclosure of directors' total emoluments and those of 
the chairman and highest-paid director, including pension contributions and stock options 
where the earnings are in excess of ₦500,000. 
(b) Executive directors should not play an active role in the determination of their 
remuneration. 
 
7. COMPENSATION OF BOARD MEMBERS 
(a) The remuneration of Executive Directors should be fixed by the Board and not in 
shareholders' meetings. 
(b) There should be remuneration committees, wholly or mainly composed of non-
executive/independent directors and chaired by a non-executive director, to recommend 
the remuneration of executive directors. 
 
8. REPORTING & CONTROL 
(a) There is an overriding need to promote transparency in financial and non-financial 
reporting. 
(b) It is the Board's duty to present a balanced, reasonable and transparent assessment of 
the Company's position. 
(c) The prime responsibility for good internal controls lies with the Board. 
(d) The Board should ensure that an objective and professional relationship is maintained 
with the auditors. External Auditors should not be involved in business relationships with 
the company. 
(e) The Board should establish an audit committee of at least three non-executive 
directors with written terms of reference, which deal clearly with its authority and duties. 
 
Part  B- THE SHAREHOLDERS 
 
9. SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS & PRIVILEGES 
 (a) The company acting through the Directors should ensure that shareholders' statutory 
and general rights are protected at all times. 
(b) Shareholders should remain responsible for electing Directors and approving the 
terms and conditions of their directorships. 
(f) The Board should ensure that decisions reached at the general meetings are 
implemented. 
(g) The Board should ensure that all shareholders are treated equally; and that no 
shareholder should be given preferential treatment or superior access to information or 
other materials. 
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Appendix 4: Relevant Extracts from the Code of Conduct for Shareholders’ 
Associations in Nigeria 
The code is designed to ensure that association members uphold high ethical standards 
and make positive contributions in ensuring that the affairs of public companies are run in 
an ethical and transparent manner and also in compliance with the Code of Corporate 
Governance for public companies. 
 
1. ESTABLISHMENT AND MEMBERSHIP OF SHAREHOLDERS’ ASSOCIATIONS 
(a) A body of not less than 50 shareholders of public companies may be established for 
the purpose of advancing the interest of its members and influencing the standard of 
corporate governance to optimise shareholder value. 
(b) The body of shareholders so established shall be registered with the Corporate Affairs 
Commission with not less than 5 persons as trustees. 
(c) Membership of a Shareholders Association shall be open to all shareholders on a 
voluntary basis. 
(d) The Shareholders’ Association shall have a constitution or bye-laws which shall 
govern the operation and membership of the Association. 
(e) The Association shall have an Executive Committee of not more than 10 officers 
constituted through an electoral process.  
(h) The Association shall file annual returns to the CAC and comply with other 
provisions of the CAMA, 1990 in relation to incorporated trustees. It shall also file an 
annual report of its activities with the SEC. 
(i) The Association shall meet periodically at least twice a year. 
(j) The Association shall respect and properly comply with all laws, regulations, 
standards, norms and code of practice appropriate to it. 
(k) The Shareholders’ Associations shall recognize their duty to the industry in which 
their companies operate and the need to maintain the integrity of the financial market as 
well as the general corporate governance standards. 
(l) A member/or officer of a Shareholders’ Associations’ shall not engage in conduct 
which is dishonest or which may otherwise bring the Association into disrepute. 
 
3. MEMBERSHIP OF AUDIT COMMITTEE 
(a) Shareholders should ensure that members who are elected into the audit committee of 
their company have knowledge of accounting and internal control processes. 
(b) Membership of Audit Committee shall be one term of three (3) years subject to good 
performance provided that such shareholders shall not be eligible for re-election until the 
expiration of 3 years after his term. 
(c) Shareholders through the shareholders’ association should ensure that the internal 
control systems of the companies in which they are shareholders, are effective. 
 
4. All Shareholders’ Associations shall adopt this code of conduct in their constitution 
and the regulatory authorities would only recognize Shareholders’ Associations which 
comply with the provisions of this Code. 
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Appendix 5: Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post 
Consolidation  
 
PART II: CODE OF BEST PRACTICES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
5.0 Code of Corporate Governance Practices for Banks Post Consolidation 
5.1 Equity Ownership 
5.1.2 Government direct and indirect equity holding in any bank shall be limited to 10 
percent by end of 2007. 
5.1.3 An equity holding of above 10 percent by any investor is subject to CBN’s prior 
approval. 
 
5.2 Organisational Structure 
5.2.0 Executive Duality 
5.2.1 The responsibilities of the head of the Board, that is the Chairman, should be clearly 
separated from that of the head of Management, i.e. MD/CEO, such that no one 
individual/related party has unfettered powers of decision making by occupying the two 
positions at the same time. 
5.2.2 No one person should combine the post of Chairman/Chief Executive Officer of 
any bank. For the avoidance of doubt, also no executive vice-chairman is recognised in 
the structure. 
5.2.3 No two members of the same extended family should occupy the position of 
Chairman and that of Chief Executive Officer or Executive Director of a bank at the same 
time. 
 
5.3 Quality of Board Membership 
5.3.1 Institutions should be headed by an effective Board composed of qualified 
individuals that are conversant with its oversight functions. 
5.3.2 Existing CBN guidelines on appointment to the board of financial institutions 
should continue to be observed. Only people of proven integrity and who are 
knowledgeable in business and financial matters should be on the Board. 
5.3.4 The Board should have the latitude to hire independent consultants to advise it on 
certain issues and the cost borne by the banks. 
5.3.5 The number of non-executive directors should be more than that of executive 
directors subject to a maximum board size of 20 directors. 
5.3.6 At least two (2) non-executive board members should be independent directors 
(who do not represent any particular shareholder interest and hold no special business 
interest with the bank) appointed by the bank on merit. 
5.3.7 A committee of non-executive directors should determine the remuneration of 
executive directors. 
5.3.10 In order to ensure both continuity and injection of fresh ideas, non-executive 
directors should not remain on the board of a bank continuously for more than 3 terms of 
4 years each, i.e. 12 years. 
5.3.11 Banks should have clear succession plans for their top executives. 
5.3.12 There should be, as a minimum, the following board committees – Risk 
Management Committee, Audit Committee, and the Credit Committee. 
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5.3.13 The practice of the Board Chairman serving simultaneously as chairman/member 
of any of the board committees is against the concept of independence and sound 
corporate governance practice, and should be discontinued. 
 
5.4 Board Performance Appraisal 
5.4.2 Each Board should identify and adopt, in the light of the company’s future strategy, 
its critical success factors or key strategic objectives. 
5.4.3 Boards should determine the skills, knowledge and experience that members require 
to achieve those objectives. 
5.4.5 There should be annual Board and Directors’ review/appraisal covering all aspects 
of the Board’s structure and composition, responsibilities, processes and relationships, as 
well as individual members’ competencies and respective roles in the Board’s 
performance. 
5.4.6 The review should be carried out by an outside consultant. 
5.4.7 The review report is to be presented at the AGM and a copy sent to the CBN. 
 
5.5 Quality of Management 
5.5.1 Appointments to top management positions should be based on merit rather than 
some other considerations. 
 
6.0 Industry Transparency, Due Process, Data Integrity and Disclosure 
Requirements 
6.1.2 Where board directors and companies/entities/persons related to them are engaged 
as service providers or suppliers to the bank, full disclosure of such interests should be 
made to the CBN. 
6.1.4 False rendition to CBN shall attract very stiff sanction of fine plus suspension of the 
CEO for six months in the first instance and removal and blacklisting in the second. In 
addition, the erring staff would be referred to the relevant professional body for 
disciplinary action. 
6.1.6 All insider credit applications pertaining to directors and top management staff (i.e. 
AGM and above) and parties related to them, irrespective of size, should be sent for 
consideration/approval to the Board Credit Committee. 
6.1.7 The Board Credit Committee should have neither the Chairman of the Board nor the 
MD as its chairman. 
6.1.8 Any director whose facility or that of his/her related interests remains non-
performing for more than one year should cease to be on the board of the bank and could 
be blacklisted from sitting on the board of any other bank. 
 
7.0 Risk Management 
7.1.1 The Board/Board Risk Management Committee should establish policies on risk 
oversight and management. 
7.1.2 Banks should put in place a risk management framework including a risk 
management unit that should be headed by a Senior Executive, in line with the directive 
of the Board Risk Management Committee. 
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7.1.3 The internal control system should be documented and designed to achieve 
efficiency and effectiveness of operations; reliability of financial reporting, and 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations at all levels of the bank. 
7.1.4 External auditors should render reports to the CBN on banks’ risk management 
practices, internal controls and level of compliance with regulatory directives. 
 
8.0 Role of Auditors 
8.1.0 Internal Auditors 
8.1.1 Internal auditors should be largely independent, highly competent and people of 
integrity. 
8.1.2 The Head of Internal Audit should not be below the rank of AGM and should be a 
member of a relevant professional body. 
8.1.3 He should report directly to the Board Audit Committee but forward a copy of the 
report to the MD/CEO of the bank. Quarterly reports of audit must be made to the Audit 
Committee, and made available to examiners on field visits. 
8.1.4 Members of the Board Audit Committee should be nonexecutive directors and 
ordinary shareholders appointed at AGM and some of them should be knowledgeable in 
internal control processes. One of such appointed ordinary shareholders should serve as 
the Chairman of the Committee. 
 
8.2.0 External Auditors 
8.2.1 External auditors should maintain arms-length relationship with the banks they 
audit. 
8.2.2 Appointment of External Auditors will continue to be approved by the CBN. 
8.2.3 The tenure of the auditors in a given bank shall be for a maximum period of ten 
years after which the audit firm shall not be reappointed in the bank until after a period of 
another ten years. 
8.2.4 A bank’s external auditors should not provide the following services to their clients: 
 
1. Bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements 
of the audit client; 
2. Appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinion or contribution-in-kind reports; 
3. Actuarial services; 
4. Internal audit outsourcing services; 
5. Management or human resource functions including broker or dealer, investment 
banking services and legal or expert services unrelated to the audit contract. 
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Appendix 6: Experts’ Interview Questionnaire 
 
1. How important are the following national (macro) environments in terms of promoting 
“good corporate governance” in Nigeria: Political, Social, Economic and Legal. Please 
suggest other national environments that are important for promoting “good corporate 
governance in Nigeria.”  
2. How important are the following industry (meso) environments in terms of promoting 
“good corporate governance” in Nigeria: Values, Culture , Ethics and History. 
Please suggest other industry environments that are important for promoting “good 
corporate governance in Nigeria.”  
3. How important are the following firm-level (micro) environments in terms of 
promoting “good corporate governance” in Nigeria: Values, Culture , Ethics and 
History. Please suggest other firm-level environments that are important for promoting 
“good corporate governance in Nigeria.” 
4. Are these institutional forces weakening in terms on their effects on “good corporate 
governance in Nigeria”? Which one (s) and to what extent? 
5. How important are the governance mechanisms of other countries (especially the UK, 
USA, Japan, China and India) on Nigeria’s governance system? 
6. How important is the UK’s colonial influence/Nigeria’s traditional mimicking of the 
UK legislation on its present state of corporate governance?  
7. Considering the recent note-worthy investments of Japan and China into Nigeria, how 
important are these developments in terms of these countries pushing their respective 
governance’s standards and practices to influence those of Nigeria? 
8. Pressures for the embracement of global standards of good corporate governance 
seem to be on the increase. How important are the following key corporate 
governance standards drivers in the shaping of good corporate governance in Nigeria? 
- World Bank, IFC, IMF, OECD and CACG. 
9. How do you regard current Nigeria’s regulation regarding corporate governance in the 
following areas: Protection of minority shareholder interests; Facilitating shareholder 
activism; Increasing information disclosure; Raising effectiveness of the Board of 
Directors ; Promoting appropriate incentives in executive pay; Raising effectiveness 
of auditors; Improving internal control systems ; Regulating the market for corporate 
control; Promoting corporate social  responsibility 
10. How do you regard the efficiencies of the following governance “watch dogs” in 
promoting good corporate governance regulation in Nigeria? - CAC, SEC, NSE, CBN, 
NDIC, ISAN, NSSA, NASB, ICAN, ANAN and the IIA. Please suggest other watch-
dogs as regards their efficiencies in promoting “good corporate governance” in Nigeria. 
11. How do you regard the efficiency of the Federal Government in promoting/ensuring 
good corporate governance regulation in Nigeria?  
12. How do you regard the role/policies of the Federal Government in corporate 
governance, in terms of its effects on corporate independence and flexibility?  
13. How important are the following aspects of board structure and board characteristics in 
terms of promoting “good corporate governance” in Nigeria: Board size ; A high 
proportion of independent board members; A high proportion of executive directors; 
Separation of the roles of CEO and board Chairman; Independent nomination, 
remuneration and audit committees; Presence of a senior (lead) independent director; 
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Number of network ties to other firms and external constituencies; Human capital of 
independent board members  (experience, expertise, reputation); Board directors’ 
heterogeneity in terms of human capital (education, expertise, etc); and Board 
directors’ heterogeneity in terms of gender and age. Please indicate any other aspects of 
board structure or any other board characteristics that you consider important for “good 
corporate governance” in Nigeria.  
14. How important are the following board processes in terms of promoting “good 
corporate governance” in Nigeria: Regular evaluation of board members; Frequency 
and lengths of board meetings; Regular meetings of independent directors (separately 
from board meetings); Regular communications with major shareholders/investors; 
Board focus on financial controls (accounting performance, TSR, EPS etc); Board 
focus on strategic controls (growth of market share, competitive advantage); Directors’ 
financial incentives, including cash and equity-based incentives ; Imposing age and 
term limits for independent directors; Imposing age and term limits for executive 
directors; Extensive and timely provision of information to independent directors; 
Bottom-up information flow from functional departments to independent directors; 
Using specialist recruitment companies when recruiting new board member; and 
Independent directors’ social ties with CEO/executive directors . Please indicate any 
other factors related to board processes that you consider important for “good corporate 
governance” in Nigeria.  
15. How effective are the following types of shareholders in terms of promoting “good 
corporate governance” in Nigeria: Pension funds, mutual funds, foundations, corporate 
pension funds; Banks; Insurance companies; Private equity investors; Individual 
(non-family) blockholders; Family blockholders; and Dispersed individual 
shareholders Please indicate any other types of shareholders that you consider 
important in promoting “good corporate governance.”  
16. How important are the following aspects of shareholder activism in terms of promoting 
“good corporate governance” in Nigeria: Publicly criticizing board members; 
Influencing board and management turnover; Influencing revisions of executive 
compensation; Regular discussions with board members of strategy issues (M&A, 
etc.); Maintaining stable shareholding; Voting at the AGM; Use of electronic voting 
systems; Disclosure of voting at shareholder meetings; and Use of lawsuits against 
managers and  auditors for negligence or breaches of duty. Please indicate any other 
aspects of shareholder activism that you consider important in terms of promoting 
“good corporate governance in Nigeria.”  
17. How important are the following executive pay related items and processes in terms of 
promoting “good corporate governance” in Nigeria: Performance-related bonus ; Share 
option incentive scheme; Long term incentive plan; Non-remuneration based incentives 
(e.g. firm’s pension contribution); Caps on the size of executive pay; Shareholders to 
vote on remuneration; Incentives tied to performance targets; Issuing “out of the 
money” options; High levels of pay disclosure; Remuneration committee’s access to 
external profession advice ; and The costs of issuing share options clearly shown in the 
annual report and accounts. Please indicate any other executive pay related items and 
processes that you consider important in promoting “good corporate governance in 
Nigeria.”  
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18. How important are the following forms of public and private disclosure of information 
in terms of promoting “good corporate governance” in Nigeria: Annual report and 
related documents; Quarterly or monthly reports; Operating and financial reviews; 
Information specifically on corporate governance (e.g. director’s pay); Information on 
related party transactions; Information on corporate social responsibility; Information 
on employment policies; Information on environmental policies; Audit committee’s 
oversight of publicly disclosed information; Private information to key investors; 
Private information to analysts; Vertical information flows between  the board and 
function departments; Horizontal information flows between functional departments; 
Provision of information to employees and other stakeholders. Please indicate any other 
aspects of public and private information disclosure that you consider important in 
promoting “good corporate governance in Nigeria.”  
19. How important are the following audit related items and mechanisms for internal 
control in terms of promoting “good corporate governance” in Nigeria: Board approval 
of external auditor appointment; Shareholders’ vote on appointment of the external 
auditor; Regular rotation of appointed external auditor; Professionally qualified 
members on the audit committee; Reporting from the audit committee to shareholders; 
Restriction on the quantity of “non-audit” tasks involving external auditors; 
Unconstrained legal liability of auditors; Risk management systems; Financial control 
and budgeting systems; Support and protection of “whistleblowers”. Please indicate 
any other audit related items or internal control mechanism that you consider important 
in promoting “good corporate governance” in Nigeria. 
20. Leaving aside potential issues of anti-trust and competition policy, how important are 
the following aspects of the market for corporate control in promoting “good corporate 
governance” in Nigeria: An active M&A market; Hostile takeovers; Leveraged buy-
outs (LBO); Management buy-outs (MBO); Public-to-private transactions; Mandatory 
bid rule; Principle of equal treatment of shareholders; Transparency of ownership and 
control (inc. defensive measures); Squeeze out and sell-out rules ; One-share / one-vote 
principle; Break-through rules; Payment through cash; Payment through share swaps; 
Payment through debt (e.g. LBO); Protection of firm-specific assets during M&A; 
Protection of employee interests during M&A; Establishment of an international “level 
playing field” that reduces takeover barriers; Ability to “ring fence” target firms from 
acquirers in countries with higher takeover barriers. Please suggest other aspects that 
you consider important in promoting an effective market for corporate control in 
Nigeria. 
21. How important is the involvement in company decision-making process of the each of 
the following stakeholders in terms of promoting “good corporate governance” in 
Nigeria: Debtholders; Employees; Customers; Suppliers; Local communities; NGOs; 
and the government? Please suggest other stakeholders who are important for 
promoting “good corporate governance in Nigeria. 
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